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Abstract. Gene drive technology offers the promise for a high-impact, cost-effective, and durable method to control
malaria transmission that would make a signiﬁcant contribution to elimination. Gene drive systems, such as those based
on clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/CRISPR associated protein, have the potential to
spread beneﬁcial traits through interbreeding populations of malaria mosquitoes. However, the characteristics of this
technology have raised concerns that necessitate careful consideration of the product development pathway. A multi-
disciplinaryworking groupconsidered the implications of low-threshold genedrive systemson the development pathway
described in the World Health Organization Guidance Framework for testing genetically modiﬁed (GM) mosquitoes,
focusing on reduction ofmalaria transmission byAnopheles gambiae s.l. mosquitoes in Africa as a case study. The group
developed recommendations for the safe and ethical testing of gene drive mosquitoes, drawing on prior experience with
other vector control tools, GM organisms, and biocontrol agents. These recommendations are organized according to a
testing plan that seeks to maximize safety by incrementally increasing the degree of human and environmental exposure
to the investigational product. As with biocontrol agents, emphasis is placed on safety evaluation at the end of physically
conﬁned laboratory testing as a major decision point for whether to enter ﬁeld testing. Progression through the testing
pathway is based on fulﬁllment of safety and efﬁcacy criteria, and is subject to regulatory and ethical approvals, aswell as
social acceptance. Theworking group identiﬁedseveral resources thatwere considered important to support responsible
ﬁeld testing of gene drive mosquitoes.
INTRODUCTION
Mosquitoes modiﬁed with gene drive systems are being
proposed as new tools that will complement current prac-
tices aimed at reducing or preventing transmission of
vector-borne diseases such asmalaria. Gene drive systems
have the potential to spread new genetic traits through in-
terbreeding populations of malaria mosquitoes from low
initial introductions (Figure 1), and the transgenic construct
could persist in those mosquitoes indeﬁnitely or until the
target mosquito population is locally eliminated. Having
observed naturally occurring drive mechanisms in insects
and other organisms, scientists speculated for decades
about how these mechanisms could be harnessed to in-
sert beneﬁcial traits into a population of vector mosquitoes
to create a high-impact, low-cost, sustainable tool for
controlling disease transmission.1 With the advent of new
molecular tools for modifying mosquitoes,2 a mechanism
was envisioned to use synthetic genes with the capability
of spreading in populations, even if they confer a ﬁtness
cost (driving transgenes). The envisioned goal for apply-
ing this technology is to reduce or eliminate vector mos-
quito populations or, alternatively, to render them less
competent to transmit pathogens. Either of these out-
comes should contribute to disease reduction. However,
the characteristics that make gene drive technology so
attractive as a cost-effective and durable vector control
tool raise questions about possible adverse effects on
human or animal health or the environment that must be
seriously considered in product development.
Several mechanisms are being examined to achieve gene
drive.3,4 Until recently, the attempted methods either did not
work in mosquitoes or were difﬁcult to engineer5,6; however,
discovery of the clustered regularly interspaced short palin-
dromic repeats (CRISPR)/CRISPRassociated protein 9 (Cas9)
system for gene editing has provided a widely accessible and
versatile molecular tool for creating driving transgenes.7 The
use of CRISPR/Cas9 in mosquitoes follows from an idea,
conceived in 2003, that naturally occurring genes producing
homing endonuclease enzymes that target and cut speciﬁc
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences could be used to
create gene drive.8 Conceptually, constructs incorporating
the CRISPR/Cas9 system spread in the same way as these
natural endonuclease genes, but the easymanipulation of the
guide ribonucleic acid (RNA) that speciﬁcally selects the site
where the chromosomecut occurs allows for the targeting of a
*Address correspondence to Stephanie James, Foundation for the
National Institutes of Health, 11400 Rockville Pike, Suite 600, North
Bethesda, MD 20852. E-mail: sjames@fnih.org
†These recommendations represent the collective effort of working
group members. They reﬂect a consensus opinion, acknowledging
that individual participants had differing views on some issues. The
issues addressed here are complex and cover a wide range of
potential gene drive technologies. Therefore, these recommendations
will need tobe interpreted in a case-by-casemanner dependingon the
nature of the investigational gene drive products and the environment
where they are to be tested. The working group members agree that
these recommendations provide important context and direction for
further planning.
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greater range of gene sequences. Computational model-
ing based on other gene drive systems suggests that the type
of drive that can be achieved with the CRISPR/Cas9 system
can be so effective that release of low numbers of modiﬁed
mosquitoes into the environment could result in establish-
ment of the genetic modiﬁcation in the natural interbreeding
population (P. A. Welkhoff, personal communication).9,10 Al-
though still in the process of being optimized, such mosqui-
toes have already been developed in the laboratory with the
ultimate intent of testing in the ﬁeld.11,12Computer simulations
and population genetic analyses suggest that gene drive
strategies for reducing or modifying the population of vector
mosquitoes both have the potential to provide a transformative
new tool for conquering malaria and to make a valuable con-
tribution toward the elimination, andultimate eradication, of this
disease.13,14
In 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) released the
Guidance Framework for testing genetically modiﬁed (GM)
mosquitoes (WHO Guidance Framework) that describes a
phased testing pathway and best practices for evaluating GM
mosquitoes (GMM) intended as public health tools.15 The
proposed product development pathway moves from physi-
cally conﬁned (also termed contained) studies in the labora-
tory and insectary (Phase 1) to small-scale physically and/or
ecologically conﬁned ﬁeld-testing (Phase 2). Early small-scale
releases in Phase 2 are intended to allow observation of the
behavior of GMM in natural environments, and thus assess-
ment of entomological endpoints of efﬁcacy, under conditions
that would minimize risk to the environment and/or human
health. Contingent on satisfactory results from conﬁned
testing, the WHO Guidance Framework advocates pro-
ceeding to a series of staged open release trials of increasing
size, duration, and complexity (Phase 3).15 These trials assess
performanceunder various conditions, such asdifferent levels
of pathogen transmission, seasonal variations in mosquito
density, or presence of other disease vectors in the region.
Larger trials in this phase allow measurement of the impact of
GMM on infection and/or disease in human populations, in
addition to entomological endpoints. Following successful
completion of Phase 3, national authorities will determine
whether tomove a speciﬁcGMMproduct into application as a
malaria control tool (Phase 4), which would include ongoing
surveillance of the effectiveness of the product under opera-
tional conditions, accompanied by monitoring of safety under
diverse conditions of use.
New low-threshold‡genedrive technologies, such as those
using the CRISPR/Cas9 system, have broad implications
at multiple phases of the recommended WHO Guidance
Framework testing pathway because of the potential to be self-
sustaining,15 that is, to spreadageneticmodiﬁcation through the
local mosquito population, and for that modiﬁcation to become
established and to persist. Recognizing both the beneﬁts and
risks accompanying this new technology, there have been calls
for additional guidance and oversight before any ﬁeld-testing
begins.7,16,17 The recommendations provided here represent the
response of a multidisciplinary working group that comprised
international experts in mosquito research (including, but not
limited to, molecular entomologists and individuals with ﬁeld ex-
perience in vector ecology and control), as well as experts in
containment/quarantine of exotic arthropods, mathematical
modeling, epidemiology, clinical trial design, statistics, ethics,
regulatory science, and policy (Box 1). Working group mem-
bers considered whether mosquitoes modiﬁed with low-
threshold gene drive could be developed appropriately and
used against malaria, and, if so, the resources and activities
needed to ensure their safe and efﬁcient ﬁeld-testing and
implementation. These consensus recommendations build
primarily on existing guidanceprovidedby theWHOGuidance
Framework,15 but also take into account recommendations
from the report of the National Academies of Science, Engi-
neering, and Medicine (NASEM) Gene Drives on the Horizon:
Advancing Science, Navigating Uncertainty, and Aligning
Research with Public Values (NASEM report),18 which con-
sidered the broader public health, conservation, and agricul-
tural potential of gene drive technology, as well as widely
accepted guiding principles for sponsors and supporters of
gene drive research.19 The recommendations presented here
attempt to envision the entire development pathway for gene
drivemosquitoes, fromdiscovery research to implementation,
to provide a basis for establishment of standards of best
practice before the initiation of any ﬁeld trials. Like the WHO
Guidance Framework15 and NASEM report,18 they are inten-
ded to inform decision-making by researchers, funders, reg-
ulators, and policy-makers. It is anticipated that these
recommendations will be revised and reﬁned as more expe-
rience with gene drive technologies is accumulated.
The investigational product for these recommendations is
considered to be the transgenic mosquito carrying a low-
threshold gene drive system (for convenience, herein referred to
as a gene drivemosquito). Over the course of three face-to-face
meetings, with ongoing discussions between eachmeeting, the
working group systematically examined how utilizing low-
threshold gene drive might inﬂuence the planning and conduct
of each testing phase described in the WHO Guidance Frame-
work.15 This report does not attempt to summarize the detailed
FIGURE 1. Spread of novel traits by gene drive vs. Mendelian
inheritance.
‡The term “threshold” refers to theproportionofmodiﬁedmosquitoes
with respect to the total mosquito population that will reliably initiate
spread of the modiﬁcation to high levels within the local mosquito
population by mating. The goal of gene drive is to rapidly increase the
proportion of vector mosquitoes carrying the beneﬁcial modiﬁcation.
Low-threshold gene drives are deﬁned here to include those that are
predicted to spread from a rare introduction (zero threshold) or low
initial release frequency.
2 JAMES AND OTHERS
information contained within the WHO Guidance Framework,
which was accepted by the working group as the foundation for
the additional considerations related here. Readers are encour-
aged to consult the WHO Guidance Framework for underlying
information on efﬁcacy and biosafety testing, ethics, public en-
gagement, and regulatory issues relevant to GMM.15 The
working group envisioned that these recommendations will be
used as a companion to the earlier WHO guidance.
Scope and rationale. To focus the discussions, the work-
ing group concentrated on the example of malaria trans-
mission in Africa by mosquitoes of the Anopheles gambiae
complex20 (see Box 2).
It was assumed that the transformation event would be
performed in An. gambiae s.s. and later transferred to sibling
species by introgression in the laboratory or by natural hy-
bridization in the ﬁeld.
Anopheles gambiae s.l.mosquitoes are reportedonly on the
African continent.22 This geographic limitation is an important
consideration in evaluating the potential spread of gene drive
approaches targeting these mosquitoes. Although An. gam-
biae s.s. and sibling speciesAn. coluzzi andAn. arabiensis are
major malaria vectors in sub-Saharan Africa, the working
group recognized that other Anopheles species (notably
Anopheles funestus) also transmit malaria, andmay, in certain
situations, contribute a signiﬁcant proportion of the residual
transmission.22,23 Products directed at thesemosquitoes also
will be required for malaria elimination.24
Because of massive deployment of currently available
malaria control tools, Plasmodium falciparum infection prev-
alence in endemic Africa halved and the incidence of clinical
disease fell by 40% between 2000 and 2015.25 Yet, residual
levels of transmission still persist even in places where cov-
erage with existing interventions is already very high.26
According to the most recent World Malaria Report 2017,26
despite best control efforts undertaken to date, therewere 216
(95% conﬁdence interval = 196–263) million cases of malaria
and an estimated 445,000 deaths from malaria in 2016, with
90%of cases and deaths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa and
with a leveling off in the recent decline in malaria mortality. In
2015, malaria killed an estimated 303,000 children under the
age of 5 years globally, and 96% of these deaths occurred in
the African region.26,27 Although the African region has shown
considerable recent progress, malaria remains stubbornly
persistent in some areas and is increasing in others26; the
substantial progress that has been made is fragile and is
threatened by insecticide resistance,28 changes in vector
behavior, resistance to antimalarial therapeutics, and high
ongoing costs of malaria control (estimated at over $6 billion
per year to meet the 2020 target for reduction in malaria
prevalence,26,29–31 with over half the costs going toward
vector control).
Thus, control ofmalaria inAfrica is arguablywhere theuseof
self-sustaining genedrivemosquitoes could yield the greatest
public health beneﬁt, and, therefore, where their initial use
would bemost justiﬁed. Although there are still many issues to
be resolved, initial indications are that low-threshold gene
drive technology, if optimized, has the potential to be readily
deployable across diverse geographical and socioeconomic
areas, including low-incomecommunities and thosewith poor
access to health care, thus protecting millions of people and
achieving extremely high impact over relatively short periods
of time.13 Because of these potential beneﬁts, NASEM and a
BOX 1
Working group composition
Core Working Group Members: participated in all working group activities and authored the recommendations
FrankH.Collins,UniversityofNotreDame;PhilipA.Welkhoff, Institute forDiseaseModeling;ClaudiaEmerson,McMasterUniversity;H.Charles
J.Godfray,OxfordUniversity; BrianGreenwood, LondonSchool ofHygiene&TropicalMedicine; SteveW. Lindsay,DurhamUniversity; Charles
M. Mbogo, Kenya Medical Research Institute; Fredros O. Okumu, Ifakara Health Institute, University of Glasgow, University of the
Witwatersrand; Hector Quemada, Donald Danforth Plant Science Center; Moussa Savadogo, New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD); Jerome A. Singh, Center for the AIDS Program of Research in South Africa; Yeya T. Toure´, University of Sciences, Techniques and
Technologies of Bamako
AdHocWorkingGroupParticipants: attended speciﬁcworking groupmeetings as appropriate to areas of expertise and provided comments
Aggrey Ambali, NEPAD; Mark Benedict, Foundation for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Christophe Boete,* Institut pour
Recherche pour le De´veloppement; Catherine Bourgouin,* Institut Pasteur; Paul De Barro, The Commonwealth Scientiﬁc and Industrial
ResearchOrganisation; Abdoulaye Diabate, Institut de Recherche en Science de la Sante´/CenterMuraz; Azra Ghani, Imperial College London;
Fred Gould, North Carolina State University; Lee Hall, US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Steve Higgs, Kansas State
University; Immo Kleinschmidt, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine; Greg Lanzaro, University of California, Davis; Christian
Lengeler, Swiss Tropical andPublic Health Institute; Jo Lines, LondonSchool of Hygiene & TropicalMedicine; DavidMalone, Innovative Vector
Control Consortium; Kevin Marsh, University of Oxford; LeonardMboera, National Institute for Medical Research Tanzania; AbrahamMnzava,
African Leaders Malaria Alliance; Scott O’Neill, Monash University; Seth Owusu-Agyei, University of Health & Allied Sciences; Malla Rao, US
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases; Larry Slutsker, Program for Appropriate Technology in Health; Willy Tonui, National
Biosafety Authority (NBA) Kenya; Kenneth Vernick, Institut Pasteur
Contributors: provided written or verbal comments or information for working group consideration
Adam Bennett, University of California, San Francisco; Austin Burt, Imperial College, London; Nora Besansky, Notre Dame University; Lorna
Clark, Imperial College London; George Christophides, Imperial College London; Andrea Crisanti, Imperial College London; Anthony James,
University of California, Irvine; John Marshall, University of California, Berkeley; Tony Nolan, Imperial College, London; Nikolai Windbichler,
Imperial College, London
Observers: attended one of more working group meetings
AnneCheever, BoozAllenHamilton andContractor support to theDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency;AdrianaCostero-Saint Denis,
USNational Institute of Allergy and InfectiousDiseases;AnnaDrexler,WorldHealthOrganization (WHO), FlorenceFouque,WHO; Fil Randazzo,
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Mike Reddy, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Emmanuel Temu, WHO; Raman Velayudhan, WHO; Renee
Wegrzyn, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
* Invited at the recommendation of WHO observers
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WHO expert advisory committee have encouraged continued
research on gene drive mosquitoes as a new tool to work
synergistically with other malaria interventions.18,32
Although this working group considered only malaria
transmission by An. gambiae s.l. in Africa, it is expected that
the recommendations related here will have relevance to similar
research on other mosquito vectors of malaria, including those
prevalent in other regions, and on other disease vectors.
However, the testing pathway will need to be reconsidered
according to the speciﬁcs of these other cases.
GENE DRIVE STRATEGIES
As deﬁned in the WHO Guidance Framework, gene drive
approaches that are “self-sustaining” (sometimes termed
“self-propagating”) are intended to spread through the target
mosquito population.15 The drive mechanism must be capa-
ble of overcoming any ﬁtness costs and capable of increasing
in frequency from low initial levels to ﬁxation, or near ﬁxation, in
the population intowhich it was introducedwithin a time frame
that will be meaningful for malaria elimination. Although other,
more limited, approaches are nowbeing considered (seeSelf-
limiting alternatives), this deﬁnition remains valid for low-
threshold gene drive strategies that are the subject of these
recommendations.
There are two major categories of gene drive strategies—
population suppression and population replacement§ (Figure 2).
Computer simulation indicates that both have the potential to
interrupt malaria transmission by the targeted mosquito spe-
cies even in the most challenging settings, and these studies
provide insight into how deployment methods and spatio-
temporal extents can be tailored to local conditions to over-
come obstacles such as extreme seasonality.13
Population suppression strategies are intended to reduce
the size of the vector population to such an extent that it will
not be able to sustain malaria transmission. This is an exten-
sion of the goal of all current vector-control products anddoes
not require driving a population to extinction. Population
suppression strategies are based on inactivation, or knock-
out, of genes involved in the target mosquito’s survival or re-
production (e.g., reducing fertility or production of female
progeny), and/or biasof the sex ratio towardmales. Thesemay
be termed “loss of function” techniques.
Population replacement strategies are intended to reduce the
inherent ability of individual mosquitoes to transmit the malaria
pathogen. These strategiesmay be built around inactivation of a
gene or genes that facilitate parasite survival in the mosquito
vector or that are required for the mosquito to transmit malaria,
such as a tendency to feed on humans. Population replacement
strategies based on inactivation of genes directly involved in
vectorial capacity are also termed “loss of function” tech-
niques. Other population replacement strategies involve the
introduction of a new gene or genes, such as those that
produce effector molecules that will kill the malaria parasite
in the mosquito. To perform successfully, such introduced
genes must be carried into the mosquito genome in tight
linkage with the gene drive mechanism.
Mosquitoes modiﬁed with low-threshold gene drive con-
structs are expected to persist in the environment. Those
strategies aiming for population replacement require the
modiﬁcation to persist at high levels for as long as malaria
continues to be transmitted to achieve their objective. For
those strategies aiming for population suppression, modiﬁed
mosquitoes are expected todecrease to lownumbersover the
period of a few years as the overall population of target
mosquitoes is reduced.Phenotypic traits identiﬁedas relevant
to efﬁcacy and/or safety should be observed in the laboratory
over multiple generations to obtain information on their sta-
bility. Because the anticipated mechanism of action and pe-
riod of environmental exposure will differ among various gene
drive strategies, researchers will be responsible for proposing
an adequateplan for demonstrating thedurability of efﬁcacy in
their regulatory applications. Modeling will provide a critical
BOX 2
The An. gambiae complex
The An. gambiae complex (also known as An. gambiae sensu lato [s.l., in the broad sense]), which includes some of the most important and
efﬁcient vectorsofmalaria in sub-SaharanAfrica, consists of eight namedsibling species that are difﬁcult todistinguishmorphologically but can
be identiﬁed using molecular methods:
An. gambiae sensu stricto (s.s. in the strict sense)
Anopheles amharicus
Anopheles arabiensis
Anopheles bwambae
Anopheles coluzzii
Anopheles melas
Anopheles merus
Anopheles quadriannulatus
The individual species exhibit distinct behavioral and ecological preferences. As examples,An. gambiae s.s. andAn. coluzzii, which are closely
related, feed almost exclusively on humans (anthropophilic), whereas An. quadriannulatus takes its blood meal from animals (zoophilic).
Anopheles melas and An. merus can breed in salt water, whereas An. gambiae and the other species breed in fresh water. Anopheles
quadriannulatus is not considered to be amalaria vector. Although these species are considered to be reproductively isolated, there is evidence
of interbreeding between someof them.Patterns of introgression betweenAn. arabiensis andAn. gambiae/An. coluzzii, and betweenAn.merus
and An. quadriannulatus, are similar across their geographic range.21
Consideration must, therefore, be given to the diversity of members of this complex present at ﬁeld testing sites and to whether the gene
sequence targeted by gene drive constructs is present in more than one species. Nontarget Anopheles species should be examined for the
extent of gene ﬂow between sibling species and the potential effects of any genetic transfer events.
§Population suppression is sometimes called population reduction.
Population replacement is sometimes termed population modiﬁcation,
population alteration, population transformation, or population
conversion. The present article retains the terminology that was used
in the WHO Guidance Framework.
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tool for determining the number of generations over which key
stability, efﬁcacy, and safety characteristics must be moni-
tored in the laboratory to provide sound justiﬁcation for pro-
ceeding to ﬁeld-testing.
Self-limiting alternatives. There are circumstances in
which consideration might be given to the testing of a self-
limiting approach.15 Self-limiting constructs constitute a form
of biological or molecular conﬁnement, which would supple-
ment physical and ecological conﬁnement. The genetic sterile
insect technique is the most extreme self-limiting technology,
and several fertile but self-limiting or self-exhausting ap-
proaches also are possible. One such approach would use a
closely related but nondriving version of the proposed self-
sustaining construct, which is expected to be passed on in
diminishing proportion through subsequent generations
according to normal Mendelian inheritance until eventually
becominghighly diluted in the population through outcrossing
and lost if it conveys any ﬁtness cost. Other proposed ap-
proaches include genetic manipulations aiming to purposely
limit the time period or geographic range over which gene
drive is expected to remain functional.33–35 Additional alter-
natives likely will continue to be conceived.36
The focus of these recommendations is on developing gene
drive mosquitoes to contribute to elimination/eradication of
malaria across sub-Saharan Africa, a vast continent37 where
malaria is largely present in rural regions and endemic in most
countries. To date, there are no modeling data to support the
possibility that any of the currently contemplated self-limiting
approaches might achieve an appreciable reduction of
malaria transmission across sub-Saharan Africa.k However,
the working group recognized three circumstances in which
testing of a self-limiting intermediate beforemoving to the ﬁeld
with a self-sustaining driving construct could be particularly
pertinent to the development pathway for gene drive mos-
quitoes to control malaria in Africa.
1. To provide additional data regarding the interaction of the
genetic construct with the environment for a ﬁrst-in-class
gene drive strategy, if deemed necessary to answer
questions raised in the risk assessment or to build conﬁ-
dence with regulators, communities, and other stake-
holders. For example, this might be useful to gain
multinational acceptance of a new technology. In this case,
the composition of the self-limiting construct with respect
to promoter, effector, and marker genes should be as
similar aspossible to that of the self-sustaining construct to
maximize the relevance of information to be gained from
this approach.
2. To conduct ﬁeld testing for efﬁcacy of population re-
placement strategies under conditions of lower risk. Initial
efﬁcacy testingmay be performed using a laboratory strain
of P. falciparum, and gametocyte-producing laboratory
strains of the parasite are available. However, before pro-
gressing to ﬁeld-testing of gene drivemosquitoes, it will be
important to determine whether the construct exhibits
predicted activity against locally transmitted parasite
strains. Because malaria gametocytes only remain viable
for a short period, such testing with local strains must be
performed in a malaria endemic region. Vector competence
for local parasites could initially be performed in-country
using a self-limiting intermediate.
3. To provide additional training and capability strengthening
for an unproven containment facility and/or inexperienced
staff before initiating work with a low-threshold self-
sustaining form of gene drive. Combined experience sug-
gests that many breaches of containment are associated
with human error due to failure to follow established pro-
cedures, emphasizing the importance of training and ex-
perience for physically conﬁned studies. Initial work with a
self-limiting strain will provide an opportunity for re-
searchers to evaluate system capacity and compliance
with standard operating procedures (SOPs) and un-
derstand regulatory requirements, under conditions of
decreased risk.
Researchers should consider the following factors when
making the decision on whether to include a self-limiting step
in thedevelopmentpathway fora self-sustaining investigational
product. First, under most conditions found in sub-Saharan
Africa, it is questionablewhether a self-limiting version could be
effective over a sufﬁcient area and time frame to provide a cost-
effective and sustainable reduction of malaria transmission.
Thus, althoughshort-termpopulation reduction or replacement
effects may be measurable, the feasibility of obtaining mean-
ingful and cost-effective epidemiological efﬁcacy, especially in
those regionsmost inneedofadditional control tools toachieve
malaria elimination, should be examined. Second, no matter
how similar the self-limiting intermediate is to the intended self-
sustaining version it cannot be expected to have exactly the
same environmental interactions and implications because of
the intentionally limited level and period of exposure. Finally,
ﬁeld-testing of a self-limiting intermediate will require a
sizable expenditure of time and resources, whichmay result
in an appreciable delay in the availability of a self-sustaining
FIGURE 2. Comparison of population replacement (A) and pop-
ulation suppression (B) strategies.
kThe working group acknowledged that self-limiting or self-
exhausting drive approaches might be useful in restricted locations,
for other diseases or under other transmission conditions, and
recognized the importance of modeling for making this determination.
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gene drivemosquito product for use against malaria. On the
positive side, although a self-limiting strain may not in itself
be an effective tool against malaria transmission in sub-
Saharan Africa, it may enable researchers to gain useful
experience and information that will increase the likelihood
of success when the self-sustaining version is released.
Testing of a self-limiting strain can also help to build relevant
regulatory experience, allowing in-country regulators an
opportunity to consider country-speciﬁc risk questions and
to tailor or adapt their regulatory frameworks.
Careful consideration must be given on a case-by-case
basis to determine what information can reasonably be ac-
quired from testing a self-limiting intermediate, how vital this
information is to decision-making, and how extensive such
testing must be to obtain the necessary information. It is
possible that regulators and policy makers may desire an in-
termediate step in the testing pathway. Researchers must be
prepared to explain the advantages and disadvantages of
such a step.
Self-limiting alternatives will be subject to relevant risk as-
sessment and regulatory requirements for importation and
use of GM organisms (GMO). Beyond that, because of the
diversity of potential self-limiting approaches, it is possible
that some conﬁnement and release requirements described
here for low-threshold gene drive may not be applicable.
These should be determined on a case-by-case basis
according to the nature of the construct.
Follow-on products. Given the current state of develop-
ment, the recommendations provided here focus primarily on
ﬁrst-in-class applications of low-threshold gene drive tech-
nology. However, it is anticipated that this research will not
end after ﬁeld testing of the ﬁrst gene drive mosquito product.
For purposes of these recommendations, the working
group assumed that initial products will be targeted at An.
gambiae s.l. It is expected that the transgenic construct canbe
transferred to other major vector species within this complex
through interbreeding in the laboratory. There will be a need,
however, to move the technology into other malaria vector
species, notably to the An. funestus complex which is also
important for malaria transmission in large regions of Africa38
and is developing resistance to common insecticides.39 This
probably will require a new transgenic event and, thus, likely
will be considered an independent investigational product.
Moreover, as has been observed repeatedly with insecti-
cides and antimalarial drugs, it can be expected that re-
sistance eventually will develop to ﬁrst generation products
through selection or evolution of variations in the targeted
genetic sequence in the mosquito or parasite.40–43 Mecha-
nismsare being explored to delay the expression of resistance
(see Resistance). However, unless malaria has been eradicated
before this occurs, resistance is likely to generate a need to
identify effector mechanisms for population suppression or
replacement that target different gene sequences.
Finally, gene editing is a rapidly evolving ﬁeld of research,
and new advances may result in second generation products
with improved efﬁcacy or other desirable features. Recog-
nizing the likelihood of ongoing advances and new ap-
proaches in gene drive technology, this working group
endeavored to avoid being too prescriptive in its recommen-
dations, aiming to provide advice that will be relevant to cur-
rent and future efforts to develop gene drive technology for
use in mosquitoes. Nonetheless, it should be understood that
some of the stated recommendations and requirements de-
scribed here might be changed for follow-on products after
uncertainties have decreased.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING GENE
DRIVE MOSQUITOES
Many of the issues that must be considered for ﬁeld-testing
an investigational productwill be common to all low-threshold
gene drive strategies and all along the continuum of the de-
velopment pathway. Product development will be more efﬁ-
cient if planning for these issuesbegins early in theproject (see
Box 3).
Product characteristics. The WHO Guidance Framework
identiﬁed two major issues to be addressed in the critical
path for development of GMMas public health tools: 1) proof
of efﬁcacy, determined through testing for entomological
and epidemiological impact; and 2) evidence of acceptabil-
ity, determined through biosafety, ethics and engagement
activities, and compliance with regulatory requirements.15
Similarly, these two issues are priorities for gene drive mos-
quitoes. Development of a target product proﬁle (TPP) will
help researchers identify their speciﬁc goals in each of these
areas and facilitate decision-making about when an in-
vestigational product is ready to move further along the
testing pathway. The TPP is a tool that aids investigators to
begin their work with the ultimate goal in mind, focusing on
the speciﬁc claims of the envisioned product, and is fre-
quently recommended for product development.44–46 Re-
searchers must be able to articulate the rationale for the
product, including the advantages it will provide beyond
existing tools. Engagement activities should include con-
sulting the potentially exposed community and relevant
government authorities early in the process of TPP formu-
lation to understand what characteristics would make the
product attractive from their perspective. For example, this
engagement could begin during the period in which baseline
ﬁeld data are collected. The TPPwill includeparameters such
as efﬁcacy, safety (including ecosystem impact), stability/
durability, and production and release characteristics18,47
(discussed further in the following text). Establishment of
TPP criteria should be informed bymodeling. The TPP can be
reﬁned as additional ﬁeld experience and data are obtained.
However, even early in development, researchers should
think about such practical issues as how the potential gene
drive mosquito will be manufactured, distributed, and mon-
itored, as this may inﬂuence fundamental decisions, in-
cluding construct composition and whether to protect
intellectual property (see Implementationasapublic health
tool). A cost analysis likely will be required before decision-
making on implementation, so researchers should consider
their goals for cost of eventual deployment.
Development pathway. The predicted properties of rapid
spread and persistence that make low-threshold gene drive
such an attractive tool for controlling malaria transmission
also complicate the ability to remove the modiﬁcation once it
has become established in the local mosquito population
shoulddemonstrable harmsbeobserved.UnlikeGMcrops for
agriculture where the modiﬁcation is not intended to spread,
low-threshold gene drive modiﬁcations purposely are
designed to continue spreading after releases of the gene
drive mosquitoes are halted.
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Similarly to the pathway described in the WHO Guidance
Framework,15 testing of gene drive mosquitoes is expected
to proceed through multiple phases or stages, each incre-
mentally increasing the degree of human and environmental
exposure to the investigational product. The transition along
the pathway will be subject to fulﬁllment of efﬁcacy and
safety criteria as deﬁned in the TPP and evaluated in the
context of speciﬁcally designed ﬁeld trials, as well as regu-
latory and ethical approvals, and social acceptance. How-
ever, the characteristics of gene drive may make it difﬁcult or
even undesirable to delineate distinct cutoffs between pha-
ses in the testing pathway beyond initial studies under
physically conﬁned laboratory and insectary conditions.
Thus, to avoid confusion, these working group recommen-
dations consider the goals and requirements of successive
major stages of ﬁeld testing as a continuum of expanding
releases, rather than as distinct or discontinuous phases
(Figure 3).
As is the case with biocontrol agents, which also are
expected to spread and persist in the environment and whose
releases may be difﬁcult to reverse, emphasis is placed on
safety evaluation at the end of physically conﬁned laboratory
testing (including testing in large indoor cages that simulate
the natural environment, if applicable) as a major decision
point for whether to enter ﬁeld testing. Initial transition to the
ﬁeldmay begin with testing in a large outdoor cage (semi-ﬁeld
testing), although this was not considered an essential re-
quirement. The ﬁrst small ﬁeld release should strive for geo-
graphic isolation to limit environmental exposure to the extent
practicable as safety observation continues. Increasingly
larger scale open releases will allow for assessment of ﬁrst
entomological and then epidemiological efﬁcacy of the in-
vestigational gene drive product. Acceptance as a public
health tool would initiate more systematic scale-up releases
and initiation of post-implementation surveillance for ongoing
efﬁcacy and safety. Requirements for each of these phases
are described in detail in the following text.
In determining the minimal requirements that an in-
vestigational mosquito product should meet to justify moving
beyond the laboratory and along the development pathway,
safety concerns and potential beneﬁts to be gained from
further testing both must be weighed. Beneﬁt should be
considered not only from the perspective of the ﬁnal product,
which aims to provide cost-effective control of malaria
transmission, but also at each level of testing before expan-
sion of releases is allowed. Researchers must be prepared to
justify each study or trial to regulators and other decision-
makers in terms of how the information to be gained will con-
tribute to decision-making. Although safety will be assessed
carefully before proceeding to ﬁeld testing, ongoing consider-
ation of safety is necessary as a matter of due diligence.
Risk assessment. The predicted ease of spread of gene
drive mosquitoes calls for extremely thorough evaluation un-
der careful conﬁnement before release into a hospitable en-
vironment (i.e., conditions that could support the survival of
themosquito).However, as emphasized in theWHOGuidance
Framework,15 it is important that safety expectations should
be proportionate to those for other vector control tools and
should take into account the risks associatedwithmaintaining
the status quo.
Risk assessment will provide guidance on decision-making
for the project team, including information for preparation of
regulatory applications and development of risk mitigation
plans. This can identify additional questions that need further
research to fully assess risk. The WHO Guidance Framework
discussed risk assessment and risk management consider-
ations at each phase of testing.15 Quantitative ecological risk
assessment was endorsed in the NASEM report as especially
useful for estimating the probability of speciﬁed outcomes.18
In their consideration of synthetic gene drives in Australia, the
FIGURE 3. Pathway to deployment of gene drive mosquitoes.
BOX 3
Planning considerations for testing along the continuum of the development pathway
Establish a team with appropriate expertise and experience
Develop/reﬁne the target product proﬁle (TPP) and criteria for advancement
Conduct modeling to inform experimental study design and understand potential beneﬁts
Develop processes for information and data sharing to promote transparency
Establish partnerships as necessary
Characterize the ﬁeld testing site (ecology, vector, and clinical)
Undertake environmental risk and biosafety assessments
Address ethical issues
Plan for and conduct stakeholder engagement at multiple levels
Plan for and meet regulatory requirements
Design remediation/mitigation plans
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Australian Academy of Science recommended that any
decision to release a synthetic gene drive be made on a case-
by-case basis following a comprehensive environmental risk
assessment which includes ecological and evolutionary
modeling.48 Others have recommended an integrated ap-
proach to risk assessment of gene drive technologies that in-
cludes the participation of ethicists49 and biosafety professionals.
The risk assessment should be grounded in the protection
goals established by the countries that would host the testing
and/or use the technology.50 However, it should cover not
only environmental and health risks, but also social and eco-
nomic risks.51 There are challenges associated with weighing
risks that the research team identiﬁes as most signiﬁcant
against those of greatest concern to the lay public in risk as-
sessments,52 which will be especially true for gene drive, a
technology that is expected to cross national borders. Thus,
there will need to be a plan for how public input on hazards is
solicited and integrated. Principles for both environmental and
social impact assessment have been proposed.53,54 The risk
assessment conducted for testing Wolbachia-infected mos-
quitoes for controlling transmission of other vector-borne
diseases provides an example,55 but this would have to be
adapted to the context of gene drive applications in Africa.
An external risk assessment, conducted by qualiﬁed indi-
viduals with no vested interest in the success of the product,
can be valuable for building community, stakeholder, and
public conﬁdence. This will be particularly important for ﬁrst-
in-class gene drive strategies. The working group recom-
mended that researchers and/or funders commission an
external all-hazards risk assessment, to be conducted by
experts that are unafﬁliated with the research project, and
that results of the risk assessment be made publicly avail-
able. Funders should be prepared to support the costs for
risk assessment as an integral part of the overall research
plan.
The risk assessment must be reexamined and updated
before moving forward along the testing pathway, to take into
account any changes in human or environmental exposure,
additional data, and any further public concerns.56 Although
researchers are encouraged to make such external assess-
ments available to regulators and the public, it should be
understood that these would not supersede the risk as-
sessments performed by the regulators in connection with
evaluating applications, in compliance with national regulatory
requirements and guidelines.
Decision-making. As described in the WHO Guidance
Framework, it is expected that decision-makers will take into
consideration criteria of both safety (risk) and efﬁcacy (beneﬁt)
for a product’s intended use.15 Beneﬁt will be perceived rel-
ative to the particular context, which in this case is the need for
malaria control in Africa.
Early on in the development of individual gene drive mos-
quito products, funders will need to make important deci-
sions about their commitment to move an investigational
product to the ﬁeld. This decision will be facilitated by
mathematical modeling of the predicted effects under re-
alistic transmission conditions. As the science continues to
evolve, there alwayswill be the possibility of newproducts on
the horizon; however, anticipation of a better product needs
to be balanced with the potential life-saving beneﬁt(s) of a
current investigational product if support is provided to
complete the development and testing process. It can be
expected that ﬁeld-testing of gene drive mosquitoes will be
rigorous and expensive. The effort necessary to move an
investigational product forward through ﬁeld testing in de-
veloping countries in a responsible manner represents a
major commitment, as described in the following text. If an
investigational productmeetsmutually agreedTPP criteria of
safety and efﬁcacy during contained laboratory testing, in-
dicating that it could have a signiﬁcant impact in reducing
malaria transmission in the setting in which release is con-
templated, a decision ismade tomove forward to ﬁeld testing
and releases begin; funders must be prepared to commit
sufﬁcient resources to meet long-term obligations to the
researchers and to the countries where the testing will take
place to which they committed in the research plan. It is
advised that all involved institutions (including funders) de-
velop a joint research collaboration agreement in advance,
which makes each institution’s obligations clear.
Modeling. Just as pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic
modeling is an essential component of developing and test-
ing a new drug, mathematical modeling has an important role
to play in each step of the testing pathway for gene drive
mosquitoes. However, the validity of the modeling will be
inﬂuencedby the strengthof thedataset it utilizes, including its
relevance to conditions at the trial site, and this underscores
the need to collect relevant baseline ﬁeld data and to make
it widely available to the research community (see Data
systems).
Even before developing constructs in the laboratory,
mathematical modeling can guide the speciﬁcation of re-
quired properties of the construct, such as homing/drive rate,
effector strength, frequency of development of resistance,
and more. Mathematical modeling can also help to identify
baseline data required from potential ﬁeld sites before the ﬁrst
ﬁeld trials, which will assist in determining whether the sites
under consideration will be sufﬁciently informative for the
proposed trial objectives.
Computational modeling can use performance character-
istics measured during early development (laboratory and
large cage testing) to predict possible outcomes in open–ﬁeld-
testing for the investigational product before any actual ﬁeld
releases are performed. These types of model-based infer-
ences provide an important contribution to decision-making
about whether ﬁeld releases are justiﬁed.
Data collected from small and large-scale ﬁeld testing can
be used in computational models to help plan a resource-
optimized robust release strategy for wide-scale imple-
mentation that achieves the goals of disease control and
elimination efforts before scale-up begins. Risks of resistance
also can be explored in mathematical models to develop
sampling schemes to identify any occurrences in the course of
implementation with substantial potential effects on the dis-
ease. Modeling also may provide insights into the effective-
ness of proposed remediation strategies.
Transparency. The working group members noted that
development of genedrive technology carries anobligation for
transparency and accountability. This is important for earning
public conﬁdence, ensuring that the product meets stake-
holder needs, encouraging inter-project coordination neces-
sary for responsible ﬁeld testing, and minimizing any risks to
humanhealth and/or the environment. Gene drive researchers
should commit to being appropriately transparent about their
work.
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With respect to public engagement, failure to be transparent
about data can heighten anxiety by creating the impression
that scientists know things they are not willing to reveal, and
this may fuel distrust. From the perspective of product de-
velopment, inappropriately conducted ﬁeld trials have the
potential to negatively impact the future success of other gene
drive products; to undermine community, stakeholder, and/or
public conﬁdence in the technology; and to contaminate the
regulatory and funding environment. Also, even though the
release of an ineffective gene drive construct in the context of
an efﬁcacy trial may not appreciably altermosquito function or
result in any direct biosafety threat, such a release might
create subtle genetic changes in the target mosquito pop-
ulation that could impact the effectiveness of subsequent in-
vestigational products and inﬂuence the use of subsequent
new gene drive products at the study site. This could result in
loss of time and resources spent developing other gene drive
products and preparing ﬁeld sites, and possibly prevent
the sites from beneﬁting from future products. At worst, ill-
conceived ﬁeld trials might cause damage to human or animal
health, or the environment. Thus, transparency should in-
clude, but is not necessarily limited to, keeping open and ac-
cessible records of any (accidental or intended) releases,
containing a full description of the investigational product.
Policies andmechanisms for inter-project coordination and
broader data and information sharing are a necessity. This
level of cooperation is best driven by research funders, as
exempliﬁed by prior data sharing agreements.57,58 Recog-
nizing the importance of transparency for public conﬁdence
and future development of gene drive technology, theworking
group recommended that funders work cooperatively on the
early establishment of policies for appropriate sharing of data
from gene drive research.
Researchers, funders, policy makers, and government au-
thorities will need to consider whether currently available sites
for publicly disclosing relevant information (e.g., the Biosafety
Clearing House of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), various clinical trial and nucleic acid databases, and
national regulatory agency websites) are sufﬁcient for gene
drive technology or whether additional reporting mechanisms
are necessary.
Coordination. The working group encouraged funders to
support efforts to establish mechanisms for coordination
across projects and programs on gene drive technology.
Formation of networks among gene drive funders, re-
searchers, and regulators and policy makers, could encour-
age information sharing and cooperation in areas of mutual
interest and overall importance to the ﬁeld. For example, co-
ordinationof communication strategies among teamsworking
on similar technologies, different approaches, and/or in the
same region is desirable and would contribute to research
advancement through enabling better community, stake-
holder, and public understanding. Such coordination should
be encouraged by those who are aware of various projects
within a region, such as academic institutions, regulators,
ethics committees, and funders. A forum for researchers in-
terestedor involved ingenedrive researchwouldbeespecially
useful to promote evidence-based self-regulation, sharing
information on best practices, and supporting appropriate
management of ﬁeld trials.
Development of gene drive technology from initial research
through ﬁeld-testing and deployment will require complex
interactions among researchers, funders, and national and
international authorities at multiple levels, including broad
alignment of public engagement efforts, biosafety, and ethical
standards. The working group recommended the establish-
ment of a neutral body empowered to manage high-level co-
ordination among the various stakeholders and to organize
centralized responses to the diverse challenges that will arise
in the development pathway for gene drive mosquitoes as
public health tools.
Data systems. Researchers are strongly encouraged to
share ﬁeld data openly and collaboratively for the greater
beneﬁt of the malaria research and control communities. Ad-
equate database platforms for data gathering and storage for
evaluation/analysis, therefore, should be available. It is rec-
ommended that the data be archived in centralized, widely
accessible data repositories with the aim of having common
data formats. VectorBase59 and PlasmoDB60 are examples of
databases established for the purposes of such research.
Mosquito data should not only include sequence information,
but also extensive meta-data describing the type of mosquito
(gene drive or wild), source of collection, and experimental
study design. As data systems are being designed for ﬁeld
trials, it is recommended that they be developed following
Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium (CDISC)
guidelines.Clinical Data InterchangeStandardsConsortium is
a nonproﬁt standards-developing organization and has de-
veloped some standards for data instruments for malaria
research.61 Investigators could engage CDISC to develop
the data ontology relevant to mosquito vectors and related
information and expand this suite of standards for gene drive
research.
Ethical obligations. The development and deployment of
gene drive mosquitoes for control of vector-borne diseases
will involve interaction with a diverse spectrum of groups, as
recognized by both the WHO Guidance Framework and the
NASEM report.15,18 The WHO Guidance Framework distin-
guishes between “communities” that live at the trial sites and
“third parties” that also have interest in the research but do not
live at the ﬁeld trial site.15 The NASEM report deﬁnes “com-
munities” as those who live in or near sites where gene drive
organisms will be used and further distinguishes “stake-
holders” as those who have direct professional or personal
interest in gene drive and “publics” as those who lack a direct
connection but have interests or concerns thatmay contribute
to decision-making.18 The composition and extent of these
groups likely will change with each successive phase of
testing. It could be argued that because gene drive constructs
theoretically could spread across large regions of Africa, most
of the African population legitimately falls in the category of
stakeholder regardless of where the trials begin. This points to
the importance of engaging with regional and multinational
bodies with authority to represent transnational sets of
stakeholders.
As described in theWHOGuidance Framework, obligations
to these different communities, stakeholders, and publics will
vary in their ethical signiﬁcance and may be addressed
through a range of activities.15,62 Researchers are responsible
for obtaining fair and legitimate authorization for ﬁeld-testing
gene drive mosquitoes.56 At the highest level, safety is a
paramount public interest that is addressed through the reg-
ulatorymechanismsput in placebygovernments.Moreover, it
is a standard requirement to obtain ethical clearance for any
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research involving human participation. The process for doing
so may differ among countries, and in some may require
considerable lead time.
At any point along the continuum of an investigational
product’s testing, individual informedconsent is required from
those who meet the internationally accepted criteria of re-
search subjects (examples of requirements may be found at
the websites of the WHO63 and U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, Ofﬁce for Human Research Protections64),
such as those who provide clinical specimens or identiﬁable
information at the individual or household level.65 However,
simply living near a vector release site does not qualify
someone as a research subject.66 Nonetheless, researchers
are obligated to respect the interests of those within the
community(ies) hosting trials of gene drive mosquitoes who,
although not research subjects, may be associated with and/
or affected by the research in a meaningful way. As discussed
in the following text under community engagement, this re-
quires practices undertaken to inform such persons about the
project, and to understand, respond to, and learn from their
perceptions and reactions in a way that makes it clear their
opinions have inﬂuence.15,56,62
Once the decision to ﬁeld-test a particular investigational
product has been made, researchers and funders incur a re-
sponsibility for the safety of the host community. Prematurely
discontinuing ﬁeld-testing and/or monitoring for lack of
funding could be considered irresponsible. Funders must be
prepared to commit to continued support for trial and post-
trial activities as longas is requiredby regulators andbyethical
obligations to the community hosting the ﬁeld testing. Like-
wise, researchers should not initiate ﬁeld releases until ade-
quate funds are secured to carry out their regulatory and
ethical obligations.
Given the complex ethical and community engagement is-
suesaccompanyinggenedrive technology, an ethics advisory
group comprising experts external to the project would be an
important mechanism to supplement the input from commu-
nity advisory boards or other community engagement activi-
ties, providing additional and broader perspectives. This
groupwould be distinct from the institutional or national ethics
committee to which researchers must submit their proposed
activities for review and approval, and would advise the re-
searchers on ethical issues related to the project. This advice
could be especially helpful in determining how to anticipate
and address controversial or sensitive issues. Mechanisms
should be established to allow this group to obtain relevant
information on issues such as risk assessment, policy, en-
gagement activities, and trial status from the project and other
advisors. The working group strongly recommended that re-
searchers establish an independent group of ethics experts
that is external to the project team and includes in-country
experts and those from involved communities, to advise their
projects throughout the research and ﬁeld testing trajectory.
Engagement. Appropriate engagement will be crucial to
the success of the research on a number of levels. Therefore,
funders must be prepared to provide support for ongoing
engagement activities as an integral component of the re-
search plan. Acceptability of the research project, and of the
ultimate gene drive mosquito product, is fundamental to its
success. Engagement is essential to meeting ethical obliga-
tions of informed consent, building trust, and gaining accep-
tance of the research. When conducted through an open
exchange of ideas, engagement can also support knowledge
sharing that leads to development of a better and more ac-
ceptable product. Engagement will be an iterative process
that continues throughout the development pathway, un-
derstanding that opinions can change over time. Consider-
ation must be given, however, to mechanisms to monitor for
and avoid stakeholder fatigue over the course of lengthy trials.
Before releases begin, researchers, in collaboration with
government authorities of countries hosting the trial, funders,
or other advisors should create a plan for achieving effective
engagement with communities and other stakeholders,
thereby providing for opinions of various groups to be con-
sidered in the decision-making process over the course of a
project. For this, it will be important to conduct a systematic
analysis of inﬂuential stakeholders at different levels.67 At the
early stages of research, in addition to in-country members of
the project team and community members, researchers
should seek to learn from other in-country and/or regional
experts and organizations familiar with the local political, re-
ligious, social, and cultural structure to establish an appro-
priate engagement strategy. It is important to understand the
different levels of government when planning the engagement
approach and respect the requirements at each level. Re-
searchers should engage early with relevant ethics commit-
tees (e.g., institutional or national) for ﬁeld sites to determine
the extent of public engagement required in preparing for and
conducting ﬁeld studies, and guidance in identifying local
leaders and key inﬂuencers (religious, community, civil soci-
ety, andmedia) who should be consulted. Researchers should
coordinate engagement efforts with existing regulatory
processes and relevant agencies that will be involved in
deploying the product. Involvement and input by the end user
of the technology, which in the case of gene drive mosquitoes
is likely to be the national malaria control program and/or
Ministry of Health or equivalent, can substantially facilitate
public engagement.
The precise nature of community engagement will vary from
context to context but must be assumed to require long-term
commitment and substantive funding. A common principle is
that communities should be provided with sufﬁcient opportu-
nity to interact with the project team to learn about the research
and its implications to formulate reasoned positions about
whether to host a trial. Information about the research and in-
vestigational product must be provided and discussed with
communities and other stakeholders in a way that strives for all
voices to be heard. The expectation is for community en-
gagement with open and honest exchange of ideas and in-
formation. Researchers should seek to learn from these groups
about ways they can improve the project or the product. Re-
searchers and funders must be open to the possibility that re-
search plans may need to change in response to community
input or even that an ongoing projectmust be halted ormoved.
The mechanism by which communities will indicate their
authorization or endorsement for a trial to proceed likely will
differ according to cultural contexts and may evolve over se-
quential phases of testing. Researchers should discuss with
the community how it wishes to be consulted and what it
considers to constitute authorization to proceed with testing.
Involvement in trial planning is important to foster community
ownership and identiﬁcation with the research. The ideal
outcome is community-driven support for the gene drive
intervention. Researchers should commit to updating the
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community with current information periodically, and partic-
ularly if plans change. Transparency will be central to trust
building.
At all levels of engagement, co-ownership of the entire
product development and testing process by in-country sci-
entists and government authorities will be critical for accept-
ability. Because the nature of effective engagement is so
context speciﬁc, it is best undertaken by people who are lo-
cally known and respected and have deep knowledge and
understanding of the local value system and culture. Social
scientists, ethicists, and other experts experienced in en-
gagement should be included in the research team to develop
and implement the stakeholder engagement plan. All mem-
bers of the project team, however, will interact with the com-
munity on some level as part of their ongoing activities and,
therefore, it is crucial to ensure that all team members are
informed and able to provide accurate information about the
project and its goals.
Community engagement should not be conﬂated with or
mistaken for public relations or marketing and does not imply
advocacy. Examples of successful community engagement
for other new technologies are available for guidance,68–70 as
is more general guidance.18,69–77
Because of the potential for geographic spread of gene
drive mosquitoes, engagement must expand rapidly to the
national andmultinational levels (as addressed for each testing
phase in the following text).Government-level championshipof
the research will be critical by the stage of large-scale
testing. Considerations for broader public engagement
were described in the WHO Guidance Framework, which ad-
vocated for an “honest broker” approach that recognizes and
responds to the value-basedperspectives of third parties.15,78
The NASEM has published an evidence-based framework to
guide science communication.18,79
Communication and outreach. Good communications
materials, translated into the appropriate language(s), will be
vital for explaining the technology and, therefore, will underpin
engagement efforts at all levels. Researchers should include
experienced science communicators on their team, as well as
sociologists and linguists to help develop the necessary vo-
cabulary to accurately and understandably convey the tech-
nical aspects of the research to each group of stakeholders.
Project communications should be developed in coordination
with appropriate authorities and emphasize information of
interest to the community, which might include utilitarian
beneﬁt, sustainability, and prudence. Communication mate-
rials should include: clear, current, and understandable in-
formation describing the project; a set of frequently asked
questions that anticipate confusing or controversial issues;
and a crisis communications plan for handling emergencies,
including methods for rapid dissemination of information and
surveying public perspective.
Communication strategies may differ for different audi-
ences, but details regarding project goals, timelines, planning,
and execution must remain consistent for a speciﬁc project.
Local media outlets, such as radio stations, can be useful for
making the community aware of the research and where to
obtain more information. Fostering well-informed media is an
important consideration throughout all facets of product de-
velopment and testing. It will be important to engage proac-
tively with the media, for example, by offering accurate, fair,
andbalanced informational sessions and tours of the research
facilities. This will help the media to obtain a basic under-
standing of the project and to provide accurate material and
information about gene drive technology. Researchers should
identify project spokespeople and provide them with com-
munications skills that will enable them to explain the project
clearly to stakeholders and the media.
From the beginning, researchers should have a plan for
interacting with those who do not agree with the conduct of
research on gene drive mosquitoes in their community. Some
who disagree may hold deep seated objections that limit
compromise, whereas others may seek changes or have
concerns that could be addressed and would, therefore, be
amenable to dialogue if engaged.
Researchers may be confronted with well-organized dis-
sent, which could originate within or outside the community
where the research is being conducted. Execution of a robust,
proactive engagement plan may help mitigate against nega-
tive messaging. Relevant study personnel should receive
support and/or formal training in conﬂict management and in
communications. However, the most important factor will be
the relationships that have already been built with key stake-
holders, including the community, in-country scientists, media,
civil society, policymakers, regulators, and relevant government
authorities. In-country champions and supportive voices are
best positioned to respond to dissenting opinions from the
outside.
Policy and regulatory considerations. Regulatory over-
sight canbeexpected atmany levels–federal, local (e.g., state,
province, county, district, or region), and institutional.15,80
Gene drive mosquitoes are intended as public health in-
terventions; therefore, malaria endemic countrieswhere these
products will be deployed are likely to seek advice from the
WHO. The WHO mandate is to provide leadership in areas of
global public health. As a result, member countries task the
WHO with developing policies and strategies to prevent
vector-bornediseasesand to respond tooutbreaks. TheWHO
plays an important role in supporting countries that lack the
technical capacity in regulation, assessment, and operational
use of new technologies. The WHO will consider safety and
public health efﬁcacy to be of high importance in its policy
making for this technology. However, even in early stage ﬁeld
releases, it is anticipated that authorities (including in-
ternational bodies suchas theWHOand in-country regulators)
will want some assurance of potential for beneﬁt. The WHO
Vector Control Advisory Group (VCAG)81 reviews evidence on
new potential vector control approaches for malaria and
neglected tropical diseases and makes recommendations to
the WHO on their public health efﬁcacy for purposes of policy
development. Thus, VCAG offers a useful starting point for
WHO interactions. Researchers should engagewith theVCAG
early in the project development process to obtain advice on
trial planning and to help inform policy development for gene
drive technology as a vector control tool.
Most malaria endemic countries where gene drive mos-
quitoes might be tested or deployed are signatories to the
CartagenaProtocol onBiosafety (seeBox4),whichaddresses
transboundarymovement of GMO.82 In these countries, GMO
usually are regulated by a National Biosafety Authority (NBA)
or Committee, which derives its authority through a national
biosafety law or other existing laws. Under Article 17, the
Cartagena Protocol requires countries to notify other coun-
tries that might be affected by an unintentional transboundary
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movement that may have an adverse effect on biodiversity.
Country obligations under the Cartagena Protocol may be
affected by ongoing discussions within the CBD.83
Because gene drive mosquitoes are intended as a public
health tool, it is desirable to have the Ministry of Health or
equivalent, which is likely to have malaria control as part of its
mandate, engaged in the regulatory process. Health regula-
tors, who will consider the potential public health impact of
gene drive mosquitoes, should be included in discussions as
early as possible. Through the support of the NewPartnership
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (an agency of the African
Union), the WHO, and other partners, African countries are
building their regulatory systems for health technologies,
which are being led by National Medicines Regulatory Agen-
cies. African countries also are revising their laws for regulat-
ing health technologies based on the Model Law for
Regulation of Health Technologies84 that was adopted by the
African Union in 2014. Key in these laws are the aspects of
mutual recognition and regional collaboration which the
countries may use in strengthening their regulatory systems.
Although the Ministry responsible for health, along with other
relevant ministries, is usually represented on the NBA, it will
have to play amore proactive role in regulating gene drives for
malaria control and elimination.
Whether a gene drive candidate is developed outside a
malaria-endemic country and must be transported to an in-
country institution for testing,{ or a gene drive candidate is
developed by an in-country team, approval must be obtained
from the country-speciﬁc NBA for contained use. In the ﬁrst
case, approval for contained use enables apermit for import to
be issued by the relevant quarantine authority. Researchers
should interact with the country’s NBA as early as possible to
provide themwith information about research plans and goals
and to determine the requirements to be met. Those who will
be exporting an investigational gene drive product must
consultwith thebiosafety ofﬁceat their home institution andat
the receiving institution before transfer. Requirements for
export and import permits are likely to apply. Appropriate
safety measures must be taken for transportation.85,86
Although several sub-Saharan African country NBAs have
experience regulating GM crops,87 few have experience
with GM insects and none presently have experience with
gene drive mosquitoes. Gene drive mosquitoes will introduce
new concepts for regulators. For example, with GM crops,
experienced regulators usually consider the possibility for an
introduced transgene to go to ﬁxation or achieve high fre-
quency in populations of sexually compatible wild relatives as
part of their risk assessment. However, gene drive differs in
that it is the intentional goal to achieve ﬁxation or high fre-
quency rapidly in the wild population of target mosquitoes,
and this can be expected to create special risk assessment
considerations. Regulators must understand that for release
of gene drive mosquitoes, the modiﬁcation is anticipated to
persist in the wild population for an indeﬁnite period, the
expected length of which may differ according to whether a
population suppression or replacement strategy is being
tested. It is possible that thismay require legal clariﬁcation, but
precedents can be drawn from regulation of classical bio-
control agents.
Governance of gene drive technology and regulatory ca-
pacity building has been identiﬁed as a priority.18 New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development provides support and
assistance to national regulators in conducting their risk as-
sessments.88 The working group strongly encouraged fun-
ders to work with intergovernmental organizations such
as NEPAD to support regulatory training and capability
strengthening. Any such training must be neutral and bal-
anced; information sharingmust cover both potential beneﬁts
and risks of the technology objectively and in a transparent
manner.
Regional approaches. Given the intention for gene drive
mosquitoes to spread beneﬁcial modiﬁcations throughout
contiguous interbreeding mosquito populations and species,
it is expected that the modiﬁcation eventually will spread
across national borders. The working group emphasized the
desirability of regional approaches to testing of gene drive
mosquitoes that would facilitate a multi-country regulatory
review and authorization process, and encouraged relevant
stakeholders, including government authorities, to support a
regional strategy. For An. gambiae s.l., sub-Saharan Africa is
the relevant region. Funders and researchers shouldworkwith
organizations such as the NEPAD to facilitate and support
regulatory harmonization efforts within the African region.
The African Union deﬁnes eight regional integration bodies
that are considered as operational arms on regionalmatters.89
These Regional Economic Communities play an important
role in coordinating member states’ interests in many areas,
including health and development, and will be important
components of any regional strategy to prepare for trans-
boundarymovement of genedrivemosquitoes. TheWHOalso
has a role to play in convening regional stakeholders.
Remediation. Researchers, funders, and government au-
thorities should work together to reach an understanding
on liability issues and trial insurance requirements before
BOX 4
The CBD and related multinational agreements
The CBD is a multilateral treaty under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Program. Its major goals are the conservation of
biodiversity, sustainable use of the components of biodiversity, and fair and equitable sharing of beneﬁts arising from genetic resources
stemming from biodiversity. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention aims to ensure safe handing, transport, and use of living
modiﬁedorganisms resulting frommodernbiotechnology thatmayhaveadverseeffects onbiodiversity, also taking into account risks to human
health. The Nagoya Protocol on Access and Beneﬁt Sharing is a supplementary agreement dealing with fair and equitable sharing of beneﬁts
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Nagoya Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress is a
supplementary agreement to the Cartagena Protocol that aims to provide international rules and procedures related to response measures
required in the event of damage resulting from living modiﬁed organisms.
{ It is possible that candidates may be imported in the form of a
modiﬁed mosquito strain, most likely as eggs, to be interbred with
local mosquitoes or as a DNA construct to be introduced into local
mosquitoes by transfection.
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beginning ﬁeld testing. Trial liability insurance is an important
risk management consideration. All should be aware of the
status of the Nagoya–Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol
on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-
safety90 and the requirements of local laws.
Remediation of an investigational gene drive mosquito
product once it becomes widespread is likely to be complex
and challenging. Thus, the emphasis must be on risk as-
sessment before each stage of testing with a goal to identify
possible adverse consequences and inform measures to
prevent them. Nonetheless, researchers should anticipate
that regulators may request a remediation plan in the context
of their applications for ﬁeld-testing gene drive mosquitoes.
Remediation options are likely to be case speciﬁc, and de-
pendent on the gene drive strategy, the stage of testing, the
location and the issue being remedied. Risk management
planning should include consideration of various mitigation
and remediation options for nonnegligible effects on a case-
by-case basis. Researchers should consider remediation
options in the context of each stage of testing and ensure that
these are appropriately evaluated, planned, and funded.
Partnering with national vector and malaria control programs
may be useful in the design of remediation plans; for example,
in some cases large-scale campaigns for indoor residual
spraying with insecticidesmight achieve both a vector control
goal and a remediation goal. Modeling should be conducted
to predict the effectiveness of the remediation strategy.
The working group members suggested that intense ap-
plication of standard pesticides followed bymonitoring would
be a logical remediation strategy for semi-ﬁeld testing and
small-scale releases. This will be a familiar vector control
strategy to regulators, public health authorities, and commu-
nities. In this case, researchers must make plans to have the
remediation materials (pesticides or other methods) and
necessary equipment on site, along with staff trained in their
proper administration for maximum effectiveness. This will
require that researchers ascertain in advance the pesticide
susceptibility of both the gene drive mosquitoes to be released
andof the localwild-typemosquitoes to thepesticide(s) chosen
for remediation efforts and the feasibility of using that
pesticide in the wider context of national malaria control or
elimination efforts.
In the unlikely case that remediation becomes necessary for
a larger scale release, such remediation would require addi-
tional vector control methods to supplement standard pro-
cedures such as indoor residual spraying and larval source
management. The choice of remediation, or mitigation,
method likely will be dependent on the nature of the exposure
and the predicted harm. If the overall effect of gene drive
mosquitoes is found to be beneﬁcial, it may be possible that a
particular harm can be mitigated without need for their
wholesale removal. It is worth noting that gene drive tech-
nology offers additional hypothetical remediation possibilities
not necessarily available for other biocontrol agents. These
include release of sufﬁciently ﬁt naturally occurring or GM
variants of An. gambiae carrying a nuclease-resistant allele
that restores function of themosquito gene thatwas the target
of the gene drive construct, or the release of another driving
construct designed to inactivate the original driving construct
(sometimes knownas a “recall” construct).8,91–93 Researchers
must remain aware of new technological developments that
could contribute to remediation options. The working group
encouraged additional research and modeling to investigate
theutility of various remediation options for speciﬁcgenedrive
strategies.
Any remediation or mitigation method based on genetic
modiﬁcation also will be subject to risk assessment and reg-
ulatory approval. Researchers must consider the regulatory
and ethical obligations for deploying a novel remediation
method, including the appropriate timing for obtaining com-
munity authorization. The working group recommended that
researchers explore the receptivity to genetic remediation
methods with regulators early in the planning process. If such
amethod is to be used effectively to counteract an unforeseen
event, it likely would need to be approved for release at the
same time as the original investigational gene drive product to
ensure that it is immediately available and ready for use before
deployment at the time it might be required. The extent to
whichefﬁcacyof suchamethodmust bedemonstratedbefore
approval should be agreed in advance with regulators. How-
ever, the working group suggested that any novel remediation
method should be tested for effectiveness to the furthest ex-
tent practicable before the testing stage in which it would be
proposed for use, bearing in mind whether a premature re-
lease of the remediation construct at a trial site could preempt
further testing of the investigational product there.
Key points: general considerations for developing
gene drive mosquitoes.
c Researchers should develop a TPP as early as possible
to help identify goals for efﬁcacy and safety, and initiate
consideration of issues relevant to manufacturing, de-
livery, and cost. This will facilitate decision-making
aboutwhen an investigational product is ready tomove
further along the testing pathway. Establishment of
TPP criteria should be informed by mathematical
modeling.Criteria canbe reﬁned asmoredata is gained
from testing.
c Collection and evaluation of baseline vector, epidemi-
ological, and ecological data should begin early to allow
for observation of multi-seasonal and multiyear varia-
tion. Efforts should be made to anticipate conditions
under which efﬁcacy trials will be conducted, especially
with respect to other vector control methods in use, as
this will impact the relevance of the baseline data.
c Government oversight of gene drive mosquitoes will
combine aspects of both biosafety and health regula-
tion, and also introduce issues that are different from
prior experience. Researchers must interact fully and
transparently with regulatory and other government
authorities as early as possible to provide information
about research planning and goals, and to determine
what requirements likely must be met. Funders should
work with independent organizations such as the
NEPAD to support neutral and objective regulatory
training and capability strengthening. Regional ap-
proaches to testing of gene drive mosquitoes that
would facilitate a multi-country regulatory review and
authorization process are critical and must be encour-
aged and supported.
c Appropriate ethical clearance is necessary for studies
involving human participation. At any stage of testing,
informed consent is required for those who meet the
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internationally accepted criteria of research subjects.
Those living at or near the ﬁeld-testing site who are not
participating directly as research subjects should be
sensitized and mobilized via community-based en-
gagement activities. Researchers, in collaboration with
government authorities, funders, or other advisors,
must put a plan in place for how engagement at various
levels will be managed, which will be facilitated by in-
cluding community engagement and communications
experts on the research team. Funders must provide
support for vigorous engagement activities as an in-
tegral component of gene drive research. Once the
decision to ﬁeld-test a candidate has been made, re-
searchers and funders incur a responsibility for the
safety of the participants and must commit to any
follow-up activities required by regulators or imposed
by ethical obligations to the community. Field testing
must not begin until adequate funding is available to
fulﬁll these responsibilities. Researchers are advised
to consider appointing an external ethics committee to
advise on sensitive or contentious issues.
c Testing must be conducted incrementally, increasing
the level of human and environmental exposure only
after the investigational product has fulﬁlled agreed on
safety, efﬁcacy, and acceptability criteria in the prior
phase. Before moving from one level of testing to the
next, researchers or funders should commission an
external all-hazards risk assessment; this will inform
project planning and decision-making, and also build
trust ifmadepublicly available. Risk assessment should
cover not only environmental and health risks but also
social and economic risks, and consider concerns
expressed by affected communities. During early en-
gagement, researchers should consider asking the
community how they wish to be consulted and what
they consider to constitute authorization to proceed
with testing.
c Consideration should be given to the utility of de-
veloping a self-limiting intermediate. Initial ﬁeld testing
of a self-limiting intermediate could beespecially useful
to gain: information for risk assessment for ﬁrst-in-class
strategies where there is no relevant prior experience
regarding potential environmental interactions; expe-
rience with working under containment conditions in
areas where new facilities are created; and, for pop-
ulation replacement strategies, locally relevant in-
formation on efﬁcacy under conditions of decreased
risk. However, such intermediates will still be subject to
regulatory requirements for GMO, and extensive test-
ing will expend time and resources. Therefore, careful
thoughtmust be given to how vital the information from
a self-limiting intermediate will be for decision-making,
and how extensive the testing must be to obtain the
necessary information.
c Researchers should commit to being appropriately
transparent about their work. Baseline ﬁeld data should
be shared for the beneﬁt of the other malaria re-
searchers and control programs. Open and accessible
records should be kept of any (accidental or intended)
releases. Researchers, funders and government au-
thorities will need to consider whether currently avail-
able sites for publicly disclosing trial information (e.g.,
the Biosafety Clearing House of the CBD, and various
clinical trial and nucleic acid databases) are sufﬁcient
for gene drive technology or new mechanisms should
be put in place.
c Researchers are advised to consider remediation op-
tions in the context of each level of testing and ensure
that these are appropriately planned and funded. These
may involve application of currently available pesticide-
based methods and/or other methods developed in the
context of gene drive research. Any remediation tech-
nology proposed must be ready for use at the time it is
required, which for novel methods (such as genetic re-
mediation) likely will mean generation of sufﬁcient data
and information to satisfy safety and efﬁcacy needs of
regulators and other stakeholders. Proposed re-
mediationmethodsmustbeconsidered in thecontextof
existing vector control and malaria elimination efforts.
c Researchers should be cognizant of the role of theWHO in
reviewingand recommendingnewvector control products
for the developing world. Early and ongoing interaction
through the WHO VCAG is strongly recommended.
PHYSICALLY CONFINED LABORATORY STUDIES
As described in the WHO Guidance Framework, testing of
new investigational gene drive products begins with small-
scale laboratory studies for efﬁcacy and safety testing under
appropriate containment conditions and operating proce-
dures.15 This phase may proceed through testing in larger
population cages within the laboratory setting, including large
environmentally controlled indoor spaces that aim to simulate
a ﬁeld setting.#
It is recognized that gene drive constructs and modiﬁed
mosquito strainsmaybecreated in laboratories outsidemalaria
endemic regions, in which case they must be transferred to
laboratories in locationssuitable forAn. gambiaeestablishment
for further testing, or they may be created at laboratories in
locations suitable for establishment. These recommendations
for contained testing requirements relate to both possibilities.
Issues such as physical conﬁnement requirements and
engagement, monitoring, or remediation obligations, are
expected to differ when initial research is conducted in a lo-
cation that is not conducive for establishment of thegenedrive
mosquitoes under development versus a location hospitable
to mosquito survival. It has been argued that all laboratory
gene drive experiments should use at least two stringent
conﬁnement strategies, one of which could be performing the
studies outside the habitable range of the organism85 (eco-
logical conﬁnement). Because this conﬁnement option would
not be available when early discovery research is performed in
laboratories in malaria-endemic countries, other forms of
conﬁnementwould need to reduce theprobability of release to
a level that is acceptably low.
# This phase of testing is herein termed physical conﬁnement, in
keepingwith the terminology of theWHOGuidance Framework,14 but
is alsowidely knownascontainment.Recommendationsarebasedon
requirements recognized as Arthropod Containment Level (ACL), and
the physical structure is standardly called a containment facility.
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Safety. The working group asserted that safety is the par-
amount consideration for gene drive mosquitoes and rec-
ommended several actions to improve the safety of the
approach.
Initial research in an environment receptive to the estab-
lishment of gene drivemosquitoes should be performed in the
context of the genetic background of the mosquitoes of the
target species inhabiting that environment (e.g., laboratory-
maintained strains derived from local wild-type mosquitoes).
Not only will thisminimize the chance of introducing incidental
traits from nonlocal laboratory lines into the local mosquito
population, but it also will maximize the ability to detect
changes conferred speciﬁcally by addition of the transgene
construct. It will be important to understand key characteris-
tics of the local mosquito strain (e.g., insecticide resistance,
fecundity) as this will be the most ideal comparator for risk
assessment purposes.
If an appropriate facility and well-trained staff needed for
maintaining containment are not available at the African in-
stitution, then initial safetyworkwith driving constructs should
be performed in a region unsuitable for establishment but in
mosquitoes with the relevant African genetic background. If
mosquito strains developed in Africa are exported for this
purpose, researchers must inform themselves about, and
operate in compliance with, local laws from the site where the
mosquitoes were derived regarding protection of genetic
resources (see Nagoya Protocol on Access and Beneﬁt-
Sharing94). Any out of country safety work should in-
clude the participation of scientists from the African partner
institution(s) to ensure co-development and continuity. Rel-
evant in-country regulators should be able to visit, inspect,
audit, and learn from such off-shore studies if they wish, to
ensure conﬁdence in the data. The off-shore work also must
comply with the various regulatory requirements of the country
where it is being conducted. As new facilities are developed in
areascompatiblewithestablishmentofgenedrivemosquitoes, a
period of laboratory and insectary work with naturally occurring
mosquito genetic variants and/or nondriving strains of GMM
should be undertaken to provide an opportunity for the site to
develop capability and gain appropriate operational and regu-
latory experience (see Containment requirements).
Becauseof thepersistenceandspreadingcharacteristicsof
gene drive technology, safety concernsmust be explored and
addressed to the greatest extent possible in the context of
contained (small and large-scale laboratory) studies. As is the
case for introduction of biocontrol agents, researchers should
have a high degree of conﬁdence in the safety of their tech-
nology before applying to move beyond contained studies.
However, recognizing that some questions about safety may
not be answerable by laboratory studies and modeling, such
as some ecological interactions, these recommendations
provide for ongoing safety observation in the ﬁeld as a matter
of due diligence.
Biocontrol analogy. All aspects of safety identiﬁed by risk
assessment should be carefully investigated under appropri-
ate physical conﬁnement, as described in the following text. In
addition to assessment of the current investigational product,
the possibility of future phenotypic variants arising because of
thepresenceof the transgenic construct thatmight result in an
increased probability for harm should be addressed. The risks
posed by a proposed release need to be assessed and judged
as acceptably low by the regulatory authority based on
laboratory data before any release from the containment fa-
cility (see Box 5).
The need to base a safety determination on data obtained
from studies conducted in physical conﬁnement is analogous
to the process for evaluating exotic organisms as biocontrol
agents, which also are intended to persist and spread in-
deﬁnitely in the environment following release. The evaluation
at this stage shouldprovide a comprehensive evidence-based
prediction of the safety of future unrestricted release of the
gene drive mosquito strain. However, as is consistent with
releases of other biological control agents, continued monitor-
ing for negative environmental and health impacts throughout
the release and post-release assessment processes is recom-
mended by the working group.
Potential harms of An. gambiae mosquitoes with driving
transgenes have been considered in a problem formulation
exercise, which concluded that the pertinent protection goals
will be human health, biodiversity, animal health, and, to a
lesser extent, water quality.50
Previous reviews have dealt in detail with risk assessment
considerations related to human and animal health and
biodiversity.15,95 Table 1 summarizes several of the hazards
related to human and animal health that researchers and re-
gulators should consider on a case-by-case basis in performing
risk assessments on eachmosquito strain containing gene drive
constructs.
Themost frequently voiced concerns regarding biodiversity
relate to loss ofmosquitoes as a food source (most relevant to
population suppression strategies) andpotential that horizontal
transfer of genetic material might cause harm to other species.
Both have been considered unlikely pathways to harm51,97 but
should be considered in the case-by-case risk assessment of
speciﬁc gene drive constructs.
With respect to methods for consideration of nontarget ef-
fects, it may be useful to take lessons from conventional
biocontrol (Table 2).
Barratt et al.,98 summarize the general considerations in
conventional biocontrol for selecting host species for host-
speciﬁcity testing, and these also may be considered as in-
structive for gene drivemosquitoes. They describe a hierarchical
method for identifying nontarget species that meet the most “at
risk”criteria, basedonpotential for interactionwith thebiocontrol
agent, and conclude that the number of species to be tested
must be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on the
lengthof the “at risk” list, thenumberofpositive results from initial
testing, and regulatory requirements.
For control of disease transmission by mosquitoes, the
population replacement strategy employing Wolbachia pro-
vides a useful biocontrol precedent. The Eliminate Dengue
project has published several studies on risk assessment and
biosafety of their technology.51,55,99–103
BOX 5
Go/no-go decision-making for moving to ﬁeld testing
The safety standard for moving an investigational gene drive
product from physical conﬁnement to ﬁeld testing should be a
well-reasoned justiﬁcation that it will do no more harm to human
health than wild-type mosquitoes of the same genetic
background and no more harm to the ecosystem than other
conventional vector control interventions.
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Efﬁcacy. Typical efﬁcacy measurements at all phases of
testing have been described in detail in the WHO Guidance
Framework,15 and they remain relevant for gene drive mos-
quitoes. In physical containment, these include mating com-
petitiveness, fertility and fecundity, rate of spread of the
transgenic construct, and population suppression or replace-
ment functionalitymeasures (e.g., rateofsuppression in laboratory
cage studies or capability to host and transmit parasite
isolates, respectively). Planning ahead to ﬁeld trials, ﬁtness
characteristics are critical because the ability of gene drive
mosquitoes to survive over the dry season will be funda-
mental to their success. Understanding that there may be a
need for testing of self-limiting intermediates to gain in-
formation and experience before identifying a useful gene
drive product (see Self-limiting alternatives), and that spe-
ciﬁc efﬁcacy criteria will vary according to the different types of
investigational products, the working group felt it was in-
appropriate to deﬁne minimum acceptable efﬁcacy criteria for
moving to ﬁeld testing with one exception (see Resistance).
While still in laboratory testing, researchers should begin to
develop a TPP that describes the attributes of the desired
product.18 This will be informed by modeling of the charac-
teristics that will be necessary to provide the desired effect on
malaria transmission.13
Resistance. The working group agreed on one character-
istic thatwouldconstitute aneffective “no-go”criterion to stop
further testing for an investigational self-sustaining gene drive
product intended for future use in malaria control, namely the
likelihood of resistance arising too rapidly for the product to
have a beneﬁcial effect against malaria transmission. Every
effortmust bemadeduring initial laboratory studies tomitigate
against this possibility. For example, the working group
thought it likely that genetic changes leading to a loss of
susceptibility to the gene drive mechanism will arise rapidly
against any candidate construct directed against a single
target sequence within either the mosquito or, for pop-
ulation replacement strategies, the parasite, unless it can
be shown that changes in those sequences are sufﬁciently
deleterious to prevent them from becoming prominent in
the population.
Possible mechanisms that might negatively impact the
stability of the effector function in different types of gene drive
constructs include the potential for the following:
1. selection for preexisting resistant phenotypes (in the
case of population suppression, the concern would be
mosquitoes with polymorphisms in the nuclease target
sequence that result in resistance43; this would also be a
concern for population replacement, but in this case se-
lection for malaria parasites that are not killed by the ef-
fector mechanism also can be expected);
2. target site mutations to arise spontaneously that make the
sequence resistant to the gene drive nuclease or effector
mechanism and are positively selected; and,
3. loss of linkage between the effector gene and the gene
drive system (this would be a concern for altered function
techniques that require the gene drive to carry an effector
gene into the mosquito genome, as is the case with some
population replacement strategies).
Information about selection for variation in the target gene
sequence may be obtained in early studies through multiple
small cage experiments, where affected mosquitoes can be
captured for genome sequencing.43 However, it also will be
important to develop effective, practical assays formonitoring
resistance in the ﬁeld.
Mutations that destroy gene drive function in a population
suppression strategy are likely to disappear over time be-
cause, in this case, a nonfunctioning gene drive will only show
Mendelian inheritance and is expected to be outcompeted by
a functioning gene drive. However, mutations that destroy
only the effector function in a population replacement gene
drive strategy that relies on introducing an exogenous effector
gene(s), while leaving the drive mechanism intact, are likely to
lead to the spread of a nonfunctional construct.104 As
TABLE 1
Prominent safety considerations related to human and animal health
Potential harm Example hazards Assessment Parameters*
Increased disease transmission Increased abundance of vector
mosquitoes
Fitness components including15:
Growth rate
Mating success
Fecundity
Adult, egg, or larval survival
Environmental tolerances
Increased vectorial capacity Host seeking and biting activity15
Vector competence* (Plasmodium or other
pathogens carried by Anopheles gambiae)
Change in temperature tolerance that could
affect environmental niche or range
Reduced control capability Insecticide resistance*
Increased direct pathology Increased allergenicity Known allergenic sequences expressed by
construct; construct-encoded proteins
detected in saliva
Increased toxicity Standard toxicity test on construct-encoded
proteins
Increased parasite virulence (population
replacement)96
Genotypic or phenotypic changes in parasites
after passage throughgenedrivemosquitoes†
* Changes to be assessed in comparison to local wild-type mosquitoes of the same genetic background.
†This would best be performed with gametocytes collected from the ﬁeld testing site to reﬂect the diversity of parasite strains circulating at the location and will not predict the evolutionary
consequences of ongoing interactions of the parasite with the mosquito and vertebrate host over time.
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described by James, “recombination can lead to the loss of
linkage of the drive system from the effector gene that it is
carrying. Given the large populations ofmosquitoes, even rare
recombinationmight be signiﬁcant. Featuresmust bebuilt into
the drive system that decrease this frequency or mitigate its
effects if it occurs.”105
Research is underway to identify ways to limit target site
resistance.106 For example, a “combination therapy” ap-
proach aimed against multiple target genes and multiple se-
quences within each target gene could help to delay the onset
of resistance to a gene drive mechanism. This might be
achieved, for example, by integrating multiple constructs into
one gene drive mosquito lineage or by releasingmultiple gene
drivemosquito lineages each containing a single construct.41,107
However, just as for drugs and pesticides, it is likely that given
sufﬁcient time, resistance to the gene drive mechanism eventu-
ally will arise. The goal should be to stave off resistance for a
period of time that is sufﬁcient to halt malaria transmission,
which, as predicted by modeling, should take place within a few
years after release of gene drive mosquitoes,13 although this in-
terval may include a substantial number of mosquito genera-
tions. If resistance arises beforemalaria transmission is halted, a
next generation transgenic mosquito product could be released
as is carried out with drugs and pesticides.
To be prepared for the possibility of resistance evolving,
research on the development of next generation constructs
should continue until malaria is eradicated and/or the gene
drive product is no longer needed.
Containment requirements. For low-threshold gene
drives, such as those that can be created using the CRISPR/
Cas system,11,12 computer simulations suggest that escape
of low numbers of mosquitoes from physical conﬁnement in
the absence of effective remediation can result in local es-
tablishment (P. A. Welkhoff, personal communication).9,10
Therefore, physical conﬁnement must be robust, taking
a systems approach to containment employing multiply
TABLE 2
Some considerations for possible effects of Anopheles gambiae containing gene drive constructs, extrapolated from consideration of biocontrol
agents on nontarget species
Potential effect Concern Relevance for An. gambiae Trigger for concern
First-order genetic Construct might spread to a second
species through interspeciﬁcmating.
May be anticipated and a deliberate
part of the implementation
strategy—for example, a gene
introduced into An. gambiae s.s. is
expected to spread into closely
related vector species such as
Anopheles coluzzii or Anopheles
arabiensis. This would be useful for
preventingmalaria transmission by a
second malaria vector, but the
possibility of more distant gene
transfer through interspeciﬁc mating
also must be considered in risk
assessment
Genetic evidence for low-frequency
intraspeciﬁc mating outside the An.
gambiae complex
Second-order genetic Construct might spread through some
other, non-mating, process to a
second species
For example, the constructmightmove
into a mobile genetic element that
could be transferred through a
microbial vector
Genomic evidence for the transfer of
genetic material between
mosquitoes and distantly related
species
First order ecological Removal of a species from a
community might harm species that
directly feed on it or which rely on the
species for pollination.
The extent to which a predator or plant
relies on An. gambiae. The harm
done to Plasmodium through the
removal of its vector is an example of
a deliberate, anticipated, and
beneﬁcial ﬁrst order ecological
effect, but the possibility of
detrimental effect on other, more
valued, species also should be
considered
Evidence that An. gambiae s.l. makes
up a considerable fraction of the
diets of speciﬁc predators in the
same ecosystem, or that particular
plants are largely pollinated by these
species
Second order
ecological
An indirect ecological effect resulting
from removal of a species allows an
increase in the density of another
species (or resource) on which it fed
(ﬁrst order effect), which in turn
allows a competitor species to
increase in density by utilizing the
unused resource
Removal of An. gambiaemight result
in increased abundance of another
species, with detrimental effects
Presence in the same larval habitats as
An. gambiae of other species of
mosquito that share the same food
source and pose a worse threat to
human health; evidence of indirect
ecological effects, including
adaptation of the malaria parasite
that have arisen after other
successful interventions that have
reduced An. gambiae density (such
as bed nets)
Higher order ecological An ecological perturbation causes
further effects that ripple through
the ecological community, and
which are ampliﬁed rather than
being damped
Addition or removal of a keystone
species have major effects
in ecological communities
A plausible mechanism based on
comparative ecological studies
showing how An. gambiae could act
as a keystone species
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redundant procedures that each provide an additional level
of security.
Researchers should be prepared to provide a plan for risk
management, including avoiding accidental escape of trans-
genic mosquitoes, as part of their applications for physically
conﬁned testing. This would be facilitated by international
harmonization of standards for the minimum containment
requirements for gene drive mosquitoes. Sponsors of gene
drive research should work with the WHO and other relevant
authorities in these harmonization activities. Those overseeing
this research at all levels, including funders and regulators,
shouldagreeonbestpractices for theoperationof laboratories/
insectaries developing gene drive mosquitoes and implement
these across all testing sites. Demonstration of adherence to a
set of widely recognized standards will enhance public con-
ﬁdence and may help facilities to obtain liability insurance, if
required under national laws.
The working group concurred with the recommendations
of Benedict et al.,86 which describe enhanced Arthropod
Containment Level (ACL) 2, or “ACL 2+,” containment and
management measures in the laboratory and insectary for
mosquitoes** modiﬁed with low-threshold gene drive (see
Box 6).
The working group agreed that compliance with inter-
national standards for quality assurance of data generation as
is normal procedure for biocontainment (e.g., development of
and compliance with SOPs,110 including strict documentation
and record keeping) is necessary andsufﬁcient formaintaining
biosafety and data quality, and recommended that Good
Laboratory Practice (GLP) certiﬁcation of facilities is not a re-
quirement. If researchers plan to use their data for product
registration purposes in the future, however, independent
external audits for compliance with quality assurance stan-
dards is advisable to ensure broad acceptability of results.
The working group noted that certain assays, such as toxicity
studies, are likely to be required as a component of risk
assessment,111,112 and that such studies are usually con-
tracted to GLP-certiﬁed providers; which would be consistent
with requirements for pesticide testing.
Regulators will establish the requirement for appropriate
biocontainment of gene drivemosquitoes andwill determine a
method for auditing adherence. Veriﬁcation of containment
must be performed to ensure that all approved practices
are being implemented including facility operation and staff
training. Currently, veriﬁcation activities depend on the na-
tional and institutional requirements and will vary between
sites. For example, in Australia, the Federal Regulator
(equivalent to the United States Department of Agriculture)
assesses compliance of a facility to the requirements of a
given level of containment. Random unannounced inspec-
tions are then conducted to checkon compliance. Institutional
biosafety committees are also charged with ensuring com-
pliance, but they are still beneath the authority of the regulator
and the inspection regimen to ensure compliance.
Projects working on investigational gene drive products
should ensure that processes for containment and veriﬁcation
do not create conﬂicts of interest. Therefore, even if strict
procedures are in place within the project, compliance with
containment requirements should be externally validated.
Some locations in which gene drives may be produced or
tested may not have a regulatory infrastructure with compli-
ance oversight procedures in place. Even if such procedures
exist, theymay lack familiarity with requirements for mosquito
containment. In that case, third-party validation would be
advisable. Thought should be given to the need for an informal
or formal certiﬁcation mechanism for containment facilities
housing gene drive mosquitoes.
Breaches of containment could result from unexpected
situations, such as natural disasters, accidents, or deliberate
actions. Containment considerations must take into account
thepossibility of facility break-ins, either byopponents of gene
drive technology wishing to disrupt the research or alterna-
tively by proponents wishing to gain access to gene drive
mosquitoes and release them prematurely. This requires that
appropriate security measures are put in place. The potential
for an inward breach of containment, involving the in-
troduction of living organisms (including pathogens) from the
external environment, should also be recognized, guarded
against, and monitored.
Containment considerations for gene drive mosquitoes
must extend to transport at any testing phase, to mitigate
against escapes at that level. Shipments should use in-
ternational standards for shipping of medical specimens and
GMO, with multiple layers of containment. Shipment and
transport as eggs will decrease the likelihood of escape.
Permits for transportmay be needed, and it can be anticipated
BOX 6
Enhanced ACL2 recommendations for containment and maintenance of mosquitoes modiﬁed with low-threshold gene drive
These recommendations build on commonalities in prior guidance for Level 2 and 3 containments of arthropods,109 which require well-sealed
structures including windows and doors and often call for additional features such as sealed ﬂoors, absence of harborages, impervious
caseworketc. All prior guidancealso requiresdevitalizationof arthropods at all life stagesbeforedisposal andcontrolledwaste streams. Further
measures recommended to ensure containment of low-threshold driving transgenes include:
More stringent physical containment measures including triple nested barrier containment, but not microbe-speciﬁc measures such as high
efﬁciency particulate air ﬁltration and negative air pressure that are often recommended at ACL3 (it is suggested that 100μmscreens should be
sufﬁcient to contain mosquitoes);
Regular authentication of all strains held, to ensure that driving transgenes have not contaminated other strains in the insectary;
Use of a distinguishing transgene marker speciﬁc to driving transgene when possible;
Development of diagnostic polymerase chain reaction (PCR) assays for strains containing driving transgenes;
Thorough inspection of mosquitoes being shipped out of the insectary to ensure they do not contain a driving transgene unless this is
intended.
It should be noted that containment and management requirements for self-limiting alternatives must be considered on a case-by-case basis
with appropriate risk assessment, recognizing that some of the approaches under consideration will pose similar challenges.
** Although containment of Plasmodium-infected gene drive mosquitoes
is not anticipated, Biosafety Level-2 practices are recommended for
this parasite.108
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that inspection at arrival and a record of the chain of custody
will be required by government inspectors.
Monitoring. In areas compatible with establishment of the
targeted vector species, researchers will likely be asked about
methods for monitoring to detect an accidental, unauthorized
release ofmosquitoes into the environment as part of their risk
management plans. At a minimum, monitoring approaches
should include efﬁcient traps, mosquito marking methods
(e.g., protein markers or genetic markers) and an SOP for
conducting surveillance within and outside the facilities.
During initial development, researchers should consider the
utility of including a speciﬁc signature sequence that would
easily identify the product as theirs, which could be useful
during large-scale ﬁeld testing and post-implementation
monitoring. Multiple trapping techniques should be deployed,
using the best technology available at the time, as part of a
surveillance effort that targets both adult and aquatic stages of
the mosquitoes. Monitoring will be simpliﬁed by the inclusion
of a unique visual or easily identiﬁed molecular marker in the
construct.
Development of more sensitive monitoring tools and ap-
proachesshouldbeconsideredby researchers and funders as
a critical research priority. Current trapping methods, which
could be applicable formonitoring for escapees in the external
environment, are of low efﬁciency. This can be addressed in
part by normal procedures for monitoring within and near the
facility. If possible, modiﬁcations to the external environment
around the facility, such as construction of a buffer zone de-
pleted of natural breeding and resting sites, may improve the
chances of detecting escapees.
Given the current sensitivity of trapping methods, for
physically conﬁned studies conducted in locations hospitable
to the vector species detection of a single genedrivemosquito
external to the facility should be considered to represent a lack
of containment. Surveillance should continue beyond the
period in which active research is underway. Because the
driving construct will be designed to spread within the local
mosquito population, ongoing evidence of the absence of
local establishment will provide conﬁrmation of the validity of
containment procedures. When physically conﬁned studies
are conducted in areas where gene drive mosquitoes will be
unable to survive, less stringent ongoing and posttrial moni-
toring requirements are appropriate.
It is important to be aware that for studies with gene drive
mosquitoes, others unafﬁliated with the project also may be
monitoring for escapees. A strategy should be put in place for
responding to such monitoring efforts and the possible out-
come that detection of escapees is claimed. This might in-
clude providing a mechanism for transparent information
sharing of monitoring results and/or for periodic independent
testing of trap contents. A comprehensive communication
plan also is necessary as part of overall public engagement, as
discussed in the following section.
Engagement. As described in the WHO Guidance Frame-
work, researchers have different engagement obligations to
the community(ies) at the research site as compared with the
greater public.15 At the phase of physical conﬁnement, the
focus will be on in-country engagement. Engagement during
contained studies conducted within the laboratory and/or in-
sectary provides an opportunity to explain project goals and
operations, develop a relationship with the community, and
initiate the process of building trust. Community engagement
is best managed and undertaken by in-country social scien-
tists who understand local value systems and can easily in-
terface with the people. While still working in the laboratory or
insectary, researchers should consider their obligations to the
community in the immediate vicinity of the facility but should
also be planning their interactions with the larger public. At
each subsequent phase of testing, broader outreach and en-
gagement will be required.15
Engagement during contained studies in malaria-endemic
countries should be considered as the beginning of a
continuum thatwill carry on andexpand through the remaining
development and testing process. Researchers should be
prepared to treat engagement as an ongoing process, pro-
viding options for ongoing dissemination of information about
the project and discourse with the community. This might in-
volve, for example, establishment of a community liaison
group or conduct of “open days” at the research facility where
community members can observe the work and talk directly
with researchers.
Because collection of baseline ﬁeld data must begin well
before releases are contemplated, the start of ﬁeld population
studies will represent another early community engagement
opportunity. Baseline studies at the planned release site will
require the presence of a ﬁeld team in villages at the study site
andmay involve local community inhabitants, for example, for
their knowledge of mosquito breeding sites or as collectors. It
will be essential to obtain community support even before
starting baseline studies. Engagement interactions need to be
initiated well before beginning the ﬁeld studies if the ﬁeld team
is not known to the community and there is a need to build
familiarity and trust. Timing could be altered if the study site
and population are already familiar with the study team.
Engagement activities at this phase should include con-
sultation with government authorities to understand their
needs and requirements for a malaria control tool. This might
include discussionswith the nationalmalaria control program,
which would be expected to use the gene drive mosquitoes
as a tool for malaria prevention. However, researchers are
cautioned not to assume that engagement with government
authorities, including regulators, is a substitute for active
community engagement.
Engagement activities should be supported by a compre-
hensive communications plan, which will underpin efforts to
inform society about the project in good faith. Researchers are
encouraged to develop their communications plan in con-
sultation with experts, who will be skilled at developing un-
derstandable communication approaches that can reach
stakeholders at various levels. The working group members
remind researchers of their responsibility to engage and
communicate clearly and accurately about the potential risks
and beneﬁts inherent in their work, while not creating
misperceptions.
Regulatory issues. Researchers should expect that regu-
lators will want to understand remediation options in the case
of an accidental release, which must be communicated in a
realistic manner. Researchers and funders also should be
aware that regulators may require a plan for follow-up sur-
veillance after completion of approved physically conﬁned
studies. It is possible that this may extend for a prolonged
period. Expectations may be clariﬁed by early interaction with
regulators and ministries or other parties responsible for
malaria or biosafety surveillance. Researchers and funders
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must be prepared to support remediation and surveillance
activities as required by regulators.
The Cartagena Protocol currently does not require notiﬁ-
cation of neighboring countries for physically conﬁned studies
withGMO.However, Article 17 does require countrieswhere a
release may lead to an unintentional transboundary move-
ment that might have an adverse effect on biodiversity to
notify other countries thatmight be affected; this requirement
could become relevant in the case of a breach of laboratory
containment in countries where the species is endemic, and
the modiﬁcation is likely to become established and spread
within the natural mosquito population. Researchers must
notify the NBA of a breach and follow the instructions from
the regulator. The country, through its designated Cartagena
Protocol Focal Point,113 is responsible for notifying other
countries.
Key points: physically conﬁned laboratory studies.
c Strict physical conﬁnement of gene drive mosqui-
toes can be achieved in an indoor laboratory, insectary,
or large environmental chamber. It is expected that a
larger testing space will provide a more realistic sense
ofmosquito behaviors such asmating competitiveness.
c All studies of mosquitoes carrying a low-threshold
gene drive system before approval to move to ﬁeld
testing should be conducted under “enhanced Level 2
containment,” equivalent to Level 3 conditions for ar-
thropods without the Level 3 requirements for patho-
gencontainment.Development ofSOPs and trainingof
personnel on compliance will be critical to mainte-
nance of containment and data quality. Those over-
seeing this research should agree on a set of widely
recognized standards for operation of laboratories/
insectaries testing gene drive mosquitoes. Compli-
ance with containment requirements should be exter-
nally validated.
c If an appropriate containment facility and well-trained
staff are not available within the endemic area partner
country, or risk of escape from containment cannot be
brought to acceptable levels for other reasons, then
initial safety work with driving constructs should be
performed outside of a region suitable for establish-
ment but in mosquitoes with the local African genetic
background. Scientists from African partner institu-
tions should be involved in the development that takes
place outside the region.
c Candidates considered for movement to ﬁeld testing
should be based on a sound hypothesis and demon-
strate efﬁcacy and ﬁtness characteristics in the labora-
tory that are consistent with the TPP and anticipated
product claim. At this early stage of testing, the major
efﬁcacy criterion that should prevent a gene drive can-
didate from being considered as a potential vector con-
trol tool is the likelihood of resistance arising too rapidly
for the candidate to have a beneﬁcial effect against
malaria transmission, and every effort must be made
during initial laboratory studies to mitigate against this
possibility.
c As is the case with conventional biocontrol agents, em-
phasis must be placed on safety evaluation before the
initiationofﬁeld releases.All aspectsof safety identiﬁedby
risk assessment should be investigated as thoroughly as
possible under appropriatephysical containment to justify
moving acandidate to ﬁeld testing. For example, potential
harm to human and animal health, or to biodiversity,
should be considered. The hazards posed by a proposed
releaseneed tobeassessedand their probabilities judged
as acceptably low by the regulatory authority based on
laboratory data before the investigational product is
moved from the containment facility to the ﬁeld.
c The standard for moving a gene drive construct from
the laboratory to ﬁeld testing should be awell-reasoned
justiﬁcation that it will donomore harm tohumanhealth
than wild-type mosquitoes of the same genetic back-
ground and nomore harm to the ecosystem than other
standard vector control interventions.
SITE SELECTION AND PREPARATION FOR FIELD-TESTING
Although making no assumptions about where gene drive
constructs might be created, working group members recog-
nized thecritical importanceofsite selectionandpreparation for
ﬁeld testing gene drive mosquitoes. For those projects origi-
nating outside a disease-endemic country, this will begin by
establishing a partnership with an institution with which to
pursue research and product development within a country
where further testing will be conducted.
Regardless of where the project originates, it will be nec-
essary to identify and characterize potential sites for ﬁeld re-
leases.Site selectionmustbegin very early in thedevelopment
pathway, ideally more than 2 years before any releases are
contemplated, keeping in mind the need for substantial vec-
tor, disease, and relevant ecological baseline data and com-
munity engagement before ﬁeld-testing. Thus, site selection
and preparation ideally will commence during the period fol-
lowing initial proof of principal, but while the gene drive in-
vestigational product still is being tested and reﬁned in the
laboratory. Guidance on selection of sites for ﬁeld-testing
GMM has been published elsewhere.15,114
Partnership and technology transfer. In situations where
the gene drive construct is developed outside of sub-Saharan
Africa, and researchers are seeking an African partner in-
stitution for continued research and development, technology
transfer should be a major goal of the work. Partnerships with
researchers and institutions in the country(ies) where the
productwill bedeveloped anddeployedmust beconducted in
a spirit of co-ownership and co-development of the technol-
ogy, and in amanner thatwill promote and foster leadership by
the in-country scientists. Scientists and research institutions
in the countrieswhere the product ultimately will be usedmust
play a central role in the development process from its
early stages. In addition to their key scientiﬁc role, they will
be the most appropriate group to present the technology to
communities and other stakeholders in their countries. In-
country researchers will be best positioned to understand in-
country attitudes and to build trust in the research. They also
will have access to local genetic variants of An. gambiae and
locally important vector species other than An. gambiae to
which the technology will need to be applied to achieve
malaria elimination on the continent. Although all partners
should be available for support, the in-country institution
will bear responsibility for interactions with the national
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regulatory and other government authorities. In fact, many
countries require partnerships with national institutions, with
the in-country institution as the applicant organization, as a
condition of regulatory approval for any activity involving a
GMO. Thus, the presence of an in-country champion for the
development of a gene drive product is imperative.
Technical capacity at the in-country partner site is an
important consideration for choice of partner; for example,
adhering carefully to SOPs and institutional policies is a pre-
requisite for assessing and ensuring both safety and efﬁcacy
of the gene drive mosquitoes. The in-country partner in-
stitution should have access to sufﬁcient infrastructure to
support ﬁeld trials, including an experienced team of ento-
mologists and epidemiologists, and the capacity for transport,
sample collection, and laboratory work. Participation of social
scientists and science communication experts also will be
required before the initiation of ﬁeld trials. If not already pre-
sent, support for appropriate infrastructure and capacity
strengthening will be required.
Political support and in-country acceptability. Recog-
nizing that in sub-SaharanAfricamany research organizations
are government afﬁliated, researchers will be responsible for
undertaking the early discussions with appropriate authorities
and others that are needed to gauge properly their willingness
to consider the development and deployment of gene drive
technology. Strong evidence of political will to enable and
support gene drive studies is a critical element of site selec-
tion. Political stability is a highly desirable, but not always
predictable, site characteristic.
Early interaction with the Ministry of Health or equivalent is
important, because this agency would be the ultimate con-
sumer of the technology as apublic health tool. Likewise, early
interaction with the appropriate regulatory bodies, which in
some countries may be local and/or regional as well as na-
tional, is critical. Anyexisting international agreements that the
country has ratiﬁed should be considered. In the case of gene
drive mosquitoes, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety82 is
relevant, and laws governing research and development of
GMO are anticipated to provide an overarching framework for
regulatory decisions. Typically, these will be placed in such
governmental units as the Ministries of Research, Science and
Technology, orEnvironment.However, other relevantministries
such as Health also should be involved in the decision-making
process, and health regulators will play a crucial role in later
stage testing.
Civil society often plays a critical role in shaping national
discussions. It would be wise to investigate local social and
cultural perspectives on biotechnology research, malaria
eradication, and large-scale public health efforts. Stakeholder
mapping67 will help to identify inﬂuential religious groups,
nongovernmental organizations or individuals who should be
engaged. It also will be important to determine whether there
are any concerns about protection of local biodiversity. This
would include species that are locally valued, as well as spe-
cies that are protected by national and international conser-
vation laws or agreements.
Legal and regulatory infrastructure. The presence of a
national biosafety law, or other relevant legislation, and
functional regulatory infrastructure should be considered a
priority in the selection of research sites. Not all regulatory
systems are alike, and it is important to determine in advance
whether the regulatory authorities are open toGMOandwilling
to engage in constructive discussions on this issue. Relevant
laws regarding liability and redress for personal injury or en-
vironmental damage should be considered in site selection.
Where strong precautionary principles underlie the existing
regulatory framework, it will be important to engage early with
authorities in a discussion of whether they consider the rele-
vance of potential beneﬁts as well as risks.
Because of the potential for transboundary movement,
such risk–beneﬁt discussions should consider the possibility
for regional regulatory cooperation in planning and conduct of
early testing. If there are regional authorities that support
multiple countries, these should be consulted as well to de-
termine their understanding of and interest in the use of gene
drive mosquitoes for malaria prevention. Early discussions
with regulators and other government authorities would be
facilitated by access to regulatory and communications ad-
visors and external technical experts in areas that are not
represented on the research team. As mentioned in the fol-
lowing text, regulatory capacity building may need to receive
substantial attention in some disease-endemic countries.
Field site characteristics. Researchers will be responsible
for taking all the various requirements for conducting a suc-
cessful test into consideration and justifying that plan to reg-
ulators. The site(s) where efﬁcacy trials will be performedmust
have, ideally as the predominant malaria vector, the same
mosquito species that is targeted by the investigational gene
drive mosquito product. This will be particularly important for
determining epidemiological impact. Moreover, ﬁeld site(s) for
initial releases must be chosen with a view to geographic
isolation (see Small-scale ﬁeld testing for entomological
efﬁcacy).
Consideration must be given to anticipated scale and out-
comes when selecting sites for future trials. At trial sites, re-
searchers will require access to current baseline data on
entomological and epidemiological factors of relevance to trial
design and endpoints. The working group suggested that
such data should be available for at least 2 years before initi-
ation of testing to allow for observation of multi-seasonal and
multi-year variation. Researchers must anticipate the condi-
tions under which efﬁcacy trials ultimately will be conducted,
particularly with respect to what other vector control methods
might be in use, and ensure that those interventions are in use
during the collection of baseline data.
Data to be collected will be those that are necessary to
assess the effects of the investigational gene drive product on
malaria vector mosquito populations and on local parasite
transmission. These might include information such as vector
diversity and population structure, effective vector population
size, vector dispersal, sporozoite rate, andnatural variations in
the genomic sequence(s) that are targeted by the gene drive
construct. Genetic characterization of the vector may be im-
portant for proper targeting of gene drive constructs. If effect
on malaria transmission will be assessed in the trial, data
should be collected onmalaria incidence and prevalence, and
on the distribution of the parasite across different Anopheles
species. Even in early testing, in addition to determining that
the relevant mosquito species is present at the proposed ﬁeld
site, regulators also may want to know the epidemiological
signiﬁcanceof the speciﬁc vector that the genedrive targets. It
may be useful to engage with an expert in the design of large-
scale vector control trials to plan more speciﬁcally what in-
formation will be needed for future trials of the investigational
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product early in the development process. Experiments at all
phases of testing should be designed to address anticipated
questions about risk; in this regard, it will be necessary to
solicit input from experienced ecologists. Researchers should
be mindful of the potential need to collect relevant baseline
ecological data, in addition to the focus on mosquitoes and
malaria.
Researchers should consider collecting, cataloging, and
storing samples of local mosquitoes and malaria parasites as
a genetic repository against which they can measure any
changes resulting from ﬁeld-testing of gene drive mosquitoes
in the future. This would require standardized methods for
species identiﬁcation and appropriate facilities for archiving
samples to maintain their integrity. Such sampling ideally
would be done in multiple areas, which will eventually be split
between control and treatment sites (see sections on Efﬁcacy
testing).
Key points: site selection and preparation for ﬁeld
testing.
c When investigational gene drive products are created
outside the region where they will be ﬁeld-tested,
partnership with in-country scientists and institution(s)
must begin early in the development process.
c Partnerships must be conducted in a spirit of co-
ownership and co-development of the technology,
which promotes and fosters leadership by the in-
country scientists. Theywill play a pivotal technical and
representational role throughout the development
pathway.
c Identiﬁcation of partner organizations and ﬁeld sites
should take into consideration not only the level of in-
country scientiﬁc capacity and local malaria trans-
mission conditions, but also whether there is political
support for new technologies and a national biosafety
law or other relevant legislation that would provide the
necessary regulatory infrastructure for evaluating the
technology.
c Selection of ﬁeld sites must begin early enough to
obtain multi-seasonal baseline entomological, epide-
miological, and ecological data needed to plan future
trials.
SEMI-FIELD TESTING
The intent of a phaseddevelopment pathway is to test anew
technology incrementally, adding complexity at each new
step. For other GMO, limited environmental exposure tradi-
tionally has been accomplished by two means: physical or
ecological conﬁnement. These methods may likewise be ap-
plied to gene drive mosquitoes. Thus, the ﬁrst step beyond
contained laboratory testing for GMM may be conduct of
physically conﬁned semi-ﬁeld, or caged, testing. Semi-ﬁeld
testing is intended to allow for observation under a more
natural setting, but under conditions that limit release of gene
drive mosquitoes into the environment.
This step was not stated as a requirement in the WHO
Guidance Framework andwas not considered by this working
group to be on the critical path for development from a tech-
nical perspective (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, the working
group acknowledged that semi-ﬁeld testing within large out-
door cagesmaybeviewedby regulators, communities, and/or
the public as important for maximizing information about or
familiarity with gene drive mosquitoes before ﬁeld release,
perhaps especially when testing a ﬁrst-in-class approach.
Thus, it will be important to have a discussion about the value
and necessity of semi-ﬁeld testing with regulators and the
public early in the planning process. In the case that semi-ﬁeld
testing is pursued, it will be important to use it as productively
as possible and suggestions on how to do this are provided in
the following text. In making the decision as to whether semi-
ﬁeld testing will be undertaken, it must be acknowledged that
semi-ﬁeld trials add time and cost to the development path-
way for genedrivemosquitoes as a tool formalaria control and
eradication.
Information similar to that expected from semi-ﬁeld testing
also may be obtained in indoor facilities outside An. gambiae
hospitable regions by testing in large environmentally con-
trolled indoor chambers that simulate natural temperature,
humidity, lighting, and spatial conditions. In these recom-
mendations, such facilities are considered as part of physi-
cally conﬁned laboratory testing. As an extensionof laboratory
testing, such facilities provide several layers of containment
and offer a useful alternative or precursor to semi-ﬁeld testing
in the mosquito-hospitable region for evaluating the behavior
and ﬁtness of gene drive mosquitoes.
The recommendations of this working group consider only
the requirements for semi-ﬁeld testing in an environment
hospitable toAn. gambiae. Inmalaria-endemic settings, this is
assumed to involve testing in outdoor cages.95,115,116 This
phase is not intended to involve testing in a ﬁeld facility that
provides an ACL 2 + laboratory level of containment. The in-
tent of semi-ﬁeld testing is to create a nearly natural environ-
ment in terms of exposure to variations in environmental such
as light and weather and natural ﬂora and fauna. Thus, the
working group recommended that it is not useful or desirable
to build high containment ﬁeld cages in disease endemic re-
gions solely for testing gene drive mosquitoes. It must be
understood, however, that the chances for gene drive mos-
quitoes to escape into the environment will be higher in semi-
ﬁeld testing than in the laboratory. Also, no matter how much
effort is put into making the cage environment as natural as
possible, it still presents aprotected andartiﬁcial environment.
Thus, results fromcage testingmaynot be entirely reﬂective of
results from a ﬁeld release.
The working group did not consider semi-ﬁeld testing to be
anessential requirement; however, if such testing isconducted,
the aim should be to improve the likelihood for success of a
subsequent ﬁeld release. In this regard, the working group
envisioned the possibility of a dynamic bidirectional interaction
between semi-ﬁeld studies and initial small-scale release
studies. For example, it could beuseful to return to cage testing
to obtain additional information on mosquito performance to
reﬁnemethodology and improve the delivery regimen if the ﬁrst
release does not result in satisfactory establishment.
Safety. Because containment cannot be guaranteed in
semi-ﬁeld testing, and gene drive mosquitoes have the po-
tential to become established in the environment from low-
level releases9,10 (P. A. Welkhoff, personal communication)
(see Box 7), the determination whether to proceed from
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physical conﬁnement in the laboratory or insectary to the ﬁeld
is a critical decision point. Semi-ﬁeld testing should not be
considered as a prerequisite for decision-making on safety
before ﬁeld release.
Although regulators will conduct their own risk assessment,
the working group strongly recommended that an external,
third party all-hazards risk assessment be conducted before
decision-making about a regulatory application, as a tool to
guide planning and preparedness. As discussed previously,
biosafety hazards identiﬁed in risk assessment must be
addressed satisfactorily before any transition from the con-
tainment facility to semi-ﬁeld testing. The recommended
standard for moving a gene drive construct from physical
conﬁnement in the laboratory or insectary to semi-ﬁeld testing
should be a well-reasoned justiﬁcation that it will do no more
harm to human health than wild-type mosquitoes of the same
genetic background and nomore harm to the ecosystem than
other standard vector control interventions (which include
broad spectrum insecticides).
Because of the possibility of loss of containment from
outdoor ﬁeld cages, the working group recommended the
conservative position of regarding semi-ﬁeld testing as
synonymous with small-scale release. Risk assessment at
this point should include small-scale ﬁeld release, but also
should consider whether any additional hazards are cre-
ated in the context of cage testing (for example, escape of
a concentration of mosquitoes). Risk assessment for
decision-making to move to ﬁeld testing will be based on
safety and efﬁcacy data collected in containment, including
any information obtained from testing in large environmental
chambers if this is applicable, and predictive analysis of
these data including modeling. If indicated by risk assess-
ment, monitoring of effects on nontarget specieswouldmost
feasibly focus on a subset of “sentinel” organisms identiﬁed
on the basis of their potential for interaction with gene drive
mosquitoes in the ﬁeld cage.95 Ecologists should be con-
sulted in this decision. Semi-ﬁeld testing could provide an
opportunity to conﬁrm prior safety results in the locally rele-
vant environment.
Efﬁcacy. Semi-ﬁeld testing can provide additional in-
formation on the local performance of gene drive mos-
quitoes that could help in the design of future efﬁcacy
trials. Most of the information to be gained in such studies
likely can be obtained by short studies over just a few
generations. This will include insights on the rate of spread
of the transgene under different conditions. Semi-ﬁeld
testing also might provide preliminary information on
mating competitiveness and assortative mating, including
spread of the transgene to other members of the An. gam-
biae species complex that are present at the site and might
be introduced into the cage.
Semi-ﬁeld testing offers a further opportunity to conﬁrm
efﬁcacy of the gene drive construct in the wild genetic
background. For population suppression strategies, this
would allow testing the rate of suppression against wild
mosquito isolates under larger scale conditions. For pop-
ulation replacement strategies, it may be necessary to bring
gene drive mosquitoes back to the laboratory to assess their
ability to prevent development of local Plasmodium isolates
using membrane feeding methods with fresh gametocytes.
Certain behavioral characteristicsmight beexaminedwithin
the ﬁeld cage. For example, it might also be possible to obtain
a sense of how the gene drive mosquitoes interact with other
vector control methods, such as long-lasting insecticidal bed
nets. Although likely to be logistically difﬁcult and time-
consuming, if cage testingwere tobeconductedover different
seasons, it might provide preliminary information on dry sea-
son survival that could be useful for design of future efﬁcacy
trials. Depending on the nature of the proposedmethod, semi-
ﬁeld testing might support proof of concept for a potential
genetic remediation strategy; however, if the remediation
construct includes gene drive, its premature release and es-
tablishment could jeopardize further testing of the original
investigational product.
Semi-ﬁeld testing is not expected to provide any direct
data on epidemiological impact, although it could provide
data that reﬁne parameters for modeled estimates of po-
tential impact.
Site selection and containment requirements. Standard
location, and structural and operational characteristics of
semi-ﬁeld cages have been described in detail elsewhere,95
where double-walled design was recommended with mesh or
screen sides and ceiling of a porosity suitable for containing
mosquitoes (100 μm netting was suggested). If regulators
allow semi-ﬁeld testing to be conducted under the same au-
thorization as small-scale release (see Regulatory issues), the
stringency of containment requirements for ﬁeld cages can be
balancedwith the need to provide near natural conditions that
will increase the relevance of results to later ﬁeld testing ef-
forts. Cage size is relevant because the intent is to simulate a
natural outdoor environment and allow near-natural mosquito
biology and behavior, such as formation of mating swarms.
Larger cages also can accommodate the introduction of na-
tive plants or alternative animal hosts to enhance the envi-
ronment and allow staff to work inside.
Given the possibility of escapes, if semi-ﬁeld testing is
deemed to be appropriate, researchers and funders should
consider the desirability of placing the ﬁeld cage in a geo-
graphically isolated location as described for small-scale ﬁeld
testing (see Small-scale ﬁeld-testing for entomological
efﬁcacy). Compromises between ideals for physical and
ecological conﬁnement, as well as practical issues such as
worker access, must be considered in determining the best
location for the cage.
As in physically conﬁned laboratory testing, adherence to
SOPs for containment, record keeping, and other processes
BOX 7
The hazard of establishment
Thehazard of establishment addresses the possibility that following an accidental release the genedrive constructwill still exist anywhere in the
environmentmonths to years later. For low-threshold gene drives a variety of analyses predict that release of low numbers ofmosquitoes could
result in a greater than 50%chance of establishment. However, the probability of establishment calculation does not state anything about how
manymosquitoes carrying the gene drive construct remain in the environment, how dispersed they will be, or whether they will drive to ﬁxation
around the release site. It only indicates that there is a higher likelihood that the construct will not have disappeared.
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of quality assurancewill be crucial for studies conducted in the
ﬁeld cage. Given the outdoor location of semi-ﬁeld cages,
SOPs also should be put in place for responding to un-
expected events, such as acts of nature that might compro-
mise containment. Staff training and auditing for compliance
with such procedures will be a priority in preparing for semi-
ﬁeld testing. Security precautions should be put in place
because the ﬁeld cage will present an obvious target for
opponents of the technology wishing to halt the research, or
alternatively, for proponents wishing to gain access to gene
drivemosquitoes and release them prematurely with the hope
of preventing malaria.
Monitoring. Regulators will conduct their own facility and
trial monitoring. However, the working group suggested that
provision for independent third-party monitoring during semi-
ﬁeld testing could be useful for affording both additional in-
formation to the project and reassurance to the public.
Standard operating procedures should include plans for
monitoring for genedrivemosquitoesoutside the cage, similar
to those implemented during physically conﬁned laboratory
testing. Response to detection of escapeeswill be dictated by
whether regulatory permission for small-scale release has
been obtained (seeRegulatory issues). If the cage is located in
or near the intended site for initial small-scale release, and
approvals for such a release already have been obtained,
escapes from the ﬁeld cage might simply be considered as
the beginning of the planned transition to small-scale re-
lease. However, if the ﬁeld cage is not located in the planned
site of small-scale release and/or there has been no approval
for release, then escapes from the cage that may result in
local establishment of the transgenic mosquitoes would
trigger a previously agreed on follow-up plan. Before
semi-ﬁeld testing in this scenario, researchers should have
developed a strategy for monitoring for persistence and es-
tablishment, along with any remediation activities, in agree-
ment with regulators. Because it is expected that safety will
already have been carefully assessed in laboratory testing,
remediation may not be a major concern if low-level escapes
are detected. However, in a situation where accidental or
intended releases have occurred,monitoring for establishment
of the gene drive construct in the local An. gambiae population
should be conducted before subsequent ﬁeld releases at the
same site to ensure the population still will be susceptible to the
gene drive mechanism.
Engagement. Itwill becrucial to assesscommunity attitude
toward the project before committing to a trial site. Semi-ﬁeld
testing provides additional opportunities for further engage-
ment with the local community. Before and during semi-ﬁeld
testing, engagement activities will include stakeholders living
in the region of the ﬁeld cage and potential release site(s).
Although interaction with key opinion leaders should have
begun earlier, it will become a critical component of engage-
ment at this point.
It will be important to ensure that the community under-
stands the concept and goals of semi-ﬁeld testing, including
information on safety studies that have already been per-
formed. Observation of research staff working inside the ﬁeld
cage with gene drive mosquitoes may help to boost public
conﬁdence about safety. However, researchers will need to
explain that cage trials are not aimed at evaluating safety
but are for obtaining information that will optimize planning
for ﬁeld release. The community must be advised of the
possibility that escapes may happen and what will be done if
that should be the case. The potential need for repeated cage
studies also should be explained. A process must be put in
place sharing information on results from these and other
relevant studies with the community and responding to their
questions or concerns.
Researchers must identify an appropriate method for
obtaining community endorsement to conduct the studies.
What constitutes acceptancewill be culturally determined and
may be identiﬁed through advance discussions with the
community. Engagement is an ongoing process, and com-
munity authorization/endorsement must be continually con-
ﬁrmed as new studies are undertaken. Institutional ethics
committees, regulators, and community advisory boards
likely will play a role in deﬁning the requirements for authori-
zation. If studies involving human research participation are
conductedwithin the ﬁeld cage, appropriate ethical approvals
must be obtained.65
Regulatory issues. Individual countries will be responsible
for regulatory decision-making. However, researchers also
are strongly encouraged to interact with theWHO through the
VCAG before proceeding to ﬁeld studies in locations hospi-
table to the target vector species.
Because containment within semi-ﬁeld cages cannot be
guaranteed, the working group suggested that if semi-ﬁeld
testing is undertaken the regulatory application optimally
would request permission for both semi-ﬁeld testing and
small-scale ﬁeld release, rather than semi-ﬁeld testing alone.
Safety justiﬁcation for such a combined application will be
based on data collected during contained studies, including, if
applicable, data from testing in large environmental chambers
located in regions inhospitable to An. gambiae. Because the
application usually requires information on geographic area
and local conditions, the regulatory processwill be simpliﬁed if
the cages for semi-ﬁeld testing are located in the same area
where initial small-scale releases are planned.
Researchers, funders, and government authorities should
agree on any remediation expectations and accountability
before the initiation of semi-ﬁeld testing. Plans should indicate
how residual populations in the cage will be eliminated after a
trial is completed, if required by regulators. The current regu-
latory assumption, based on experiencewith conﬁned trials of
GM crops, is that the modiﬁed organismwill be removed from
the environment after an approved period. Regulatory recer-
tiﬁcation may need to be sought if the research continues
beyond the originally approved timeline.
If semi-ﬁeld testing is conducted, the working group rec-
ommended that such testing bemanaged on a regional basis,
with involvement of regional regulatory authorities in agreement
on issues such as protocol development, testing requirements,
and data collection methods. The intent is to facilitate regional
understanding and acceptance of the results from semi-ﬁeld
testing, thus increasing the relevanceof the resultswhile reducing
the need to build cages and repeat testing in every country.
Key points: semi-ﬁeld testing.
c Semi-ﬁeld testing is intended to allow initial ﬁeld eval-
uation in a more natural setting than the laboratory,
whereas still limiting environmental exposure. The aim
of semi-ﬁeld testing should be to improve the likelihood
for success of a subsequent ﬁeld release. Conduct of
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semi-ﬁeld testing also may serve to boost regulatory
and public conﬁdence in the investigational product.
Because a safety determination should have been
made previously based on studies conducted under
physical containment and performance results
obtained within the protected cage environment, al-
though potentially informative, may not be entirely re-
ﬂective of results from a ﬁeld release, caged testing
was not considered to be on the critical path for
development.
c Mosquitoes carrying a low-threshold gene drive sys-
tem theoretically may be able to establish themselves
from low-level introductions. Because of the possibility
of accidental escape from outdoor ﬁeld cages, the
working group recommended the conservative posi-
tion of regarding semi-ﬁeld testing as synonymouswith
low-level release. If undertaken, cage testing should be
conducted with the understanding that it is part of a
ﬁeld testing continuum. If allowed by authorities, the
regulatory application should include permission to
conduct both semi-ﬁeld testing and small-scale ﬁeld
release, rather than to conduct semi-ﬁeld testing alone.
It is recommended that the cage be placed in or near
the site planned for initial small-scale releases, if pos-
sible, to simplify regulatory review.
c Although regulators will conduct their own trial moni-
toring, researchers or funders should consider
arranging for independent third-party monitoring for
escapes during semi-ﬁeld testing, to provide both ad-
ditional information to the project and reassurance to
the public. Plans should be put in place before testing
begins about how to follow up if monitoring detects a
lack of conﬁnement.
c If semi-ﬁeld testing is conducted, it should be handled
on a regional basis, with regional involvement in and
agreement on protocol development, testing require-
ments, anddata collectionmethods. This is intended to
facilitate regional acceptance of the results from semi-
ﬁeld testing, thus increasing the relevanceof the results
while reducing the need to build cages and repeat
testing in every country.
SMALL-SCALE FIELD-TESTING FOR
ENTOMOLOGICAL EFFICACY
As deﬁned in the WHO Guidance Framework, the next
testing phase would be small-scale ecologically conﬁned
testing with a primary goal of measuring entomological efﬁ-
cacy.15 The working group debated whether ecological con-
ﬁnement is applicable to gene drive mosquitoes released into
an existing wild population. As described under the Site se-
lection and containment requirements, efforts can bemade to
identify a geographically isolated site for the initial ﬁeld release
where ecological characteristics minimize the possibility of
outward migration of gene drive mosquitoes and inward mi-
gration of wild-type mosquitoes. Thus, the working group
determined that although in the case of low-threshold gene
drive ecological conﬁnement cannot be assured, the intent in
the initial ﬁeld trial should be to minimize environmental ex-
posure to the extent possible while conﬁrming efﬁcacy and
safety observations from prior stages of testing.
Trial design for entomological efﬁcacy should include
standard elements such as outcomemeasures, comparators,
data collection methods, analysis, and reporting schedules,
and stopping/discontinuation rules. The primary technical
goals of small-scale ﬁeld releases are to: 1) test the rate of
transmission of the transgenic construct into the local An.
gambiae population; and 2) continue assessing biological
function (suppression or replacement).
It is expected that therewill be aneed for several small-scale
trials, each perhaps on the order of a single village, to un-
derstand the effect on entomological endpoints of variables
such as delivery protocol. Such small-scale trials will also
assess performance under different environmental and
transmission conditions before proceeding to large-scale
trials testing epidemiological efﬁcacy. The rate of spread of
the transgenic construct via mating is likely to be dynamic,
inﬂuenced by factors such as variation in mosquito density,
effects of seasonality, natural barriers to or promoters of dis-
persal, use of other vector-control interventions, human
population density, andmosquito species composition. Thus,
researchers, funders, and regulatory authorities should expect
and plan for more than one small-scale release to obtain data
across a range of transmission conditions as necessary to
design a trial to measure disease impact. As discussed in the
following text, the more similar the test sites at this phase are
to the sites for future epidemiological efﬁcacy trials, the
more relevant the results will be for future trial design. In-
deed, researchers should consider the possibility that sites
chosen for small-scale releases later will become part of
the epidemiological trial for that same investigational
product. When identifying the locations at which to con-
duct small-scale testing, researchers should keep in mind
that the WHO VCAG has expressed a preference for more
than one large-scale efﬁcacy trial, to be conducted in dif-
ferent settings, and consider how this might ﬁgure into
planning.32
Assuming no early evidence of adverse consequences,
geographic isolation need not remain an expectation in
subsequent small-scale trials following the initial release,
but observation for any unanticipated results related to
safety should continue. As mentioned, subsequent small-
scale trials may need to be conducted in multiple sites and
under different malaria transmission conditions. The con-
cept of multiple small releases is similar to the traditional
testing pathway for drugs and vaccines, and that proposed
for other types of vector control products, which generally
rely on multiple small-scale trials to collect all data neces-
sary to design a complex and resource intensive large-scale
trials for disease efﬁcacy.117
Researchers and regulators must agree on a plan for how
long initial releases will be followed and what information is
required to make the decision to move to large-scale releases
for testing epidemiological efﬁcacy.Modelingwill help identify
the data that should be collected and how long observation
should continue. From the standpoint of information collec-
tion, a longer observation period would yield valuable data on
duration of efﬁcacy (including how long it takes for genetic
resistance to develop) and additional insights on safety (e.g.,
allowing more time to check for ecological effects). For
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example, sites of early releases ofWolbachia-infected Aedes
aegypti mosquitoes have been monitored over years to un-
derstand the stability of the antiviral effector mechanism.118,119
However, a longer termobservationperiodalsowill increase the
probability that mosquitoes could escape from geographic
conﬁnement. The time frame will need to balance data needs,
regulatory needs, availability of funds, and expediency.
If the site is suitable for inclusion in the trial for epidemio-
logical efﬁcacy, the release can be allowed to continue while
releases at additional sites commence. If the site is not
expected to participate in the epidemiological trial, the release
could still be allowed to remain active for extended observa-
tion. If allowed to continue, it is anticipated that long-term
follow-up could be conducted in parallel with subsequent
testing so as not to add time and costs to the development
process. This practice has precedent in vaccine and bio-
control trials. If study termination is required, it is expected that
this would involve intense application of standard pesticides.
Safety. As stated previously, initial ﬁeld release should not
proceed without an external third party all-hazards risk as-
sessment to determine those risks that are signiﬁcant and
require risk mitigation measures and, thereby, guide planning
and maximize preparedness. Although data from physically
conﬁned studies will form the basis for a decision about the
safety ofmoving to ﬁeld releases, it is expected that continued
observation for safety will be maintained during small-scale
releases as a precaution and regulatory requirement. Ecolo-
gists should be involved and/or incorporated into the team at
this point. Any speciﬁc concerns will be identiﬁed through the
risk assessment process, depending on the nature of the gene
drive construct and the environment where the release will
occur. If already performed in the context of semi-ﬁeld testing,
subsequent risk assessment at this phase would be in-
cremental, focusing on differences such as numbers of mos-
quitoes to be released, trial site, or period of exposure. During
small-scale ﬁeld testing, it is important also to include con-
cerns expressed by community members at the trial site and
by involved third parties, such as government ofﬁcials, in the
risk assessment process. Project risks, such as reputational
risk to the research institution(s), also must be taken into ac-
count. After the initial release, risk assessment for subsequent
small-scale releases likewise would be incremental, taking
into consideration differences such as site characteristics or
numbers of mosquitoes to be released and additional con-
cerns expressed by different communities.
The views of ethics committees and/or regulators will pro-
vide the safety information that is required and for how long
monitoring should continue. Trials must be designed to ad-
dress safety questions raised by regulators or other oversight
bodies. As an example, due diligence at this phase might in-
volve observation of the stability of the transgenic construct
and key interactions of the transgenic mosquitoes with other
species. The relevant period formonitoringmaydiffer between
population suppression strategies, where numbers of trans-
genic mosquitoes are intended to decrease sharply over time,
and population replacement strategies that aim to maintain
transgenic mosquitoes in the environment indeﬁnitely.
Determining an impact onmalaria incidence is not expected
to be a key objective of early small-scale trials. However, if
malaria transmission is present at the site of small-scale re-
leases, then monitoring for human health consequences
should be considered as a safety precaution. Data on existing
control measures, incidence of cases, and prevalence in var-
ious age groups should be collected before and after the re-
lease (see Field site characteristics). If an adequate passive
surveillance system is not available in hospitals and health
centers within the study area, there may be a need to bolster
or establish such a system to obtain accurate data. This in-
formation will be important for evaluating whether there is any
correlation between a change in disease pattern (either posi-
tive or negative) and the release, and likelywill be requestedby
both the community and regulators as a safety measure.
Evidence for adverse impact on human health would con-
stitute a “no-go” criterion to end further testing and would
trigger remediation efforts. Even at this early stage, re-
searchers are encouraged to consider the utility of a small
Data andSafetyMonitoringBoard (DSMB),120 as is common for
clinical trials, to provide independent monitoring of the malaria
data, to avoid bias in decision-making. An independent trial
steering committee would be helpful to provide advice on the
many decisions to be made in ﬁeld testing.
Efﬁcacy. It will be important to plan the ﬁrst introduction of
gene drive mosquitoes to provide the best opportunity for a
successful trial. Modeling based on the speciﬁc characteris-
tics of the investigational gene drive product and current en-
tomological and epidemiological data from the ﬁeld site
location will be instrumental in designing the initial trial.
However, allowance should be made for the fact that ﬁeld
performance of vector control tools is rarely as good as pre-
dicted in theory based on limited biological information.
Proof-of-principle testing will determine whether the con-
struct performs as expected, that is, whether it increases in
frequency within the local An. gambiae population over time
and maintains its biological function. A major objective will be
to understand movement of the driving transgenes through
the local mosquito population. Preliminary insights may be
gained at this phase about how environmental conditions and
human population distribution affect the rate of spread. An
initial understanding of these characteristics can be obtained
at any location where An. gambiae are present, but it will be
important that baseline studies have been conducted for a
sufﬁcient period to accurately assess them. This information
on rate of spread will be crucial for design of subsequent trials
for epidemiological efﬁcacy. For example, for a randomized,
cluster-controlled trial (described under Epidemiological
testing), it will be important to be able to predict how long it will
take to observe the effect in mosquitoes throughout a treat-
ment cluster and how much separation between clusters will
be required. Because these characteristics are expected to be
inﬂuenced by local conditions, it will be necessary to conduct
a small-scale release in an environment that is similar to the
one envisioned for the epidemiological efﬁcacy trial(s). In lo-
cations where seasonality is an issue, monitoring for trans-
gene spreadmust continue across the dry season. Transgene
tracking should make use of available life stages, including
larvae, adult swarms, and females (including spermathecae).
The other major category of performance information
needed to design an epidemiological efﬁcacy trial is functional
activity (entomological efﬁcacy). For population suppression
strategies, entomological efﬁcacy can be determined by
testing for transgeneprevalence and reductionofAn. gambiae
within the local mosquito population by trapping or other
collection methods. Although localized elimination may be
desirable, this could be difﬁcult to achieve under conditions of
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small-scale release if there is potential for inward migration of
An. gambiae from surrounding untreated areas. Care must be
taken to ensure that any relevant environmental changes,
such as diminished rainfall, are taken into account in inter-
pretation of the entomological results. Testing entomological
efﬁcacy for population replacement strategies will require
assessment of the ability to sustain development of local
Plasmodium isolates by calculating the proportion of mos-
quitoes that are infected. Depending on the conditions of
malaria transmission at the site, this may be accomplished by
looking at naturally acquired infection rate or by membrane
feeding with fresh gametocytes in the laboratory. In either
case, mosquitoes will need to be brought back to a laboratory
facility for testing. Thus, accessibility of the release site will be
a particularly important consideration for assessing function
of population replacement strategies.
Resilience to the development of genetic resistance should
be assessed to the extent possible within the time frame of the
small-scale release. Development of resistance can be
assessed by observing the stability of functional activity and
by periodic sampling and molecular characterization of the
local An. gambiae population to look for variations in the gene
drive–targeted sequence. For population suppression, re-
sistance might be detected as a reversal of the trend toward
decreasing numbers of An. gambiae.43 For population re-
placement, the goal is complete inhibition of parasite
development.11,13,121,122 If complete refractoriness is not
observed, it will be important to monitor for development of
parasites that are resistant to the effector mechanism and for
evolution of genetic resistance to the gene drive construct in
themosquitoes. If resistant parasites are observed, it will then
be necessary to consider whether the changes might make
themmore dangerous (e.g., more virulent, or more resistant to
antimalarial drugs).
Other useful data that can be collected at this stage, if the
release is allowed to proceed long enough, might include ef-
fect on other species within the An. gambiae complex (as-
suming other species are present); changes in overall malaria
vector abundance, composition, or age structure over time;
and changes in Plasmodium infection rates in the vector (as-
suming malaria transmission at the site).
Performance should be judged against deﬁned criteria for
adequate behavior (e.g., establishment, spread, functionality),
which should be established before release within a TPP
discussed with the regulatory authorities (see General con-
siderations for developing gene drive mosquitoes). In-
ference can be drawnabout the adequacyof the investigational
gene drive product, based on whether the key performance
targets were reached and the predicted study objectives were
achieved. For each small-scale release, researchers and regu-
latorsmustagreeonthe timepoint(s) for reporting resultsand for
deciding whether to move forward to large-scale releases,
irrespective of whether the release is terminated. Indeed, in
keepingwith the concept of a ﬁeld testing continuum (Figure 3),
large-scale trials may involve an expansion from the site(s) of
small-scale release.
As mentioned, testing epidemiological efﬁcacy is not an
anticipated goal at this phase. However, comparison of
facility-based (clinics, hospitals) disease passive surveillance
data before and after release and/or between areas where
release has and has not occurred, advised previously as a
safety precaution, might also provide some preliminary
indication of epidemiological efﬁcacy. It will be necessary to
determine the value of putting additional effort into measuring
health impact within these small-scale releases; sample size
calculations based on prior knowledge of malaria prevalence
and incidence at the trial location could help with these deci-
sions. Further measurements that might be considered in-
clude incidence of cases (or severe disease or mortality),
prevalence in different age groups, and seroconversion rate.
Comparison with a historical or internal control may allow
exclusion of other explanations for an observed change and
suggest a causal relationship.123 Researchers are encour-
aged to consult with the WHO VCAG about their trial plans
well in advance of releases.
Site selection and containment requirements. Many
important factors should be taken into account when identi-
fying the initial release site. These include existence of the
necessary entomological conditions and adequate access to
local, technical, and regulatory expertise, as well as appro-
priate isolation. Ideally, small-scale release sites also will be
located distant from national borders. The working group
recognized that itwill bedifﬁcult to identify sites that provideall
these factors and, therefore, some degree of compromise
likely will be required.
The site for the initial small-scale releasemust at aminimum
providemosquitoes of the same species as the investigational
gene drive product. Because An. gambiae feeds extensively
on people, this will require the presence of humans. Because
the primary goal of small-scale releases is to measure ento-
mological efﬁcacy, there is no requirement for any baseline
malaria prevalence at the ﬁeld site. However, the absence of
local malaria transmission will inﬂuence how population re-
placement strategies are tested for entomological efﬁcacy.
Absence of malaria transmission at the initial site also will
mean that any potential adverse effect on disease cannot be
assessed until later releases.
The working group envisioned that these early releases
could be small, perhaps only the size of a single village. Re-
searchers are advised to plan for more than one release site
(perhaps at least three) to increase ﬂexibility and avoid un-
anticipated timeline delays. Whereas it may be ideal to have
onlyAn. gambiae at the ﬁrst release site tomaximize the ability
to measure functionality of the gene drive construct, such
sites are likely to be difﬁcult to identify. Entomological efﬁcacy
can be distinguished in the presence of other malaria vectors.
Moreover, it could be useful for a release to be undertaken at a
site where other members of the An. gambiae complex in
addition to An. gambiae s.s., particularly An. coluzzii and An.
arabiensis, are present to assess the potential for spread of
the driving transgenes to sibling species.
Ecological conﬁnement. There are differing opinions about
the extent to which ecological conﬁnement is achievable for
An. gambiaemosquitoes in sub-Saharan Africa. Identiﬁcation
of ecological islands on the mainland where genetic isolation
will be maintained reliably within a natural microhabitat is
complicated by the general instability of species boundaries,
although geographic barriers can contribute.124 Human mo-
bility can facilitate the movement of mosquitoes, as the in-
sects can involuntarily be transported in vehicles, boats, and
airplanes. Evidence for other methods of long-range dispersal
of An. gambiae also is building.125
Islands have important advantages over ecological con-
tainment on the mainland for initial testing of gene drive
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mosquitoes, however genetic analyses indicate that neither
lake nor oceanic islands will provide absolute conﬁnement or
inability to spread beyond the island.126–128 Moreover, it must
be remembered that conduct of ﬁeld testing on islands also
may introduce certain other challenges, including difﬁculty of
access.
Because absolute isolation cannot be guaranteed at either
mainland or island sites (see Table 3), the working group did
not make any deﬁnitive recommendation regarding the loca-
tion for initial release. Rather, it recommended that adequate
thought be given early in the planning process to the degree of
isolation achievable at the initial release site. In making this
decision, researchers should consider not only location, hu-
man behavior, and mosquito behavior, but also possibilities
for enhancing ecological conﬁnement by creating buffer
zones or taking advantage of seasonality.
The initial introduction of gene drive mosquitoes should be
undertaken in an environment that provides the necessary
conditions for testing establishment, spread, and entomo-
logical efﬁcacy while at the same time offering geographic
isolation tomaximize, to the extent practical, the possibility for
ecological conﬁnement.
Assuming no adverse effects are observed during initial
introduction, the working group recommended that the need
for geographic isolation could be lifted for subsequent
small-scale releases of the same investigational product,
although safety monitoring should continue as a matter of
due diligence.
Monitoring. Monitoring for transgene spread in this phase
will be simpliﬁed under conditions of strong geographic iso-
lation, although asmentioned previously absolute conﬁnement
of gene drive mosquitoes cannot be guaranteed. There may
be transport to and from islands that could provide opportu-
nities for escape to other locations; for both lake and oceanic
islands this will include boat trafﬁc, and for larger islands may
also include aircraft. This would introduce complexity in terms
of where and how to monitor for escapees. A release at
a mainland site may spread in a more predictable manner,
enabling monitoring from the fringes of the release, but
monitoring may need to cover a large geographic area. Any
road or river trafﬁc in a mainland release area could increase
the possibility of unpredictable longer-range dispersal.
Monitoring for development of genetic resistance by mos-
quitoes or malaria parasites to the gene drive construct within
local mosquitoes has been discussed previously (see Efﬁ-
cacy). This will require that laboratory and/or ﬁeld assays have
been developed and evaluated beforehand.
An important consideration at this phase of evaluation is the
period for which monitoring must be conducted. Data will
need to be archived during the monitoring period. As men-
tioned previously, it would be useful to continue to follow the
release for as long as possible. Deﬁning monitoring obliga-
tions will be particularly relevant if there is no intent to termi-
nate the trial and clear the area, as previously has been the
expectation for trials of GM crops. This decision would be
simpliﬁed if the site becomes part of subsequent large-scale
releases, as this would necessitate ongoing monitoring. Re-
searchers and regulators should agree on a feasible moni-
toring plan that deﬁnes expectations, including duration,
before releases. Funders must be prepared to support moni-
toring requirements imposed by regulators.
Engagement. The release area for small-scale trials should
be sufﬁciently small to allow for intense community engage-
ment through personal interactions. The engagement team
should clearly describe the trial to the community members,
with authentic explanation of risks and beneﬁts, and seek their
perspectives. Although this is best performed by project team
members who are social scientists familiar with the local cul-
ture and are experts in engaging community members, there
should be opportunities for the community to meet with
project leadership, if desired. It is advisable to conduct a
survey to judge the level of community awareness before
asking for endorsement of a release. A community liaison or
referencegroup could be helpful for providing feedbackon the
level of community satisfaction and whether the project is
meeting its engagement goals.
Relevant ethics committees and/or regulatory authorities
mayneed to approve the community authorization plan before
TABLE 3
Some considerations for ecological conﬁnement
Consideration Island Mainland
Efﬁcacy Possibility of less complex mosquito population genetics, less
polymorphism, may increase chances of initial establishment
Easier to obtain conditions for realistic prediction
of establishment and spread rate comparable
to those necessary for testing epidemiological
efﬁcacy
May provide a simpler mosquito population structure less
generalizable to mainland settings
Lower potential for inward migration of wild-type mosquitoes may
increase ability to detect establishment and spread
Containment Genetic evidence for somedegreeof isolationmaysimplifymonitoring Difﬁcult to deﬁne boundaries and thus to control
diffusion
Boat or air trafﬁc to and from islands may complicate detection of
escapes
Any road or river trafﬁc in the area could increase
emigration potential
Monitoring Depending on size, may facilitate intense monitoring May require monitoring over larger area
Engagement Malaria elimination may be achievable using conventional methods,
decreasing willingness to try a novel strategy
Malaria elimination likely to require new tools,
simplifying explanation of potential beneﬁt for
public health
Depending on location, may be less likely to have local scientiﬁc
leadership and champion for the technology
More likely to have research infrastructure, local
scientiﬁc leadership, and champion
Regulatory issues Regional approval desirable in the absence of guaranteed
conﬁnement
Regional approval highly relevant
Depending on degree of isolation, may have special biodiversity
considerations
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release, which should be included in the project development
timeline. Researchers should anticipate that ethics commit-
tees and/or regulatory authorities will require assurance that
the community has access to the standard of care for malaria
according to national policy.
Obligations may differ according to the experimental strat-
egy, for example, if female mosquitoes will be released. Ac-
cess to long-lasting insecticidal nets is required at this stage if
not previously provided during baseline studies, because this
represents the current best practice. Access to malaria med-
ication is not usually a researchproject’s responsibility, but it is
recommended that researchers work with the health care
system to ensure that it is readily available. It should be noted
that increased treatment access may initially result in in-
creased reporting of cases, so, similarly to bed nets, it is best if
these practices are established early to provide realistic
baseline data. If personally identiﬁable data or specimens are
collected as part of small ﬁeld releases, researchers must
observe the requirements of human subject research.
An important consideration is whether opportunities can be
madeavailable for individuals or households at the release site
to choose to not participate and, if so, what these opportuni-
ties might comprise. For small-scale releases, options for
responding to concerns within the hosting community may
include: project agreement to avoid releasing in the immediate
location of the residence, or if that is unsatisfactory, at some
mutually agreed on distance from the household; provision of
mosquito repellent and/or provision of traps to remove mos-
quitoes from the household. However, none of these options
can guarantee complete lack of exposure to gene drive
mosquitoes. The community reference group may have
additional ideas in this regard and should be consulted early
in project development. Researchers should remember that
there will be a need for engagement around these options, to
ensure that community members understand how to access
and use them and what they offer in the context of gene
drive.
It is possible that a malaria outbreak will occur naturally
during testingor follow-up, for example, as a result of rains that
support mosquito development. This possibility, along with
anticipated malaria management strategies, should be dis-
cussedwith the community in advance. Such an outbreak can
be expected to trigger a need for intensive community en-
gagement and broader public communication efforts. The risk
to the project will relate to the level of understanding and trust
that has been established within the community. Researchers
must be prepared to work with the community and respond to
its needs. For example, this may involve temporarily halting
releases or ensuring malaria treatment is available in the area
where malaria has appeared.
At this testing phase, engagement must have proceeded
beyond the local community. Researchers should be engag-
ing with local malaria and vector control programs, both to
understand their plans for future vector control campaigns
that might impact trial results and to begin sensitizing them
about the technology and their potential role in its assess-
ment. Discussions of the release plan through existing re-
gional organizations before initiation of the trial would bewise.
Alsobefore releases, it will be important to have reachedout to
third parties who are likely to have inﬂuence to discuss the
technology and the testing plans. This will include relevant
policy makers, who must be kept informed of and involved in
planning of all phases of ﬁeld testing. Although it may not be
possible to win the endorsement of all parties, it remains
critical to continually interact broadly to enhance un-
derstanding and avoid misperceptions about the research.
Regulatory issues. Individual countries will be responsible
for regulatory decision-making. As envisioned by this working
group, if semi-ﬁeld testing has been conducted then regula-
tors will already have confronted the possibility of small-scale
ﬁeld release of gene drive mosquitoes, and authorization for
both types of testing may have been granted. If not preceded
by semi-ﬁeld testing, or if requested by regulators, this small-
scale ﬁeld testing will require a new regulatory application.
Although the NBA will be the ﬁrst level of entry, it is desirable
for health regulators also toplay aprominent role at this phase.
A major difference between ecologically conﬁned testing of
gene drive mosquitoes and standard conditions for ecologi-
cally conﬁned testing of GM crops is that, because An. gam-
biae feeds almost exclusively on people, humans likely will be
exposed to gene drive mosquitoes at this early stage. This will
require prior discussion with regulators to ensure understanding
of the biological basis for this requirement.
Because regulatory experience with conﬁned testing of GM
cropsassumesclearing the site followinga trial, theconcept of
leaving the release site active also may require a change in
regulatory paradigms. Biocontrol precedentswould be helpful
to provide context for this discussion. Researchers should
begin discussionswith regulators early in the planning of initial
small-scale releases if theywish tomake a case for leaving the
release site active for long-term follow-up.
The extent to which regional regulatory acceptance will be
necessary to allow initial small-scale releases of gene drive
mosquitoes likely will depend on the level of conﬁnement that
can be achieved at the trial site anddistance from international
borders. Modeling may be helpful to inform this prediction.
Researchers must be transparent with regulators about the
potential for transboundary spread of the gene drive con-
struct, based on all available data and information. Under
current mechanisms, the decision to notify or consult with
neighboring country regulators will be made by the regulatory
authority of the country in which the trial is proposed.
Key points: small-scale ﬁeld-testing for
entomological efﬁcacy.
c Small-scale ﬁeld trials primarily are intended to assess
entomological efﬁcacy under natural conditions, while
still restricting environmental exposure to the extent
possible. Although absolute ecological containment
cannot be guaranteed for mosquitoes modiﬁed with
low-threshold gene drive, initial small-scale ﬁeld re-
lease should aim for geographic isolation, to minimize
the possibility of outward migration.
c The primary goals of small-scale ﬁeld releases are to 1)
test the rate of transmission of the transgenic construct
into the local An. gambiae population; and 2) continue
assessing biological function (suppression or re-
placement). Resilience to development of genetic re-
sistance also should be assessed to the extent possible
given scale and timing. Moreover, these releases also
must be designed to address any safety questions
raised by regulators or other oversight bodies.
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c Trials for entomological efﬁcacy must be conducted
where the malaria vector that is the subject of the in-
vestigational gene drive product is present. If malaria
transmission is present at the site, data on malaria in-
cidenceandprevalencebefore andafter release should
be collected (e.g., through passive surveillance) as a
safety precaution. Evidence for adverse impact on
human health would constitute a “no-go” criterion that
would end further testing and trigger remediation
efforts.
c Multiple small releases at different sites likely will be
needed to understand the effects of differences such
as geography, climate, ecology, and human habitation
on the investigational gene drive product, which will be
important for planning a large-scale trial for epidemio-
logical efﬁcacy. Assuming no early evidence of adverse
consequences, the expectation of geographic isolation
can be lifted in subsequent small-scale trials of the
same investigational product but observation for any
unanticipated results related to safety should continue.
c The longer the observation of the release can proceed,
the more information can be collected about the be-
havior of gene drive mosquitoes, spread of the trans-
genic construct, and ecological interactions. However,
allowing the release to remain active may not be stan-
dard practice, especially in the case of regulatory sys-
tems that are used to contain testing of GM crops,
which ordinarily requires termination of the trial fol-
lowed by elimination of GM materials from the envi-
ronment. If researchers desire to leave the release
active at the site, theywill need tomake a strong case to
regulators about the reasons for continuing to observe
the release. Thiswill be simpliﬁed if the site is integrated
into subsequent large-scale trials. Researchers and
regulators must agree on a plan for how long the re-
lease will be followed. This plan must deﬁne the point
for reporting results and making decisions about
moving forward to the next level of testing.
c Before releases, researchers and regulatorsmust agree
on a monitoring plan that is feasible and deﬁnes ex-
pectations. Researchersmust be transparent about the
potential for spread of the transgenic construct, based
on the degree of geographic isolation and prior test-
ing and modeling results. Funders must be prepared
to support monitoring requirements imposed by
regulators.
c Relevant ethics committees and/or regulatory author-
ities likely will need to approve the community en-
gagement and authorization plan before release.
Researchers should anticipate that requirement to
ensure the community is provided with the standard of
care for malaria according to national policy.
FIELD-TESTING FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EFFICACY
The ultimate measure of the efﬁcacy of a gene drive in-
tervention is its ability to reduce or eliminate morbidity and
mortality due to malaria parasites, without signiﬁcant long-
term costs to the socioeconomic system in which it is
deployed. How epidemiological efﬁcacy can be evaluated
may differ depending on whether researchers are working in a
malaria control setting (where there is still appreciable malaria
transmission) or a malaria elimination setting (where disease
burden and transmission levels will be low).129 It will be im-
portant to anticipate what the malaria situation will be at ﬁeld
sites at the time the investigational gene drive product is ready
for ﬁeld-testing, as more countries move toward elimination.
Researchers should strive to keep the trial design simple, as
experience teaches that unexpected complications often
arise during trial conduct. Entomologists are advised to enlist
the participation of thosewith expertise in design and conduct
of clinical trials, including epidemiologists and statisticians, to
support development and execution of epidemiological efﬁ-
cacy trials. World Health Organization has provided recom-
mendations for design of epidemiological efﬁcacy trials for
vector control products.130 Before entering into testing for
epidemiological efﬁcacy, researchers should understand as
much as possible about the behavior of the investigational
gene drive product from prior releases, and in particular how it
responds to seasonality. Researchers should think carefully
about the level of malaria transmission for which their in-
vestigational product would be best suited.
As explained in the WHOGuidance Framework, at the end of
the epidemiological efﬁcacy testing phase sufﬁcient data should
have been collected to understand spatial dispersal, transgene
activity, ecological interactions, and the effect on disease
transmission,15 as these will be key factors in the decision to
implement the technologymorebroadly.Somesenseof thecost
of deployment also may be available, but this must take into
account that delivery methods likely will not yet be optimized.
Safety. It will be necessary to update the all-hazards risk
assessment before moving to large-scale releases, consid-
ering conditions speciﬁc to the trial design and location.
Trials for disease impact will involve human subject re-
search and, therefore, it is expected that the project will be
registered as a clinical trial in a public registry (such as the
existing International Clinical Trials Registry Platform131 or
U.S. National Library of Medicine ClinicalTrials.gov132). It is
standard practice in clinical trials tomonitor for adverse health
events, and to determine whether these occur differentially in
study arms and the likelihood that they are related to the in-
tervention. A trial steering committee and DSMB must be put
in place to regularly review adverse event reports and provide
independent oversight of participant safety as well as efﬁcacy
of the investigational product.133
Ecologists should be incorporated in the team at this stage.
Although no adverse environmental effects would be antici-
patedat thisphasegivenpriorsafetystudiesandenvironmental
monitoring, ongoing routine surveillance is still necessary for
due diligence. It is expected that thiswill focusoncase-speciﬁc
monitoring based on risk assessment. Continued observation
of mosquito community structure is a logical possibility. It also
maybeadvisable to identify amanageable numberofnontarget
organisms with a predicted high exposure to the transgenic
mosquitoes for surveillance during large-scale trials (for ex-
ample, representative ﬁrst order organisms as deﬁned in
Table 2). Although trials for epidemiological efﬁcacy may be
centered on villages, it is advisable to conduct monitoring in
areas away fromvillages, aswell aswithin them, to allow for the
possibility of detecting ecological impacts that are different
from those near human-dominated settings. Evidence for
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absence of nontarget effects at this phase might reduce con-
cerns about the need for general surveillance during the post-
implementation monitoring period.
Efﬁcacy. There are several ways to collect evidence of
epidemiological efﬁcacy in a setting where there is a signiﬁ-
cant malaria disease burden. If the ability of gene drive mos-
quitoes to prevent malaria transmission is as signiﬁcant as
predicted by some modeling, efﬁcacy against malaria may
become obvious even during small-scale releases. However,
because experience suggests that the performance of new
vector control tools in the ﬁeld is rarely at the level predicted
from laboratory studies and modeling results, the working
group assumed a need for generating high-quality evidence of
epidemiological efﬁcacy by randomized trials. This likely will
require larger ﬁeld sites, which introduces additional com-
plexity for planning and execution. It is quite likely that these
sites will contain several species of malaria vector. In that
case, the investigational gene drive product ideally would
target allmajor vectors of theAn. gambiaecomplex in thearea.
If the product targets only a single species, it will be especially
important in designing the trial to rely onmodeling topredict its
potential effect in the presence of other vectors, as this will
affect the establishment of epidemiological endpoints. In this
regard, it will be necessary to understand the proportion of
malaria transmission attributed to the speciﬁc vector species
being targeted as part of baseline data collection.
One possible approach is a stepped-wedge design, with se-
quential roll-out across sites in a randomized entry order.134 This
approach could build on sites of earlier small-scale release. The
cluster randomized controlled trial (CRT), inwhich each cluster is
a village or group of villages, is considered the gold standard
for assessing epidemiological efﬁcacy of vector control
products.15,130,135–137 In this design, clusters will be randomly
assigned to either receive releases of gene drive mosquitoes
or to remain untreated, serving as controls. It is critical to en-
sure that all other factors are as similar as possible between
control and intervention clusters, including the use of other
vector control methods. To achieve this, study arms should
be balanced using restricted randomization. Randomization
shouldbeconducted in apublic, transparentmanner involving
communities wherever possible. Researchers are strongly
advised to coordinate the timing of the trial with delivery of
routine vector control interventions by the national malaria
control program. The bigger the treatment effect, the fewer
clusters that will be required to observe a signiﬁcant difference.
The characteristics of gene drive technology introduce
complexities for any trial design. The most obvious of these is
the potential for driving transgenes to spread to mosquito
populations in control areas before the end of the trial, which
requires predicting how isolated from each other the in-
tervention and control clusters must be. Presence of buffer
zones may be helpful to prevent, or at least slow, such
spread138; their optimal size and other features should be in-
formed by data obtained from small-scale releases. A related
concern is predicting how quickly each of the intervention
clusters will “convert” (that is, most, if not all, of the target
mosquitoes within the cluster carry the gene drive construct)
after releaseof genedrivemosquitoes, and thuswhen tobegin
measuring for the gene drive effect on malaria. If measure-
ments begin before the gene drive mosquitoes have spread
throughout the intervention clusters, this could result in a
lower than realistic effect. Depending on cluster size, it may be
possible in per protocol analysis to measure the correlation of
change in transmission parameters and/or malaria incidence
along the leading edge as the driving transgenes spread
through the cluster—although the usual patchy distribution of
mosquito populations may complicate this type of analysis.
Trial planning for gene drive interventions will require sub-
stantial forethought and an adaptive trial design may be nec-
essary. Data collected from small-scale trials, such as the rate
of spread of the transgenic construct, will aid the planning for
epidemiological efﬁcacy trials, which underlines the need for
early testing to be conducted under conditions as similar to
the environment of trials for epidemiological efﬁcacy as
possible.
In a setting with appreciable malaria transmission, the pri-
mary clinical endpoint will be the one used for assessing other
malaria interventions—a reduction in incidence of infection in
children measured by cross-sectional surveys, or in disease
measured by active and/or passive case detection.130 When
setting the efﬁcacy goal, researchers must keep in mind the
potential for malaria transmission by vectors that are not the
focus of the gene drive strategy. The goal in terms of level of
reduction in malaria incidence/prevalence will have to be de-
termined site by site because of differences in malaria trans-
mission conditions and standard mosquito control practices.
Double blinding, a widely accepted method for preventing
bias by ensuring that neither the trial participants nor the re-
searchers know who is receiving a particular treatment, could
be difﬁcult for so obvious a treatment as release of transgenic
mosquitoes, and the safety and ethical implications of re-
leasing similar numbers of unmodiﬁed mosquitoes in control
clusters would need to be explored thoroughly. However, at a
minimum those technicians who are assessing malaria in-
cidence from blood specimens should be kept unaware of the
source of samples and the identity of treatment versus control
clusters.
Entomological endpoints will be determined according to
the gene drive strategy as in earlier small-scale releases. Pri-
mary entomological endpoints could be sporozoite rate (for
population replacement strategies) and mean number of An.
gambiae per house per night (for population suppression
strategies). The required sample size should be calculated
based on the primary clinical endpoint, but the entomological
conditions must also be taken into consideration in sample
size calculation to better understand how gene drive affects
the vector population.
Secondary endpoints might be:
c Clinical, such as anemia and parasite diversity (especially
for population replacement strategies).
c Entomological, such as, indoor and outdoor biting patterns
through the night, resistance to gene drive, or changes in
insecticide resistance. Newer methods, such as detection
of antibodies to mosquito saliva,139 also may provide in-
formation on the number of bites to which individuals are
exposed.
The WHO recently expressed a preference to see results
from at least two CRTs to make a decision on recommenda-
tion of new vector control tools. The preference would be for
these to be performed in different areas (such as East and
West Africa) and different settings (high and low malaria
transmission).32 However, the working group acknowledged
PATHWAY TO DEPLOYMENT OF GENE DRIVE MOSQUITOES 31
that a CRT design might not be feasible for a rapidly spread-
ing gene drive construct. In this case, the realistic alterna-
tive would be simply to track the spread of the transgenic
construct and to correlate it with a changing incidence of
malaria cases. Such comparisons are complicated by the
likelihood of various confounders, but there is increasing ex-
perience with this for vaccine studies. If the reduction in
malaria transmission is sufﬁciently signiﬁcant, regulators may
accept the gene drive product without more rigorous trials. In
that case, they may impose some additional efﬁcacy moni-
toring requirements after wide scale deployment as a public
health tool (similar to Phase 4 in drug trials).
As mentioned previously, it is possible that by the time a
gene drive tool is ready for large-scale testing the malaria
burden may have been dramatically reduced by diligent ap-
plication of other control methods. In an elimination setting,
efﬁcacymeasures other than reduction in incidence ofmalaria
cases in children may need to be explored. This might involve
measurement of a reduction in the incidence of malaria in-
fections in all age groups, as detected by a sufﬁciently sen-
sitive method. This will require large populations to ensure a
sufﬁcient accrual of cases. In settings of very low trans-
mission, routine surveillance systems are usually of higher
quality and these may be used for passive case surveillance
instead of setting up cohorts. Moreover, the value of the
technology may be in its durability and capacity to reduce
receptivity to reintroduction of malaria at sites that have been
cleared (i.e., as a “last mile” technology for achieving malaria
eradication).
Alternative options are possible for measuring the efﬁcacy
of gene drive mosquitoes, and trial design must consider the
characteristics of the investigational product and the malaria
transmission setting underwhich it is tested. Flexibilitymay be
required to adjust expectations according to conditions at the
time of testing. Researchers should consult in advance with
the WHO VCAG in the development of their testing plans to
ensure the results will contribute meaningfully to WHO
decision-making about product utility as a public health tool.
Site selection. Baseline data from the site over at least 2
years before the trial should be available. It will be critical that
baseline studies at the site of epidemiological efﬁcacy trials
identify all malaria vector species present, and their relative
densities and infection rates, as this will inﬂuence planning for
detectionof reducedmalaria transmission. In the lead-up to this
phase, up-to-date site-speciﬁc entomological surveillance,
linked tomodeling, should be used to translate from the extant
mix of species in a location to the epidemiological impact that
can be expected for a construct of a given efﬁcacy, which re-
lates back to identiﬁcation of the relevant clinical endpoints.
For efﬁciency, it would be ideal to use the same in-
frastructure and personnel as in earlier testing efforts. Indeed,
as previously mentioned, one scenario is that the epidemio-
logical efﬁcacy trial will simply grow and expand from the prior
small-scale testing site(s). This should be taken into consid-
eration when choosing the sites for small-scale ﬁeld testing.
For a CRT, the site will need to provide sufﬁcient numbers of
clusterswith sufﬁcient separation tominimize spillover of gene
drive mosquitoes into control areas before the end of the trial
as described previously.
From a regulatory and a stakeholder engagement per-
spective, it would be desirable to locate the trial as far as
possible from a national border or major transport routes to
other countries. Alternatively and ideally, because the even-
tual spread of the gene drive mosquitoes is likely, neighboring
countries might collaborate on this research. The extent of
regional coordination, including regulatory harmonization, will
be a factor in the decision as to how important distance from
national borders is for site selection.
Monitoring. It will be important for researchers, funders,
and regulatory authorities to agree on a feasible monitoring
planwell in advanceof the epidemiological efﬁcacy trial, which
describes expectations for the extent, that is, frequency, scale
and period, of monitoring. Monitoring for spread of the
transgenic construct during large-scale releases is likely to
require an extensive network for trapping andcollection, along
with facilities and resources for processing and analyzing
samples. As in small-scale releases, it will be important to
follow the gene drive construct by all available means. Moni-
toring for development of genetic resistance to the gene drive
construct within local mosquitoes must be conducted. For
population replacement strategies, monitoring for appear-
ance of malaria parasites resistant to the effector mechanism
is also required. Ideally, national malaria control/elimination
surveillance and monitoring teams will become involved in
these efforts. This would help to build technical awareness
and capacity in anticipation of their future role in imple-
mentation and post-implementation activities.
Engagement. Epidemiological efﬁcacy testing necessarily
will involve interactions with human participants living in the
trial area for the purpose of collecting individually identiﬁable
information and/or specimens, and this must be conducted
according to standards for human subjects research. As de-
scribedpreviously, however, not all individuals living in the trial
area will meet these criteria. Thus, broad community en-
gagement is a vital aspect of preparation for and conduct of
this phase of testing. At this larger scale, there may be less
opportunity for a personal approach to community engage-
mentandendorsement.Moreemphasismayneed tobeplaced
on wide distribution of informational materials, interactions
with key opinion leaders and inﬂuencers, and on mechanisms
such as reference or liaison groups to gauge community
opinion. Given the area that may be covered in epidemiolog-
ical efﬁcacy trials, consideration might be given to the suit-
ability of an “opt-out”model of consent. The engagement plan
should provide for ongoing communication with the commu-
nity about the trial’s progress. Media interactions can help in
this regard.
It must also be recognized that there is a higher probability
of dissent at the scale of an epidemiological efﬁcacy trial.
Serious consideration must be given to providing meaningful
opportunities for individuals or households to decline partici-
pation.Whereas someseriousoptions canbepresented, such
as not allowing releases ormonitoring at their homeor place of
work and/or not participating as human subjects through
provision of personal identifying information or specimens, it
likely will be increasingly difﬁcult to prevent some degree of
exposure to gene drive mosquitoes as large-scale testing
proceeds. Theextent of exposure is likely todiffer according to
whether a suppression or replacement strategy is being
tested. Expectations for the long-term spread of the gene
drive construct within the local mosquito population must be
conveyed realistically in the engagement process. It is advised
that a survey of public understanding of these expectations be
undertaken before releases. Some mechanism for protecting
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the privacy of trial participants may need to be consid-
ered, perhaps similar to the standardly used certiﬁcate of
conﬁdentiality (for example, certiﬁcates of conﬁdentiality from
the U.S. National Institutes of Health140).
Government-level championship of the research will be
essential before this stage, as this will be critical for regional
interactions. In addition to the government of the host
country, researchers must consider neighboring countries
as stakeholders and begin interacting regionally before the
trial begins. For example, presentations about the project
might be made at regional meetings of health ministers and
national malaria control programs. Results from small-scale
trials on the rate at which the transgenic construct will
spread in the localAn. gambiae populationwill help to inform
these interactions.
Regional and international organizations concerned with
malaria control must be engaged before large-scale releases
begin, although preferably this will have occurred even earlier
in the project. As described for small-scale releases, re-
searchers must ensure access to appropriate standard of
care for all households involved in the trial. This likely will re-
quire coordinationwith the nationalmalaria control program in
trial planning.
Regulatory issues.Regional scientiﬁc collaborations and a
mechanism for regional regulatory authorization are especially
important for large-scale releases, and a framework will need
to be put in place for this. It is anticipated that the national
regulatory authority for the country hosting the trial will be
responsible for informing other countries’ regulatory bodies
and invoking any regional cooperationmechanisms, although
it is possible this processmight be initiated by a regional body
depending on the status of regional harmonization activities.
The possibility exists that more than one project may be
advancing its investigational gene drive product toward ﬁeld-
testing within the same time frame and within the same (or
nearby) regions. This could be challenging for risk assess-
ment, as well as efﬁcacy and safety assessment and stake-
holder engagement, if the different gene drive products were
to spread and overlap. If multiple trials are proposedwithin the
same country, the national regulatory authority would be
aware of the applications and should be responsible for de-
termining whether a need exists to invoke additional man-
agement requirements. This situation could become very
challenging tomanage if the different trials are being regulated
by different countries, underscoring the importance of a re-
gional coordination and authorization process. Information on
ﬁnal decisions about importation or release of living modiﬁed
organisms is required to be provided to the Biosafety
Clearing-House of the Cartagena Protocol,141 and, as men-
tioned previously, there are existing websites for registering
clinical trials. However, a centrally managed trial registration/
declaration website could make information on gene drive
mosquitoes easier to access.
The WHO will intervene at the request of a country. Prior
interaction with the WHO will be important in case it is called
on by a country to become involved in trial issues. Re-
searchers are advised to consult with the WHO VCAG during
trial planning, which can advise on study design and proto-
cols. The best approach is to ensure that the host country has
been thoroughly involved inplanning theCRTat all levels (local
Ministry of Health or equivalent, malaria control program, local
institutions, and WHO local ofﬁce).
Key points: ﬁeld testing for epidemiological efﬁcacy.
c The goals of large-scale testing for epidemiological
efﬁcacy will be to determine the effect on disease
transmission, and to understand spatial dispersal and
ecological interactions, as these will be key factors in
the decision to incorporate the gene drive product into
national malaria control programs. Optimally, epide-
miological efﬁcacy testing would be conducted under
at least twodifferentmalaria transmission settings (high
and low). Before the trial, it will be critical to have
identiﬁed all malaria vector species present at the trial
site(s), their relative densities and infection rates, as this
will inﬂuence the ability to detect reduced malaria
transmission. When setting the efﬁcacy goal, re-
searchers must keep in mind the potential for malaria
transmission by vectors that are not the focus of the
gene drive strategy.
c For gene drivemosquitoes, if prior small-scale releases
are allowed to remain active, large-scale trials may
build on andexpand these. Thewidely preferreddesign
for determining efﬁcacy of vector control tools is the
CRT. However, although the CRT works well in malaria
control settings, it must be recognized that by the time
investigational gene drive products reach this stage of
testing, some parts of sub-Saharan Africa are likely to
be close to malaria elimination. Moreover, speciﬁc
characteristics of the investigational product, particu-
larly the rate of spreadof the transgenic construct, likely
will require ﬂexibility and innovative trial design.
c The goal in terms of level of reduction in malaria in-
cidence and/or prevalence will have to be determined
site by site because of differences in malaria trans-
mission conditions. In a setting with appreciable
malaria transmission, the primary clinical endpoint will
be that used for assessing other malaria inter-
ventions—a reduction in malaria incidence in children
measured by active and/or passive case detection. In a
malaria elimination setting, efﬁcacy might better be
measured by reduction in prevalence of infection. Du-
rability of the effect (capacity to reduce receptivity to
reintroduction of malaria) also may be an important
efﬁcacy indicator.
BOX 8
Release strategy
Design of a release strategy to achieve the goals of malaria control or eliminationmust take into account the characteristics of the speciﬁc gene
drive mosquito product and factors such as the local population size of the target mosquito species, mosquito movement and spatial
connectivity between populations, and the effects of seasonality. The release strategy as implemented may involve hundreds to thousands of
mosquitoes releasedover a limitedperiodof time fromeachof apotentially largenumberof spatiallydistributedsites.Despite theprediction that
establishment may result from accidental release of low numbers of gene drive mosquitoes, higher numbers likely will be needed to maximize
the chances of implementation success.
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c As for earlier small-scale releases, it will be important
for researchers, funders, and regulatory authorities to
agree well in advance of the trial on a feasible moni-
toring plan that describes expectations for the extent,
that is, scale and period, of monitoring. At this point no
adverse environmental effects would be anticipated
given prior safety studies, but hypothesis-based moni-
toring is still advisable as a precaution. The monitoring
plan should be derived from results of risk assessment.
c Testing for epidemiological efﬁcacy will involve col-
lection of identifying information and specimens from
individuals living at the trial site, which will require in-
dividual informed consent. Wider community engage-
ment activities also will continue to be necessary to
involve those living in the area but not directly partici-
pating as human subjects. Researchers will be expec-
ted to register in a clinical trial database at this phase of
testing.
c Broad stakeholder and public engagement will be re-
quired before the initiation of large-scale trials. Re-
searchers must consider neighboring countries as
stakeholders and interact regularly with them, sharing
information about the investigational product and re-
sults from earlier trials. This will be facilitated if a re-
gional approach is taken at the stages of semi-ﬁeld
testing and small-scale releases.
c The potential for transboundary movement will be espe-
cially important at this phase, and a regional coordination
and authorization process will be essential to prepare for
large-scale releases of gene drive mosquitoes.
IMPLEMENTATION AS A PUBLIC HEALTH TOOL
Because of the characteristics of potential persistence and
spread, implementation of gene drive mosquitoes as a public
health tool within national malaria control programs likely will
build onto prior large-scale releases for testing epidemiolog-
ical efﬁcacy, moving to broader andmore systematic regional
distributions. Observations fromprior releases of the behavior
of the investigational product under different geographic and
ecological conditions, in combination with modeling, will in-
form the design of deployment plans (see Box 8).
Decision-making. The decision to implement at scale is
expected to be based on proof of efﬁcacy, safety, and other
measures of acceptability, and perception of need (beneﬁt)
and overall cost (including deployment and follow-up
activities).15,142 For gene drive mosquitoes, these consider-
ations will be viewed in the context of malaria elimination and
eradication goals, which aim tomaintain the burden ofmalaria
stably at zero forever. This will require an overall strategy that
is robust to any reversal that might result from, for example,
evolution of resistance mechanisms that reduce the efﬁcacy
of individual malaria control tools, decreases in funding that
impede accessibility of those tools, or failure of delivery sys-
tems due to economic/social crisis or user apathy. Gene drive
mosquitoes may prove highly effective at reducing malaria
transmission on their own,14 and thus be a critical control tool
for use in conﬂict areas or under other conditions where
conventional tools cannot be delivered effectively. However,
the working group recommended that they generally should
be considered, at least at ﬁrst, as complementary to other
malaria control measures within an integrated strategy that
will provide the best protection against malaria resurgence
because of any of the aforementioned conditions. In this case,
the beneﬁt and cost of implementing gene drive mosquitoes
will be considered based on additive value in combination
with other interventions. Prior assessment of the utility of
combinations of gene drive mosquitoes with other commonly
used vector control interventions, either in the context of ﬁeld
trials or by modeling, will be important to inform decision-
making.
The WHO has indicated that scale-back of vector control
may be considered in areas where malaria transmission has
been interrupted and reduced vulnerability and receptivity
indicate minimal risk of resurgence, given the presence of
adequate disease and entomological surveillance systems
along with capacity for case management and vector control
response.143 Gene drive mosquitoes are expected to reduce
transmission intensity, which should lower the required level
of coverage with other interventions and contribute to cost
savings. Moreover, they are predicted to be useful for pre-
venting reintroduction of infection in areas where malaria has
been eliminated, which could contribute to the durability of
cost savings and be crucial in the last mile of an eradication
campaign.144 For population suppression strategies, an ad-
ditional beneﬁt may come from control of other diseases
carried by the same vector; for example, in the case of An.
gambiae s.s., this would include lymphatic ﬁlariasis.
A prerequisite for implementation of gene drive mosquitoes
will be long-term prior engagement with government author-
ities, especially malaria control or elimination programs, un-
derpinning their ability to make a decision about the value
proposition for the technology and the role they wish to take.
This engagement could build on the regional mechanism
recommended for cooperation and coordination around
large-scale ﬁeld trials.
Production and distribution. To ensure a smooth transi-
tion to implementation, researchers, funders, regulators, and
government policy makers must begin thinking early on about
how gene drive mosquitoes will be produced and distributed,
as this may inﬂuence the development pathway. Registration
is generally the last step of the regulatory approval process. It
sets the marketing conditions for product quality, labeling
and effectiveness claims, usage conditions, and, if applicable,
advertising and promotional materials, and requirements
for post-approval monitoring, adverse event reporting, prod-
uct experience reporting, and manufacturing changes. For
commercial products, the applicant or registrant (normally the
developer or manufacturer) is required to assure ongoing
product quality and to comply with other conditions of ap-
proval. There remains a need to determine the most appro-
priate business model for implementation of this new
technology, which will best facilitate taking the product to
scale in target countries.145 Current thinking on gene drive
mosquitoes is to transfer the technology to national govern-
ments for use in their national malaria control programs.
Manufacturing is expected to require relatively small-scale
insectaries,whichmight benationally or regionally distributed,
or evenmobile, andcouldbeoperatedby thegovernment. The
mechanisms and requirements for registration of gene drive
mosquitoes are unclear at this time and require further
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consideration because this will inﬂuence planning around issues
of intellectual property, liability, and post-deployment monitor-
ing. Registration is usually performed on a national basis, but in
the case of gene drive mosquitoes regional harmonization of
registration requirements and processes may be required. Un-
derstanding how such challenges have beenmet for agricultural
biocontrol agents could provide useful insights.146 Regulatory
harmonization efforts under the African Medicines Regulatory
Harmonization program may also provide a model.147
If gene drivemosquitoes are to be produced and distributed
bygovernment programs as a component of integrated vector
management (IVM), countries must be ready to take re-
sponsibility for these aspects of their deployment, along with
the necessary public engagement and post-implementation
monitoring.148 This should be facilitated by the recent com-
mitment of African leadership to eliminate malaria by 2030.148
Keeping in mind the potential for, and implications of,
transboundary movement, decision-making about approval
for implementationwill need to takeplaceona regional or even
continent-wide basis and a framework will need to be put in
place to coordinate and support deployment. A relevant
model is the Pan-African Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Eradi-
cationCampaign,150whichwasagreedonbyAfricanHeadsof
State, is managed through a coordination ofﬁce that was
established by the Organization of African Unity’s Secretary
General, and is run by national authorities.
Policy development. Researchers developing gene drive
mosquitoes for use in developing countries must be aware of
the inﬂuential evaluation and prequaliﬁcation process con-
ducted by WHO. Prequaliﬁcation follows assessment, rec-
ommendation and policy development for new tools and
approaches, and is intended for products that already have a
place in disease control operational strategies.
Countries likelywill look toWHOforguidanceon theutility of
genedrivemosquitoes as a public health tool.Within theWHO
process for evaluation of vector control products, gene drive
mosquitoes will, at least initially, be considered as a new
product class and, therefore,will be reviewed through theNew
Intervention Pathway.151 Currently, under this process, the
WHO will develop evaluation standards and the WHO VCAG
will review supporting data submitted by the applicant (re-
searchers or other developers) on entomological and epide-
miological efﬁcacy, and potential public health impact, of the
gene drive mosquito product. The WHO VCAG recommen-
dation on the public health value of the product will be for-
warded to the relevant policy advisory committee, which in the
case of malaria is the Malaria Policy Advisory Committee. On
the basis of the strength of the evidence, theWHOmay issue a
policy recommendation and develop operational guidance for
its use in malaria control programs. TheWHO prequaliﬁcation
team will coordinate any needed dossier review, ﬁnalization
of quality control criteria and inspections of product manu-
facturing facilities with the VCAG process, so that once policy
guidance has been issued, a decision can rapidly be made on
prequaliﬁcation of a product. In the future, depending on the
nature of the technical strategy used for each new product, gene
drivemosquitoesmaybecome recognized as a product class for
which a policy recommendation has been issued. If so, they
would enter directly into the prequaliﬁcation pathway. In such a
case, some of the extensive risk assessment requirements rec-
ommended previously for “ﬁrst-in-class” products may not be
considered necessary.
Quality control. Currently there are no widely recognized
quality standards for manufacture of a living mosquito
product. Most relevant programs that are now in ﬁeld trials,
including those based on sterile insect technique or other
strategies, still are operating in investigational rather than
commercial mode. As such, developers are deﬁning indi-
vidual standards for quality and consistency of their prod-
ucts, which are subject to regulatory approval. Although at
the time of this writing, none of these efforts involve An.
gambiae mosquitoes, lessons learned from large-scale pro-
duction and maintenance of mosquito colonies within these
programs, or from similar efforts for other insect vectors of
disease, could be valuable for establishing broader stan-
dards in the future.152 Ideally, this would include the identi-
ﬁcation of simple and cost-effective methods to predict
performance in the ﬁeld.
A particular issue for An. gambiae products will be the current
inability to adequately cryopreserve seed stock of transgenic
mosquitoes, which results in a need for transgenic lines to be
constantly maintained through all life cycle stages in the in-
sectary. Unless this challenge can be overcome by discovery of
improved preservation techniques, regulators will need to un-
derstand the implications of this requirement for ongoing main-
tenance on the genetic lineage with reference to product quality
andproduct speciﬁcations.Avoidanceof adaptation to insectary
environments,which could result in reduced ﬁtness,may require
occasional refreshing of the colony through crossing with local
mosquitoes. Moreover, there may be a need to adapt the gene
drive product to different locations to improve the probability of
initial establishment, which also would be accomplished by in-
trogression of the genetic construct into the genetic background
of the local mosquitoes.
Regulatory authorities may not consider such breeding
activities as a new transgenic event, in which case a new risk
assessment would not be needed. However, the usual regu-
latory considerations of identity, strength, quality, purity, and
potency applied to other types of products almost certainly
will have to be reinterpreted for gene drive mosquitoes. Thus,
there is a need to develop quality standards for manufacturing
of living mosquito products that are consistent with their
particular production requirements.
Key points: implementation as a public health tool.
c Becauseof thecharacteristicsofpersistenceandspread, it
is likely that implementation of gene drivemosquitoes as a
public health tool within national malaria control programs
willbuildontoprior large-scale releases,moving tobroader
and more systematic regional deployment that will be
based on observations of the product’s behavior under
different geographic and ecological conditions.
c Gene drive mosquitoes should be considered as part
of an IVM plan to control and eliminate malaria. The
decision to implement is expected to be based on
proof of efﬁcacy, safety, and other measures of ac-
ceptability, as well as perception of need (beneﬁt) and
overall cost (including deployment and follow-up ac-
tivities). These considerations will be viewed in the
context of national and regional malaria elimination
and eradication goals.
c Because of the implications of transboundary movement,
decision-making about approval for implementation will
need to take place on a regional or even continent-wide
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basis, anda frameworkwill be required tosupport this. The
WHO will play an important role in evaluating the product
andmaking a recommendation to potential user countries
about its value as a public health tool for malaria control.
c Researchers, funders, regulators, and policy makers must
begin thinking early about how gene drivemosquitoeswill
be produced and distributed, as this may inﬂuence the
development pathway. Current thinking on gene drive
mosquitoes is that the technology will be transferred to
national governments for use in their national malaria
control programs, but there remains a need to identify the
most appropriate business model to facilitate this. Long-
term engagement will be required to ensure government
authorities are familiar with the technology and have the
information they need to judge the value proposition of
taking on this role.
c Most current trials of living mosquito products, including
thosebasedon sterile insect techniqueor other strategies,
are operating under research authorization and deﬁning
their own standards for product quality and consistency,
which are subject to regulatory approval. For scaled-up
deployment as a public health tool, there is a need to de-
velop quality standards for manufacturing of living mos-
quito products that are consistent with their production
requirements.
POST-IMPLEMENTATION SURVEILLANCE, MONITORING,
AND EVALUATION
After a decision ismade to deploy gene drivemosquitoes as
a public health tool, there will be a need for ongoing surveil-
lance, monitoring, and evaluation. In this regard, the working
group re-emphasized the following three important points:
1. The requirements for post-implementation monitoring and
evaluation of gene drive mosquitoes must be considered
on thebackgroundof current activities routinely conducted
by national programs to monitor malaria cases and the
efﬁcacy of vector and other control methods, as well as
activities that must be put in place in the context of malaria
elimination efforts. Malaria surveillance is identiﬁed as a
core intervention in the Global Technical Strategy for
Malaria 2016–2030.31
2. The loss of efﬁcacy due to genetic selection is a general
challenge for malaria control tools, including insecticides,
drugs, and diagnostics.28,153
3. Reduction in the number of malaria vectors is a generally
accepted public health goal and the aim of all existing
insecticide-based control methods. Commonly used in-
secticides are known to have effects on a broad range of
nontarget species,154 and gene drive mosquitoes must be
considered in the context of their relative risk and beneﬁt
versus other forms of vector control.
Current monitoring considerations. Monitoring of vector
control methods currently includes operational aspects (such
as coverage, usage, quality, and durability), entomological
surveillance (including local vector species composition and
distribution, and susceptibility to insecticides, vector, and
human behaviors), and epidemiological surveillance (such as
malaria incidence, malaria prevalence, and mortality). Stan-
dard indicators for vector surveillance include larval density
and abundance, adult abundance, degree of vector contact
with different hosts, the infection rate of the vector, and vector
susceptibility to the control method of interest. Choice of
which indicators to include will be inﬂuenced by whether the
gene drive strategy aims at population suppression (whichwill
emphasize monitoring of vector numbers) or replacement
(which will emphasize monitoring susceptibility of the
TABLE 4
Examples of standard monitoring considerations for current vector control methods
Vector control methods Operational monitoring Entomological monitoring
Long lasting insecticidal nets Dosage Biting cycle in relation to sleep habits
Coverage Human blood Index
Timing Human biting rate
Persistence Sporozoite rate
Status of equipment Adult density
Resources used Insecticide susceptibility status
Cost
Indoor residual spray Dosage Daytime indoor resting
Coverage Human-biting rate
Timing Human blood Index
Persistence Parous rate
Status of equipment Sporozoite rate
Resources used Insecticide susceptibility status
Cost Adult density
Larviciding Coverage Presence and density of larvae
Persistence Adult mosquito density
Resources used Insecticide susceptibility status
Cost
Source reduction Number of potential breeding sites Adult mosquito density
Number eliminated
Resources used and cost
Improved housing House design and structure Indoor mosquito resting densities
Mosquito prooﬁng
Distance from potential breeding sites
Resources used and cost
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vector to the pathogen). Examples of standard entomo-
logical monitoring assessments are shown in Table 4, al-
though it is unusual for any program to conduct the entire
range of tests.
Requirements for epidemiological surveillance will differ
under different transmission conditions. In malaria control
settings,where the disease burden remains high, surveillance,
monitoring, and evaluation generally includes a combination
of passive surveillance of cases reported through the health
system and periodic representative household surveys
to assess population coverage of key interventions. In
low-transmission or elimination settings,155 surveillance
mechanismsmust be able to detect more dispersedmalaria
transmission foci. In such situations, all cases need to be
investigated and managed in a timely manner to prevent
onward transmission of disease. This may be accomplished
through active case detection, whereby individuals are
tested whether they are symptomatic or not. This is termed
reactive case detection when it is conducted in response to
a case presenting at a health facility, and usually involves
testing of individuals living in the same or neighboring
households of the index case. Foci investigation, wherein
an area of transmission or transmission potential is deﬁned
through active case detection, geographical reconnaissance,
entomological investigation, and community behavioral surveys,
will be a key component of surveillance for malaria elimination
programs and will identify areas that need to be closely
monitored.
Regardless of whether the goals of malaria elimination and
eventual eradication are to be reached solely with more tra-
ditional drug, vaccine, and vector control tools or will in-
corporate the use of genedrivemosquito products, signiﬁcant
investment of resources will be required for training and fa-
cilities and improvements in information collection, data
management, and reporting. Thus, the working group rec-
ommendations focus on different or additional requirements
especially relevant to the use of gene drivemosquitoes. These
largely relate to ongoing monitoring for lack of spread of the
gene drive construct into the local vector population, any loss
of efﬁcacy, or adverse effects on human health or the
environment.
Safety. The working group looked for relevant precedents
from agricultural biocontrol and GMO as background for for-
mulating its recommendations on gene drive mosquitoes. For
biocontrol agents, regulators decide to allow releases based
on risk analysis and data collected in containment. Generally,
there is no formal process of post-release monitoring and
evaluation or for reporting back to the regulator. Thus, there is
no mandated time frame or area for follow-up and this is left
to the discretion of the developer, who will be inﬂuenced by
funding constraints. Post-release monitoring may focus more
on efﬁcacy issues such as how well the biocontrol agent
established, how far it spread, and whether it had the desired
effect on the target species.156
Post-release requirements for agricultural GMO differ
widely among countries. Monitoring may involve general
surveillance for unanticipated effects and/or case-speciﬁc
surveillance for identiﬁed nonnegligible risks. Currently, Bra-
zilian law does not require post-release monitoring of GMO.
However, the National Biosafety Technical Commission has
adopted a general surveillance approach that requires the
applicant to make information about the release available to
the public, provide questionnaires to users of the GMO tech-
nology and others involved in the process to facilitate
reporting, and may require other notiﬁcation systems and
monitoring tools in line with the GMO use application; case-
speciﬁc monitoring would be triggered if nonnegligible risks
are identiﬁed. In the United States, where GMO are reviewed
by different federal regulatory authorities according to their
product claimand intendeduse,157 requirements differ among
the different regulatory bodies but may include a requirement
for the applicant to report adverse effects and monitor for any
changes in safety or effectiveness or failure to meet the ap-
proved product claim including the occurrence of resistance.
In Australia, the applicant is required to report on any adverse
impacts, unintended effects or other information relating to
potential harms to human health and safety or the environ-
ment. In the European Union, applicants are required to sub-
mit a plan for monitoring that may include both case-speciﬁc
monitoring (e.g., for development of resistance) and general
surveillance (e.g., through surveys of those conducting related
work or existing monitoring networks and literature searches
of relevant studies). In Africa, several countries have experi-
ence with GM crops, but few have established procedures
for post-release monitoring. South Africa, which has exten-
sive experience of commercialized GM crops, has developed
a post-marketing monitoring strategy that takes into ac-
count monitoring for compliance with the release permit
and independent monitoring for unintended effects on
biodiversity.158
Thus, currently, there is no uniform precedent from either
biocontrol orGMcropsonwhich tobasepost-implementation
monitoring recommendations for gene drive mosquitoes. By
the time an implementation decision is made, individual gene
drive mosquito products will have undergone extensive risk
assessment that should have taken into account all identiﬁed
hazards to human health and the environment, and possible
pathways to harm. Such products also will have undergone
rigorous study during small- and large-scale trials, including
intensive observations on health and ecosystem effects. It
should be presumed that the technology would not have
reached this stage if therewas any indication of nonnegligible
adverse effects that could not be suitably mitigated, or if
authorities had not determined that the beneﬁts outweighed
any adverse effects. If prior studies have been conducted
over a range of ecological conditions, they may provide
sufﬁcient data and experience to justify an exemption from
ongoing surveillance for broad ecosystem effects. However,
because at present gene drive mosquitoes are a novel
technology, it is likely that some degree of ongoing post-
implementation monitoring of effects on carefully speciﬁed
nontarget organisms will be expected. Effects on human
health will be addressed through ongoing monitoring for
epidemiological efﬁcacy (see Efﬁcacy), which will determine
whether malaria incidence decreases or increases after
implementation.
If continued ecosystemmonitoring is required by regulators, it
will be important for parties to agree beforehand onwhat is to be
monitored and towhat extent, as well as where responsibility for
response would lie should an adverse event be detected. This
might include agreement on conditions under which monitoring
could be stopped if no adverse effects are observed. Thosewho
make this decision will need to keep plausibility and feasibility
well in mind, given the envisioned use conditions. Gene drive
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mosquitoes are not expected to be a commercial productwhere
proﬁts might offset monitoring costs, but to be delivered by
governments as a component of IVM. Moreover, gene drive
mosquitoes most likely will be implemented in conjunction with
commonly used insecticide-based vector control methods that
could have an independent effect on the ecosystem. And ﬁnally,
the complex relationship between mosquitoes, climate condi-
tions, and human behavior likely will make it particularly difﬁcult
to attribute any observed ecosystem changes directly to expo-
sure to the gene drive product.
Regarding case-speciﬁc monitoring, the working group felt
that it will be important to keep track of changes in the local
mosquito community structure. The focus of these recom-
mendations, a gene drive product in An. gambiae s.s., pre-
sents an unusual case, in which it would be considered
desirable for the genetic construct to move through cross-
mating to other malaria vectors within the An. gambiae s.l.
species complex. It should be made clear that movement of
the construct to sibling species that also aremalaria vectors is
considered part of the intended effect, and in that case func-
tionality with respect to population suppression or re-
placement should bemonitored in those other species. It also
would be of interest to monitor for the unexpected transfer of
the construct to nonvector Anopheles outside the An. gambiae
species complex or a few other sympatricmosquito species as
a measure of the speciﬁcity of the technology.
If surveillance for broader effects on biodiversity is de-
termined to be required, then plans must be put in place for
what should be assessed, how and by whom the assessment
will be conducted, how the data will be collected and ana-
lyzed, and how the processwill be funded. It will be imperative
to agree in advance on the endpoints of concern. These
should be chosen for biological relevance, as indicators not
just of change per se but of potential to cause harm to the
environment as deﬁned on the national or regional level, and,
given the complexity of determining causality, with serious
consideration of how the resulting data will be used. The
working group suggested that any suchmonitoring should be
tightly focused on selected organisms closely related to An.
gambiae in the ecological food web (ﬁrst-order organisms as
described in Table 2).
The decision regarding which nontarget species to monitor
must be informed by cultural and scientiﬁc considerations
and, therefore, should be determined by representatives from
those regions that would be affected, positively or negatively,
by implementation of gene drive mosquitoes for malaria
control. Theremay need to be an agreement on establishment
of a limited number of sentinel sites, which ideally would be a
subset of sites monitoring entomological efﬁcacy so that en-
vironmental observations can be integrated with information
on the presence of gene drive mosquitoes.
As opposed to ongoing surveillance for entomological and
epidemiological efﬁcacy (see Efﬁcacy), environmental sur-
veillance is outside the purview of national vector manage-
ment and malaria control programs. There will be a need to
assign oversight and management to some entity with ap-
propriate authority and how this will be handled needs to
be part of regional decision-making on implementation.
Options for management might include formation of a co-
alition of regional government authorities, establishment of an
authorized regional entity, or contracting to some existing
organization.Oneexample of how this hasbeenhandled is the
South AfricanNational Biodiversity Institute, a governmentally
established organization with the mandate to monitor the
environmental impact of GMO after commercial release.159 It
also might be possible to partner with organizations that are
already engaged in collecting data on agricultural develop-
ment, conservation, climate change effects, etc.
Efﬁcacy. Given appropriate planning, training, and re-
sources, much of the monitoring for entomological efﬁcacy of
gene drive mosquitoes could be performed through existing
programs. The WHO has issued guidance on IVM for national
and regional program managers in sub-Saharan Africa.160 En-
tomological surveillance usually is carried out by vector control
personnel at national and subnational levels. World Health Or-
ganization has recommended the establishment of sentinel
sites within each country, based on criteria such as disease
endemicity, ecology, andaccessibility. These siteswill conduct
collection of Anopheles and other insect vectors of disease.
These routinely will be analyzed for vector density, insecticide
susceptibility, and various parameters of disease transmission
(e.g., proportion of blood-fed mosquitoes and proportion car-
rying malaria parasites in their salivary glands) and behavior
(e.g., number of mosquitoes resting and biting indoors). As
stated previously, these ongoing activities of entomological
surveillance established for monitoring of other vector control
methods also will provide critical information on the efﬁcacy of
gene drive mosquitoes. For example, measurement of vector
density will be a key efﬁcacy indicator for population suppres-
sion strategies, and number of parasites in the salivary glands
will be an important indicator for population replacement
strategies. Attention to any behavioral changes by the gene
drive mosquitoes, or any changes in carriage of other rou-
tinely monitored pathogens, would also be informative.
For gene drive mosquito products, the additional mea-
surement of whether the transgenic construct is found in
collectedmosquitoes will be required. If possible, researchers
should include a marker in the construct that can be assayed
easily by local vector control personnel, given the availability
of appropriate equipment, training, and resources; otherwise,
mosquitoes may need to be shipped to a centralized testing
facility that has the appropriate expertise, equipment, and
resources. It will be important to bring local vector control
programs into the planning process early to provide themwith
sufﬁcient time to prepare.
In a typical malaria control setting, data on disease in-
cidence is obtained by passive case detection from health
management information systems and collated from public
and private health facility records. Some countries have
established sentinel surveillance systems to monitor malaria
trends.160 Increasingly, countries are using district health in-
formation software platforms161 for reporting, analysis, and
dissemination of data for all health programs. With the un-
derstanding that they will reﬂect the totality of malaria control
measures, these systems can be harnessed for ongoing
monitoring of the disease impact of gene drive mosquitoes.
In areas of low transmission and in a malaria elimination con-
text, monitoring for entomological and epidemiological efﬁcacy
will becomemore difﬁcult. The limitations of current trapping and
other methods for measuring malaria transmission will become
more pronounced. This may be alleviated to some extent by
development of better diagnostics, traps, and other tools. The
WHO has published considerations for increasing the sensitivity
of surveillance systems for malaria elimination.155 Methods of
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reactive case detection and focus investigation offer opportuni-
ties to understand the circumstances of rare malaria trans-
mission, including checking for performance failure of gene drive
mosquitoes. Country coordination and cooperation will be re-
quired for regional surveillance andprograms such as the current
Elimination 8162 initiative in southern Africa provide a good ex-
ample of how this might be performed.
There will be a need to deﬁne assays for product perfor-
mance for use in disseminated surveillance and to determine
who will conduct these assays. There also will be a need to
develop a system for reporting performance failure and the
decision-making process related to response, including the
outcome from a regulatory perspective of a failure to respond.
Similar reporting and analytic requirements are necessary for
management of insecticide resistance.163 Regional in-
formation sharing will be an important consideration and les-
sons may be learned from international networks that have
been established to monitor for drug and insecticide re-
sistance (The Worldwide Insecticide Resistance Network164;
WorldWideAntimalarialResistanceNetwork165;and IRMapper).166
It is expected that the WHO will play a normative role in setting
standards and guidelines.
A failure in product performance can have two different
causes: 1) production or deployment problems that result in a
failure of gene drive mosquitoes to establish locally after de-
livery; or 2) selection for or evolution of resistancemechanisms
that reduce the efﬁcacy of the gene drive construct. Production
problems may be identiﬁed and corrected. Deployment prob-
lemsmaybeaddressedby reapplicationof the samegenedrive
product, taking into account a possible need to redesign the
delivery protocol in response to local conditions.
As with other malaria intervention products, such as in-
secticides and drugs, it is expected that naturally occurring
genetically based resistance to the gene drive mosquito
product will appear at some point in time. Methods employing
combinations of targets can be incorporated by researchers
during early development of the construct to try to prolong the
viable product lifetime (see Physically conﬁned laboratory
studies), but these cannot be expected to maintain efﬁcacy
indeﬁnitely. Important indicators of the emergence of re-
sistance, or another form of product performance failure,
would include: increased malaria case incidence; resurgence
of vector numbers, in the case of population suppression
strategies, or numbers of parasites in the salivary glands, in
the case of population replacement, in the presence of the
genetic construct; or alternatively, an unexpected reduc-
tion in the proportion of An. gambiae carrying the transgenic
construct.
It probably will be necessary to follow up on any initial ob-
servations of product failure by national programswith amore
focused assessment of the situation, to verify the result and try
to understand its cause. This follow-up assessment likely will
need to be performed by a highly trained team through a
central testing facility. For population replacement strategies,
it will be necessary not only to test for resistance developing in
the mosquitoes, but also within the parasite population.
The most desirable scenario for performance failure due to
resistance is that it is picked up early by monitoring and,
therefore, is limited to a small area. In this case, it might be
possible to eliminate the resistant variant locally by intensive
application of traditional vector control methods and, thereby,
retain theoverall viability of the genedriveproduct. However, if
gene drive mosquitoes spread as efﬁciently as predicted, this
would be highly unlikely. Thus, planning should focus on the
more probable scenario in which a rapidly and widely
spreading resistant variant imminently threatens the utility of
the product. Assuming malaria transmission is still ongoing at
the time efﬁcacy begins to wane, this scenario may require
release of a second-generation genedrive product tomaintain
theeffect untilmalaria elimination hasbeenachieved. Lessons
learned from management of insecticide resistance suggest
that additional products should be ready for deployment rel-
atively quickly after the ﬁrst gene drive product is imple-
mented.163 Indeed, concurrent release of multiple gene drive
products might be a desirable deployment strategy for rapid
effectiveness, but this would require parallel development.
The WHO likely will play an important role in providing
guidance forwhen it is time to implement a second-generation
gene drive product.
Engagement. Engagement in the implementation and
post-implementation phases primarily will be at the national
level, in the context of public health campaigns. However,
regional country coordination and cooperation will be impor-
tant in preparation for implementation of gene drive mosquito
products. During product launch, it will be important for all
stakeholders at the national or regional level to work together
to make the announcement. Spokespersons should come
from involved government authorities, such as the NBA and
National Malaria Control Program, with product developers
available to provide support if necessary.
At the implementation phase, a major concern will be
obtaining ﬁnancial support for wide-scale deployment and
follow-on activities. Assuming that deployment will be man-
aged through national control programs, countrieswill need to
engage in advance with major funders such as the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; various na-
tional development agencies; and the regional development
bank. It will be essential that these organizations understand
the gene drive technology, and are fully briefed on its utility as
determined from efﬁcacy trials and on its role in malaria
elimination and eradication.
Key points: post-implementation surveillance,
monitoring, and evaluation.
c After a decision to implement gene drive mosquitoes
has been taken, there will be a need for ongoing sur-
veillance, monitoring, and evaluation. The require-
ments for post-implementation monitoring and
evaluation of gene drive mosquitoes must be consid-
ered on the background of current activities routinely
conducted by national programs to monitor for malaria
cases and the efﬁcacy of vector and other control
methods and activities that must be put in place in the
context of malaria elimination efforts.
c There is no uniform precedent from either GM crops or
agricultural biocontrol agents on which to base rec-
ommendations for post-implementation safety moni-
toring. By this stage, genedrivemosquitoes alreadywill
have undergone extensive risk assessment and rigor-
ous study in the context of prior ﬁeld trials, so itmust be
assumed that no nonnegligible adverse effects have
been detected or that beneﬁts have been deemed to
justify proceeding in the presence of appropriate
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mitigation measures. However, because gene drive
mosquitoes are a novel genetic technology, it is likely
that some degree of ongoing post-implementation
monitoring of effects on nontarget organisms may be
expected. The decision about what nontarget species
to monitor must be made on a cultural and scientiﬁc
basis and, therefore, must be determined by repre-
sentatives from those regions where the technology
will be used to control malaria.
c If continued ecosystem monitoring is required by reg-
ulators, it will be important for parties to agree in ad-
vance on the endpoints of concern, keeping both
biological signiﬁcance and feasibility in mind. Effects
on mosquito community structure and on organisms
closely related to An. gambiae in the food web are
logical possibilities. Prior agreement must be reached
on who will conduct this monitoring and how it will be
funded.
c There is guidance available for conduct of entomo-
logical and epidemiological surveillance in the context
of malaria control and elimination, and these activities
will be required regardless of the tools that are used. An
additional efﬁcacy monitoring requirement speciﬁc to
gene drive mosquitoes will be the need to test for the
presence of the transgenic construct in mosquitoes
collected for entomological surveillance. Given ap-
propriate training and resources, much of the moni-
toring for entomological efﬁcacy of gene drive
mosquitoes could be performed through existing pro-
grams. It will be important to bring these programs into
the planning process early to provide them with sufﬁ-
cient time to prepare.
c As with other malaria intervention products, such as
insecticides and drugs, it is expected that resistance to
thegenedrivemosquito product eventuallywill appear.
If malaria transmission remains a threat at that time,
evidence of product performance failure must be fol-
lowed up by amore focused investigation of the cause.
There will be a need to deﬁne assays for performance
failure for use in disseminated surveillance and to de-
termine who will perform these assays and analyze the
results. Some may be within the purview of existing
vector management programs, but there may be a
need to enable centralized testing facilities for certain
more in-depth analyses. There also will be a need to
develop a system for reporting performance failure and
decision-making on follow-up. It is expected that the
WHOwill play a normative role in setting standards and
guidelines.
c Engagement during implementation and post-
implementation primarily will be at the national level, in
the context of public health campaigns. However, it will
be important to ensure that funders of national control
programs are fully briefed on gene drive technology and
its role in malaria elimination and eradication to obtain
support for implementation andpost-implementation
activities.
DISCUSSION
These recommendations describe the development path-
way for a new and potentially powerful tool, based on gene
drive technology, to prevent transmission of vector-borne
diseases. New synthetic gene drive applications, such as
those using the CRISPR/Cas system, have the potential to
introduce a beneﬁcial modiﬁcation rapidly into the local pop-
ulation of vector mosquitoes allowing it to become estab-
lished, spread, and persist. Two applications of gene drive,
leading to either a reduction in numbers of vector mosquitoes
or a reduction in their ability to transmit pathogens, currently
are being considered. Because of the present uncertainties
around gene drive technology, the complexity of anticipating
the development pathway was such that this working group
chose to simplify discussions by focusing on a relatively nar-
row use, namely a tool for controlling malaria transmission by
An. gambiae s.l. mosquitoes in Africa. However, it is expected
that these recommendations will stimulate similar thinking
about other possible uses of gene drive technology.
Theworking groupmembers foundmany similarities to, and
distinctions from, the development pathway for other types of
vector control tools.15,137 The group proposed that the testing
BOX 9
Resources recommended to prepare for ﬁeld testing of gene drive mosquitoes
More sensitivemonitoring tools andapproaches for detecting escapes fromconﬁnement andassessing the spreadof gene drivemosquitoes in
ﬁeld trial
Standards and best practices for the operation of laboratories/insectaries housing gene drive mosquitoes, including an external process for
validating compliance (although good laboratory practice certiﬁcation is not considered necessary)
Processes and venues (e.g., databases) to promote information and data sharing
Support for appropriate risk assessment
Support for effective stakeholder and community engagement
Opportunities for regulators to obtain training and experience to build capacity in regulation of modiﬁed insects
Mechanisms for regional harmonization of regulatory requirements and regional decision-making about regulatory authorization
Quality standards for manufacturing of living mosquito products that are consistent with their production requirements
Mechanisms for oversight and management of post-implementation environmental surveillance, if required
Assays for product performance failure for use in disseminated surveillance
Systems for reporting performance failure and decision-making on follow-up
Aneutral body tomanagehigh-level coordination among the variousstakeholders andorganize centralized responses to thediversechallenges
that will arise in the development pathway for gene drive mosquitoes as public health tools
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pathway for gene drive mosquitoes should follow a similar
trajectory for proof of public health impact, moving from
testing for entomological efﬁcacy to epidemiological efﬁcacy.
However, the potential of gene drive mosquitoes to establish
and spreadwithin the local environment in away thatwould be
difﬁcult to halt, draws parallels to the testing pathway for ag-
ricultural biocontrol agents. Thus, a key conclusion was the
requirement for extensive safety testing while still working in
strict containment under conditions where the probability of
inadvertent environmental exposure is negligible. Theworking
group concluded that no investigational gene drive product
that reveals a potential for signiﬁcant negative impact on the
environment or human health during testing in containment,
as compared with wild-type An. gambiae and conventional
vector control tools, should be moved to ﬁeld testing. For
those investigational products that pass this initial hurdle, the
pathway for further ﬁeld-testing will resemble that for GM
crops, initially aiming to limit environmental exposure through
physical and geographic conﬁnement and only gradually
moving to open releases. A similar progression was recom-
mended in the WHO Guidance Framework.15
Because of the presumed ability of gene drive products to
persist in the environment, the working group recognized that
development might not take place in a series of distinct and
separate phases, as for other typesof products, but rather that
each new phase may represent an extension or expansion of
the one before. Emphasis was placed on a requirement for
external all-hazards risk assessment before expansion from
each phase of testing to the next. Such a risk assessmentmay
well identify issues that must be addressed before moving
forward, to reduce risk and increase acceptability of testing.
The working group concluded that low-threshold gene drive
products for control of malaria transmission can be tested in a
safe andethicalmanner.Members foundmanyprecedents that
can be built on to create a pathway for responsible develop-
ment of these products. These include not only existing regu-
latory frameworks, but also development activities being put in
place for malaria elimination efforts more generally. However,
they recognized that gene drive evaluation will require signiﬁ-
cant advanced planning and coordination among researchers,
funders, regulators, and other government ofﬁcials, and policy
makers. Several important resources and practices should be
put in place to prepare for ﬁeld testing (see Box 9).
In particular, this new technology will require a robust and
transparent mechanism for regional regulatory coordination
and decision-making to deal with the potential for trans-
boundary movement. This must be underpinned by sub-
stantive capacity building, to enable decision-makers in
affected countries to make well-reasoned judgments about
the risks and beneﬁts of the technology in their own context.
Scientists and research institutions in the countries where
the gene drive mosquito product will be used must play a
central role in the development process from its early stages;
it is they who will represent the technology to communities,
regulators, government authorities, and other stakeholders.
Emphasis must be placed not only on technology transfer to
partner institutions, but on building knowledge about gene
drive technology among African scientists and the public
more broadly. Public acceptability is a critical determining
factor in the success of this technology, and will be inﬂu-
enced by public conﬁdence in the in-country scientists and
government authorities to make wise judgments. Product
developers (researchers and funders) bear major responsibility
for conducting conscientious stakeholder engagement for their
activities, listening and responding to concerns and obtaining
appropriate authorizations for their work. Honest dialog be-
tween developers and involved communities is fundamental for
building trust, and such collaboration must begin early. Com-
munications about the technology andproduct(s)must be open
and honest, avoiding hyperbole about either beneﬁts or risks,
and framed to suit the backgrounds and interests of different
audiences.
Although at the time of this writing there is no gene drive
mosquito product ready to enter ﬁeld testing, there is sub-
stantial enthusiasm for the technology’s potential to make a
signiﬁcant contribution to malaria elimination and eventual
eradication. Investigational products are already in labora-
tory development and, given the rapid pace of advances in
the science, more can be expected to appear shortly.
Therefore, it is imperative that testing of such products be
informed by the best practices described in this report. Like
its predecessor document, the WHO Guidance Framework
for testing GMM,15 these recommendations aim to foster
quality, consistency, and credibility of the processes for
testing and regulating this new genetic biocontrol technol-
ogy. The ability of proponents of gene drive technology to
demonstrate convincingly a thoughtful and prudent ap-
proach to their work may be a key determinant of whether it
achieves sufﬁcient public acceptance to allow its potential to
be tested.
GLOSSARY
Allele: A variant form of a gene at a particular locus on a
chromosome.Different allelesproducevariation in inherited
characteristics. Examples: A variant allele may cause
mosquitoes to become resistant to insecticides. Other
variant alleles may cause resistance to endonucleases
used in gene drive technology (see Crispr/Cas9).
Biosafety: Policies and practices intended to prevent harm to
the health or safety of human beings, other living organisms,
or the environment, especially those pertaining to safe han-
dling and containment of infectious agents.
Biosafety committee: A group, chartered by an institution,
which is responsible for implementing policies and guide-
lines related to use of potentially hazardous biological
agents, including, but not limited to, infectious agents, hu-
man materials, and recombinant DNA studies. This group
ensures that research involving these agents does not en-
danger researchers, laboratory workers, human research
subjects, the public, or the environment.
Cage testing: See Semi-ﬁeld release.
Capacity building: The provision and promotion of education
and practical training, particularly within low-resource and
unskilled communities, often with respect to essential ser-
vices. The term is also used in regard topromoting skills and
knowledge of researchers and regulators.
Cartagena protocol on biosafety to the CBD: An in-
ternational agreement that addresses the safe handling,
transport, and use of living modiﬁed organisms resulting
from modern biotechnology, with the aim of protecting bi-
ological diversity and human health. One hundred and se-
venty countries are signatories to the agreement, which
took effect on September 11, 2003.82
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Champion: An individual who plays a dominant role over-
coming technical and organizational obstacles in product
development.167
CRTs: Trials that group individuals into clusters, such as
residents of particular villages or urban neighborhoods.
Each cluster is assigned randomly an experimental
treatment such as a placebo or drug, or, in the case of
GMM, releases may be in one set of clusters and not in
another.
Combination therapy approach: See Multiplexing.
Community: A group of people who live in or near a potential
ﬁeld trial or release site and have a tangible and immediate
interest in the gene drive project.
Community engagement: Practices undertaken to inform
stakeholders about the diseases and vectors of interest
and goals of a proposed research study or intervention
trial, and to understand stakeholder perspectives and
reaction.
Compliance: The act of following or obeying a rule or order,
particularly with respect to governmental regulation.
Computational modeling: The process of using various
mathematical structures to predict real world situations.
Construct: The DNA introduced in the process of genetic
engineering.
Conﬁnement (also called physically conﬁned): The use of
measures that seek to prevent unplanned or uncontrolled
release of the transgenic organism into the environment.
For GMM, this may involve physical conﬁnement (also
termed “containment”) behind barriers within a laboratory,
insectary or cage facility; and/or ecological conﬁnement by
geographic/spatial, and/or climatic isolation. In addition or
alternatively, biological conﬁnement aims to use molecular
or reproductive strategies to prevent spread of the trans-
genic construct if escapes occur.85
Containment: See Physical conﬁnement.
CRISPR: A naturally occurring mechanisms of immunity to
viruses found in bacteria that involves identiﬁcation and
degradation of foreign DNA.
CRISPR/Cas9: A gene editing platform in which an endonu-
clease andaguideRNAareused to introducedouble strand
breaks at a speciﬁed location within the genome.
DSMB: An independent advisory group that monitors partic-
ipant safety and treatment efﬁcacy during a trial.
Deployment: Implementation of an intervention method to
prevent disease; for example, the use of GMM as part of a
national or regional program for vector control.
Drive: See Gene drive.
Driving transgene: See Gene drive.
Ecological conﬁnement: A situation in which the spread of
organisms is limited by the presence of ecologically un-
suitable terrestrial habitat that the species cannot colonize.
Ecological risk assessment: The study and use of probabi-
listic decision-making tools to evaluate the likely beneﬁts
and harms of a proposed activity on the well-being of
humans and environment, often under conditions of
uncertainty.
Ecosystem: A dynamic biological system consisting of all
organisms in a speciﬁc environment and the nonliving
features of the environment with which they interact.
Effect: A potential beneﬁcial or harmful outcome.
Endemic:A situation inwhich disease is present continuously
at some level in an area.
Endpoint: An event or outcome that can be measured ob-
jectively to determine whether the intervention being stud-
ied has the desired effect.
Entomological efﬁcacy: A measurement of the intended
functional effect on the target mosquito population, such
as reduced reproduction or competence to transmit a
pathogen.
Engagement: Seeking and facilitating the sharing and ex-
change of knowledge, perspectives, and preferences be-
tween, or among, groups who often have differences in
expertise, power, and values.
Ethics: An activity or inquiry intended to shed light on the
correctness or justiﬁability of a given course of conduct.
Ethics committee (also called institutional ethics committee,
institutional review board, or ethical review board): A group
charged with providing oversight for biomedical and be-
havioral research involving humans, with the aim to protect
the rights and welfare of research subjects.
Ethical review board: See Ethics committee
Field trial: An experiment designed to test a promising new
investigational product or process in a context similar to
that in which the product or process is intended to be used.
First-in-class: The ﬁrst of a particular mechanism, approach,
or strategy.
Fitness: Description of the ability to both survive and re-
produce and is equal to the long-term average contribution
to the gene pool by individuals having a particular genotype
or phenotype. If differences between alleles of a given gene
affect ﬁtness, then the frequencies of the alleles will change
over generations, the alleles with higher ﬁtness become
more common.
Fixation: Hundred percent frequency of an allele in gene
across the species population.
Gene:Asegment ofDNA that serves as abasic unit of heredity
and that serves as the chemical information required by
cells for synthesis of a product.
Genedrive:A systemof biased inheritance inwhich the ability
of a genetic element to pass from a parent to its offspring
through sexual reproduction is enhanced. Thus, the result
of a gene drive is the preferential increase of a speciﬁc
genotype that determines a speciﬁc phenotype from
one generation to the next, and potentially throughout a
population.
Gene drive candidate: Either the gene drive mosquito or the
DNA construct.
Gene drive mosquitoes: See Investigational product.
Gene drive strains: See Investigational product.
Gene editing: A technique that allows researchers to alter the
DNAof organisms to insert, delete, ormodify a geneor gene
sequences to silence, enhance, or otherwise change an
organism’s speciﬁc genetic characteristics.
Gene ﬂow: The transfer of genetic information from one pop-
ulation into another population (also called gene migration).
Gene pool: The collection of genes in an interbreeding
population.
Genetic engineering: Introduction of DNA, RNA, or proteins
manipulated by humans to effect a change in an organism’s
genome.
Genetically engineered mosquitoes: See GMM.
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GM:Anorganismwhosegenotypehasbeen altered, including
alteration by genetic engineering and nongenetic engi-
neering methods.
GMM (also called genetically engineered mosquitoes, trans-
genic mosquitoes, or living modiﬁed mosquitoes): Mos-
quitoes that have heritable traits derived through use of
recombinant DNA technology, which alter the strain, line, or
colony in amanner usually intended to result in reduction of
the transmission of mosquito-borne human diseases—see
also GMO. Genetically modiﬁed mosquitoes likely also will
be characterized by introduced heritable marker traits to
facilitate monitoring on release into the environment, and in
some cases may include only such markers, as for pop-
ulation biology studies.
GMO: Any organism that has in its genome novel DNA of
endogenous, exogenous, or mixed origin that was made
using modern recombinant DNA technology. Although
successive selective breeding of strains of organisms with
naturally occurring allelic variations also results in strains
with genotypes different from the natural population, these
are excluded from this deﬁnition.
Genome: The complete sequence of DNA in an organism.
Genome editing:Speciﬁcmodiﬁcation of an organisms’DNA
to create mutations or introduce new alleles or new
genes.
Genotype: An individual’s genetic identity.
GLP: Refers to a quality system of management controls for
research laboratories and organizations to ensure the uni-
formity, consistency, reliability, reproducibility, quality, and
integrity of chemical (including pharmaceuticals) nonclinical
safety tests.
Governance: The process of exercising oversight through
traditions (standards of practice) or regulations by which
individuals and communities are held accountable. Gov-
ernance often involves such policy tools as professional
standards of practice and codes of conduct; formal
guidelines, agreements, and treaties; and legislation or
other governmental regulation.
Hazard: An event, activity or other cause of a negative con-
sequence or impact identiﬁed in a risk analysis.
Horizontal gene transfer: Heritable transfer of a functional
genetic element from one organism to another without
mating, most often relating to genetic exchange between
different species or more distantly related species.
Incidence of infection: The rate at which new infections oc-
cur during the speciﬁc period of time.
In-country: As used in these recommendations, refers to
people or groups of people, processes, and/or regions in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Informed consent: The process intended to ensure that hu-
man subjectswhowill be observed or involved in a research
activity are fully and explicitly advised of all risks, costs, or
inconveniences theymay bear as a result of participating as
a research subject, and voluntarily agree to accept or bear
those risks and costs.
IVM: A decision-making process for the effective and efﬁcient
use of a combination of available resources in the man-
agement of vector populations, so as to reduce or interrupt
transmission of vector-borne diseases.148
Investigational gene drive product: See Investigational
product.
Investigational product:As used in these recommendations,
the investigational product is considered to be the transgenic
mosquito species carrying a gene drive system (for conve-
nience, also referred to as a gene drive mosquito). This term
applies to the original mosquito species (e.g. An. gambiae
s.s.) in which the gene drive construct was introduced.
Last mile: The ﬁnal step in the process of malaria
eradication.
Malaria elimination: Interruption of local transmission (re-
duction to zero incidence of indigenous cases) of a speci-
ﬁed malaria parasite in a deﬁned geographical area as a
result of deliberate activities. Continued measures to pre-
vent reestablishment of transmission are required.168
Malaria eradication: Permanent reduction to zero of the
worldwide incidence of infection caused by human malaria
parasites as a result of deliberate activities. Interven-
tions are no longer required once eradication has been
achieved.167
Mathematical modeling: See Computational modeling.
Migration: The movement, often seasonal, of populations,
groups, or of individuals across geographic space.
Mitigation: Actions, policies, and programs that serve to
prevent, minimize, or compensate for disruption of the
natural environment.
Multiplexing: Construct(s) aimed against multiple target
genes and multiple sequences within each target gene.
Nontarget effect: A direct, unintended, short- or long-term
consequence for one or more organisms other than the
organism intended to be affected by an action or interven-
tion. Concern about nontarget effects typically centers
around unforeseen harms to other species, but nontarget
effects can also be neutral or beneﬁcial.
Nontarget organism: any organism that is not a direct target
of an intended intervention. For GMM the direct target or-
ganism is other mosquitoes of the same species in the wild
population.
Opt-out: A consent model where participants are contacted
without speciﬁcally volunteering to take part in the research
and excluded only when they say they are unwilling to
participate.
Pathogen: A biological agent, such as a virus, bacterium, or
parasite, that causes disease. In malaria infection, the
pathogen is a unicellular parasite.
PCR: A laboratory technique used to amplify, make multiple
copies of, a speciﬁc DNA target from a mixture of DNA
molecules.
Phased testing pathway: A step-wise approach to guide the
preparation for and conduct of research in the laboratory
through environmental release.
Phenotype: The observable traits of an organism (i.e. how an
organism appears outwardly and physiologically) based on
genetic and environmental inﬂuences.
Physical conﬁnement: The use of human-made or natu-
ral physical restrictions or barriers to prevent unin-
tended or uncontrolled release of an organism into the
environment.
Population: All individuals of a given species within a deﬁned
ecological area.
Population biology: The study of populations, including their
natural history, size, migration, evolution, and extinction.
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Population replacement: The use of genetic methods to
change speciﬁc traits in an entire population. Also referred
to population modiﬁcation and population alteration.
Population suppression: Intentional reduction of the number
or distribution of a population through physical, chemical,
or biological means, particularly with pest species (also
called population reduction).
Prevalence of infection: the frequency of infection within a
population at any given time.
Product: See Investigational product.
Publics: Groups who lack the direct connection to a project
that stakeholders and communities have but nonetheless
have interests, concerns, hopes, fears, and values that can
contribute to decision-making.
Refractoriness: A condition in which the mosquito is in-
trinsically unable to support the development of a pathogen
to an infective stage or to a point of sufﬁcient abundance
such that the mosquito cannot transmit disease.
Regulation: an ofﬁcial rule to manage the conduct of those to
whom it applies, usually developed from legal interpreta-
tions of legislation and implemented by government min-
istries or agencies.
Regulatory agency (also called regulatory authority, ministry,
regulatory body, or regulator): A public authority or gov-
ernment entity responsible for exercising authority over
some area of activity in a supervisory capacity.
Remediation: Actions, policies, and programs that seek to
stop or reverse any disruption of the natural environment.
Risk: An objective measure of the product of the likelihood
and consequences of a hazard, deﬁned within a prescribed
set of circumstances. Risk is often described as a proba-
bility distribution of a set of consequences over a deﬁned
time period.
Risk assessment: The process by which all available evi-
dence on the probability of effects is collected, evaluated,
and interpreted to estimate the probability of the sum total
of effects.
Risk communication: The process through which concerns
about and tolerance of risk are articulated by stake-
holders and the results of risk assessment and risk
management are communicated to decision-makers and
the public.
Risk management: The process of identifying and imple-
menting measures expected to reduce risk to a tolerable
level.
Self-limiting: Genetically modiﬁed mosquitoes approaches
where the genetic modiﬁcation will not pass on indeﬁnitely
through subsequent generations.
Self-sustaining (also called self-propagating): Genetically
modiﬁed mosquitoes approaches where the heritable
modiﬁcation is spread and maintained indeﬁnitely through
the target population.
Stakeholder:Apersonwith aprofessional or personal interest
sufﬁcient to justify engagement, but may not have geo-
graphic proximity to a potential release site for a gene drive
technology.
SOPs: Written, step-wise instructions or descriptions of es-
sential, routine practices, intended to ensure consistent
and safe performance.
Step-wedge trial:A formof randomized controlled trial where
an intervention is rolled out in a random but sequential
manner so that all control clusters eventually are exposed to
the intervention.
TPP: A strategic development process tool that uses set of
criteria to predeﬁne ideal attributes of a candidate in-
vestigational product and subsequent modiﬁcations to
acceptance thresholds.
Trait: A genetically determined characteristic or condition.
Transboundary movement: Movement across national,
state, or other political lines of demarcation.
Transgene:Any gene transferred into an organism by genetic
engineering.
Transgenic mosquitoes: See GMM.
Transgenic construct: See Construct.
Transgenic organism: An organism into which one or more
genetic sequences from another species or synthetic se-
quences have been introduced into its genome by genetic
engineering.
Values:Deeply held, complicated, sometimesevolvingbeliefs
about what kinds of things—in humans’ lives and the world
at large—should be fostered, protected, or avoided.
Vector:An organism that spreads disease to other species by
transmitting one or more pathogens rather than causing
infection itself.
Vector mosquitoes: Those mosquitoes that are able to
transmit a disease-causing pathogen.
Wolbachia: A type of intracellular symbiont bacteria found in
the cells of many invertebrates, including insects and
nematodes, that can affect the reproductive biology of its
hosts.
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACL: Arthropod Containment Level
CDISC: Clinical Data Interchange Standards Consortium
CRISPR: Clustered regularly-interspaced short palindromic
repeats
CRT: Cluster randomized controlled trial
DNA: Deoxyribonucleic acid
DSMB: Data and safety monitoring board
GLP: Good Laboratory Practice
GM: Genetically modiﬁed
GMM: Genetically modiﬁed mosquitoes
GMO: Genetically modiﬁed organism
IVM: Integrated vector management
NASEM: National Academies of Science, Engineering and
Medicine
NBA: National Biosafety Authority
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
PCR: Polymerase chain reaction
RNA: Ribonucleic acid
SOPs: Standard operating procedures
TPP: Target Product Proﬁle
VCAG: Vector Control Advisory Group
WHO:World Health Organization
Received January 30, 2018. Accepted for publication April 4, 2018.
Acknowledgments: We thank the following for reviewing this re-
port and providing valuable comments and suggestions: Je´re´my
Bouyer, Brinda Dass, Jason Delborne, Kevin Esvelt, Sarah Hartley,
Calestous Juma, Daniel Masiga, Alan Pearson, Kent Redford, and
Dominic White. We also thank Laren Friedman for creating the
ﬁgures.
44 JAMES AND OTHERS
Financial support: Authorswere asked to self-declare their connection
to gene drive research during the time period in which this manuscript
was developed (August 2016 to January 2018). H. C. J. G. was directly
involved in conduct of gene drive research. S. J., M. G., and K. H. T.
wereemployedbyanorganizationproviding ﬁnancial support for gene
drive research. All other authors conﬁrmed they were not involved in
either research on or funding of gene drive research during this period.
This effort was supported by a grant from the Open Philanthropy
Project.
Authors’ addresses: Stephanie James,Michael Gottlieb, andKarenH.
Tountas,Foundation for theNational InstitutesofHealth,Bethesda,MD,
E-mails: sjames@fnih.org, mgottlieb@fnih.org, and ktountas@fnih.org.
Frank H. Collins, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, E-mail:
frank@nd.edu. Philip A. Welkhoff, Institute for Disease Modeling,
Bellevue,WA,E-mail:peckhoff@intven.com.ClaudiaEmerson,McMaster
University, Hamilton, Canada, E-mail: emerson@mcmaster.ca. H.
Charles J.Godfray, OxfordUniversity,Oxford,UnitedKingdom,E-mail:
charles.godfray@zoo.ox.ac.uk. Brian Greenwood, London School of
Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, United Kingdom, E-mail: brian.
greenwood@lshtm.ac.uk. Steve W. Lindsay, Durham University, Dur-
ham, United Kingdom, E-mail: s.w.lindsay@durham.ac.uk. Charles M.
Mbogo, Kenya Medical Research Institute, Nairobi, Kenya, E-mail:
cmbogo@kemri-wellcome.org. Fredros O. Okumu, Ifakara Health In-
stitute, Ifakara, Tanzania, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, Scotland,
and University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa,
E-mail: fredros@ihi.or.tz. Hector Quemada, Donald Danforth Plant
Science Center, Saint Louis, MO, E-mail: hquemada@danforthcenter.
org. Moussa Savadogo, New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
Ouagadougou,BurkinaFaso,E-mail:moussa.savadogo@nepadbiosafety.
net. Jerome A. Singh, Centre for the AIDS Programme of Research in
South Africa, Durban, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. E-mail: singhj9@
ukzn.ac.za. Yeya T. Toure´, University of Sciences, Techniques and
TechnologiesofBamako,Bamako,Mali, E-mail: ytoure76@gmail.com.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.
REFERENCES
1. CurtisCF,GravesPM, 1988.Methods for replacement ofmalaria
vector populations. J Trop Med Hyg 91: 43–48.
2. Beaty BJ, Prager DJ, James AA, Jacobs-Lorena M, Miller LH,
Law JH, Collins FH, Kafatos FC, 2009. From Tucson to geno-
mics and transgenics: the vector biology network and the
emergence of modern vector biology. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 3:
e343.
3. Burt A, 2014.Heritable strategies for controlling insect vectors of
disease. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 369: 20130432.
4. Adelman ZN, 2015. Genetic Control of Malaria and Dengue.
Academic Press. New York, NY: Elsevier Science Publishing
Co.
5. SinkinsSP,GouldF, 2006.Genedrive systems for insect disease
vectors. Nat Rev Genet 7: 427–435.
6. Macias VM, Ohm JR, Rasgon JL, 2017. Gene drive for mosquito
control: where did it come from andwhere arewe headed? Int J
Environ Res Public Health 14: E1006.
7. Esvelt KM, Smidler AL, Catteruccia F, Church GM, 2014. Con-
cerning RNA-guided gene drives for the alteration of wild
populations. ELife 3: e03401.
8. Burt A, 2003. Site-speciﬁc selﬁsh genes as tools for the control
and genetic engineering of natural populations. Proc Biol Sci
270: 921–928.
9. Marshall JM, 2009. The effect of gene drive on containment of
transgenic mosquitoes. J Theor Biol 258: 250–265.
10. Noble C, Adlam B, Church GM, Esvelt KM, Nowak MA, 2017.
Current CRISPR gene drive systems are likely to be highly in-
vasive in wild populations. bioRxiv, doi: 10.1101/219022.
11. Gantz VM, Jasinskiene N, Tatarenkova O, Fazekas A, Macias
VM, Bier E, James AA, 2015. Highly efﬁcient Cas9-mediated
gene drive for population modiﬁcation of the malaria vector
mosquito Anopheles stephensi. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112:
E6736–E6743.
12. Hammond A et al., 2016. A CRISPR-Cas9 gene drive system
targeting female reproduction in the malaria mosquito vector
Anopheles gambiae. Nat Biotechnol 34: 78–83.
13. Eckhoff PA, Wenger EA, Godfray HC, Burt A, 2017. Impact of
mosquito gene drive on malaria elimination in a computational
model with explicit spatial and temporal dynamics. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 114: E255–E264.
14. DeredecA,GodfrayHC,Burt A, 2011.Requirements for effective
malaria control with homing endonuclease genes. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 108: E874–E880.
15. World Health Organization, 2014. Guidance Framework for
Testing ofGeneticallyModiﬁedMosquitoes. Available at: http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/127889/1/9789241507486_eng.
pdf?ua=1. Accessed January 22, 2018.
16. Adelman Z et al., 2017. Rules of the road for insect gene drive
research and testing. Nat Biotechnol 35: 716–718.
17. Kaebnick GE, Heitman E, Collins JP, Delborne JA, Landis WG,
Sawyer K, Taneyhill LA, Winickoff DE, 2016. Precaution and
governance of emerging technologies. Science 354: 710–711.
18. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine,
2016. Gene Drives on the Horizon Advancing Science, Navi-
gating Uncertainty, and Aligning Research with Public Values.
The National Academies Press. Available at: http://nas-sites.
org/gene-drives/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
19. Emerson C, James S, Littler K, Randazzo F, 2017. Principles for
gene drive research. Science 358: 1135–1136.
20. VectorBase Bioinformatics Resource for Invertebrate Vectors of
Human Pathogens. Anopheles gambiae s.l. Available at: https://
www.vectorbase.org/taxonomy/anopheles-gambiae-sl. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
21. Fontaine MC et al., 2015. Mosquito genomics. Extensive in-
trogression in a malaria vector species complex revealed by
phylogenomics. Science 347: 1258524.
22. SinkaME et al., 2012. A global map of dominantmalaria vectors.
Parasit Vectors 5: 69.
23. Sinka ME et al., 2010. The dominant Anopheles vectors of hu-
man malaria in Africa, Europe and the Middle East: occurrence
data, distributionmaps and bionomic precis. Parasit Vectors 3:
117.
24. Roche JP, 2015. AnophelesMosquitoes as Vectors of Malaria in
East Africa: Bed Nets and Beyond. Entomology Today: Ento-
mologicalSocietyofAmerica.Availableat:https://entomologytoday.
org/2015/04/24/anopheles-mosquitoes-as-vectors-of-malaria-
in-east-africa-bed-nets-and-beyond/. Accessed January 22,
2018.
25. Bhatt S et al., 2015. The effect of malaria control on Plasmodium
falciparum in Africa between 2000 and 2015. Nature 526:
207–211.
26. WHO, 2017. World Malaria Report 2017. World Health Organi-
zation. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
259492/1/9789241565523-eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed January
22, 2018.
27. WHO, 2016. World Malaria Report 2016. World Health Or-
ganization. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
handle/10665/252038/9789241511711-eng.pdf;jsessionid=
8F359C7AF7CC0FEB0988D4690942A77F?sequence=1.
Accessed May 4, 2018.
28. Hemingway J et al., 2016. Averting a malaria disaster: will
insecticide resistance derail malaria control? Lancet 387:
1785–1788.
29. Nkumama IN, O’Meara WP, Osier FH, 2017. Changes in malaria
epidemiology in Africa and new challenges for elimination.
Trends Parasitol 33: 128–140.
30. Patouillard E, Grifﬁn J, Bhatt S, Ghani A, Cibulskis R, 2017.
Global investment targets for malaria control and elimination
between 2016 and 2030. BMJ Glob Health 2: e000176.
31. World Health Organization, 2015. Global Technical Strategy for
Malaria 2016–2030. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/176712/1/9789241564991_eng.pdf. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
32. World Health Organization, 2017. Fifth Meeting of the Vector
Control Advisory Group. Geneva, Switzerland, November 2–4,
2016. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
255824/1/WHO-HTM-NTD-VEM-2017.02-eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
PATHWAY TO DEPLOYMENT OF GENE DRIVE MOSQUITOES 45
33. Champer J, Buchman A, Akbari OS, 2016. Cheating evolution:
engineering gene drives to manipulate the fate of wild pop-
ulations. Nat Rev Genet 17: 146–159.
34. Tanaka H, Stone HA, Nelson DR, 2017. Spatial gene drives and
pushed genetic waves. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 114:
8452–8457.
35. Noble C, Min M, Olejarz J, Buchthal J, Chavez A, Smidler AL,
DeBenedictis EA, Church GM, Nowak MA, Esvelt KM, 2016.
Daisy-chain gene drives for the alteration of local populations.
bioRxiv, doi: 10.1101/057307.
36. Burt A, Deredec A, 2017. Self-limiting population genetic control
with sex-linked genome editors. bioRxiv, doi: 10.1101/236489.
37. Fischetti M, 2015. Africa Dwarfs China, Europe and the U.S. The
Most Prevalent Flat Maps Make Africa Appear Much Smaller
Than It Is. Scientiﬁc American: Springer Nature. Available at:
https://www.scientiﬁcamerican.com/article/africa-dwarfs-china-
europe-and-the-u-s/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
38. Derua YA, Alifrangis M, Magesa SM, Kisinza WN, Simonsen PE,
2015. Sibling species of the Anopheles funestus group, and
their infection with malaria and lymphatic ﬁlarial parasites, in
archived and newly collected specimens from northeastern
Tanzania.Malar J 14: 104.
39. Djouaka RJ, Atoyebi SM, Tchigossou GM, Riveron JM, Irving H,
Akoton R, KusimoMO, Bakare AA, Wondji CS, 2016. Evidence
of a multiple insecticide resistance in the malaria vector
Anopheles funestus in south west Nigeria.Malar J 15: 565.
40. Beaghton A, Beaghton PJ, Burt A, 2017. Vector control with
driving Y chromosomes: modelling the evolution of resistance.
Malar J 16: 286.
41. Marshall JM, Buchman A, Sanchez CHM, Akbari OS, 2017.
Overcoming evolved resistance to population-suppressing
homing-based gene drives. Sci Rep 7: 3776.
42. Unckless RL, Clark AG, Messer PW, 2017. Evolution of re-
sistance against CRISPR/Cas9 gene drive. Genetics 205:
827–841.
43. Hammond AM et al., 2017. The creation and selection of muta-
tions resistant to a gene drive over multiple generations in the
malaria mosquito. PLoS Genet 13: e1007039.
44. Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative. Target Product Proﬁles.
Available at: https://www.dndi.org/diseases-projects/target-
product-proﬁles/. Accessed March 29, 2018.
45. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2007. Guidance for In-
dustry and Review Staff Target Product Proﬁle—A Strategic
Development Process Tool. Available at: https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm080593.pdf. Accessed March 29, 2018.
46. Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise. Target Product Proﬁle: A Guid-
ance Document. Available at: http://www.vaccineenterprise.
org/timely-topics/target-product-proﬁle. Accessed March 29,
2018.
47. Carballar-Lejarazu R, James AA, 2017. Population modiﬁcation
of Anopheline species to control malaria transmission. Pathog
Glob Health 111: 424–435.
48. Australian Academy of Science, 2017. Synthetic Gene Drives in
Australia: Implications of Emerging Technologies. Available at:
https://www.science.org.au/ﬁles/userﬁles/support/documents/
gene-drives-discussion-paper-june2017.pdf. Accessed January
22, 2018.
49. Lunshof JE, Birnbaum A, 2017. Adaptive risk management of
gene drive experiments. Appl Biosaf 22: 97–103.
50. Roberts A, Andrade PP, Okumu F, Quemada H, Savadogo M,
Singh JA, James S, 2017. Results from the workshop “problem
formulation for the use of gene drive inmosquitoes”.Am J Trop
Med Hyg 96: 530–533.
51. Murray JV, Jansen CC, De Barro P, 2016. Risk associated with
the release of Wolbachia-infected Aedes aegypti mosquitoes
into the environment in an effort to control dengue. Front Public
Health 4: 43.
52. Hartley S, Millar KM, 2014. The challenges of consulting the
public on science policy: examining the development of Euro-
pean risk assessment policy for genetically modiﬁed animals.
Rev Policy Res 31: 481–502.
53. International Association for Impact Assessment and Institute of
Environmental Assessment, UK, 1999. Principles of Environ-
mental Impact Assessment Best Practice. Available at: http://
www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/principlesEA_1.pdf. Accessed Jan-
uary 10, 2018.
54. Vanclay F, 2003. International principles for social impact as-
sessment. IAPA 21: 5–11.
55. Murphy B, Jansen C, Murray J, De Barro P, 2010. Risk Analysis
on the Australian Release of Aedes aegypti (L.) (Diptera:
Culicidae) Containing Wolbachia. CSIRO. Available at: http://
www.eliminatedengue.com/library/publication/document//
riskanalysisﬁnalreportcsiro.pdf. Accessed January 22, 2018.
56. NeuhausCP, Caplan AL, 2017. Ethical lessons from a tale of two
genetically modiﬁed insects. Nat Biotechnol 35: 713–716.
57. Wellcome Trust. Sharing Research Data to Improve Public
Health: Full Joint Statement by Funders of Health Research.
Available at: https://wellcome.ac.uk/what-we-do/our-work/
sharing-research-data-improve-public-health-full-joint-
statement-funders-health. Accessed January 22, 2018.
58. WellcomeTrust, 2003.SharingData from Large-Scale Biological
Research Projects: A System of Tripartite Responsibility.
Available at: https://www.genome.gov/pages/research/
wellcomereport0303.pdf. Accessed January 22, 2018.
59. VectorBase. VectorBase Bioinformatics Resource for Inver-
tebrate Vectors of Human Pathogens. Available at: https://
www.vectorbase.org/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
60. Plasmo DB. Plasmodium Genomics Resource. Available at:
http://plasmodb.org/plasmo/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
61. CDISC, 2017. Malaria Therapeutic Area User Guide v1.0. Avail-
able at: https://www.cdisc.org/standards/therapeutic-areas/
malaria. Accessed January 22, 2018.
62. Leitner WW, Wali T, Kincaid R, Costero-Saint Denis A, 2015.
Arthropod vectors and disease transmission: translational as-
pects. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 9: e0004107.
63. World Health Organization. Ethical Standards and Procedures
forResearchwithHumanBeings. Available at: http://www.who.
int/ethics/research/en/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
64. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2009. Code of
Federal Regulations Title 45 Public Welfare Department of
Health and Human Services Part 46 Protection of Human
Subjects. Available at: https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-
and-policy/regulations/45-cfr-46/. Accessed January 22,
2018.
65. Achee NL, Youngblood L, BangsMJ, Lavery JV, James S, 2015.
Considerations for the use of human participants in vector bi-
ology research: a tool for investigators and regulators. Vector
Borne Zoonotic Dis 15: 89–102.
66. Kolopack PA, Lavery JV, 2017. Gates Open Research. Informed
Consent in Field Trials of Gene-Drive Mosquitoes [Version 1;
Referees: 4Approved]. Available at: https://gatesopenresearch.
org/articles/1-14/v1. Accessed December 20, 2017.
67. LAC HSR Health Sector Reform Initiative, 2000. Stakeholder
analysis guidelines. Policy Toolkit for Strengthening Health
Sector Reform. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health
Organization.
68. Bandewar SV, Wambugu F, Richardson E, Lavery JV, 2017. The
role of community engagement in the adoption of new agri-
cultural biotechnologies by farmers: the case of the Africa
harvest tissue-culture banana in Kenya. BMC Biotechnol
17: 28.
69. McNaughton D, Duong TT, 2014. Designing a community en-
gagement framework for a new dengue control method: a case
study from central Vietnam. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 8: e2794.
70. Kolopack PA, Parsons JA, Lavery JV, 2015. What makes com-
munity engagement effective?: lessons from the eliminate
dengue program in Queensland Australia. PLoS Negl Trop Dis
9: e0003713.
71. Lavery JV, Tinadana PO, Scott TW, Harrington LC, Ramsey JM,
Ytuarte-Nunez C, James AA, 2010. Towards a framework for
community engagement in global health research. Trends
Parasitol 26: 279–283.
72. Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics, 2012. Emerging Biotechnologies:
Technology, Choice and the Public Good. Available at: http://
nufﬁeldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Emerging_
biotechnologies_full_report_web_0.pdf. Accessed January 22,
2018.
73. MacQueenKM, BhanA, Frohlich J, Holzer J, Sugarman J; Ethics
Working Group of the HIVPTN, 2015. Evaluating community
46 JAMES AND OTHERS
engagement in global health research: the need for metrics.
BMC Med Ethics 16: 44.
74. International Finance Corporation, 2007. Stakeholder En-
gagement: A Good Practice Handbook for Companies Doing
Business in EmergingMarkets. Available at: http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/579261468162552212/pdf/399160IFC1
StakeholderEngagement01PUBLIC1.pdf. Accessed January 22,
2018.
75. International Finance Corporation, 2014. A Strategic Approach
to Early Stakeholder Engagement: AGood Practice Handbook
for Junior Companies in the Extractive Industries. Avail-
able at: https://commdev.org/userﬁles/FINAL_IFC_131208_
ESSE%20Handbook_web%201013.pdf. Accessed January
22, 2018.
76. Community Engagement in the NSW planning System, 2003.
Crown. Available at: https://www.communityplanningtoolkit.
org/sites/default/ﬁles/CommunityEngagementHandbookNew
SouthWales.pdf. Accessed January 22, 2018.
77. MESH. MESH Community Engagement Network. Available at:
https://mesh.tghn.org/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
78. Pielke RA, 2007. TheHonest Broker: Making Sense of Science in
Policy and Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
79. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine,
2016. Communicating Chemistry A Framework for Sharing
Science: A Practical Evidence-Based Guide. The National
Academies Press. Available at: http://nap.edu/23444. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
80. Ramsey JM, Bond JG, Macotela ME, Facchinelli L, Valerio L,
Brown DM, Scott TW, James AA, 2014. A regulatory structure
for workingwith geneticallymodiﬁedmosquitoes: lessons from
Mexico. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 8: e2623.
81. WorldHealthOrganization.VectorControlAdvisoryGroup (VCAG).
Available at: http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/vector_
ecology/VCAG/en/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
82. Convention on Biological Diversity. The Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety. Available at: https://bch.cbd.int/protocol. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
83. Convention on Biological Diversity. Convention on Biological
Diversity Safeguard Life on Earth. Available at: https://www.
cbd.int/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
84. New Partnership for Africa’s Development, 2017. Issue Brief:
African Union Model Law for Medical Products Regulation:
IncreasingAccess to andDelivery of NewHealth Technologies
for Patients in Need. Available at: http://www.nepad.org/
resource/issue-brief-african-union-model-law-medical-products-
regulation-increasing-access-and. Accessed January 22,
2018.
85. Akbari OS et al., 2015. Safeguarding gene drive experiments in
the laboratory. Science 349: 927–929.
86. Benedict MQ, Burt A, Capurro ML, De Barro P, Handler AM,
Hayes KR, Marshall JM, Tabachnick WJ, Adelman ZN, 2018.
Recommendations for laboratory containment and manage-
ment of gene drive systems in arthropods. Vector Borne Zoo-
notic Dis 8: 2–13.
87. African Biosafety Network of Expertise, 2013. Development of
GeneticallyModiﬁedCrops inAfrica. Availableat: http://nepad-
abne.net/biotechnology/development-of-genetically-modiﬁed-
crops-in-africa/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
88. New Partnership for Africa’s Development. ABNE: A Biosafety
Resource Network for African Regulators and Policy Makers.
Available at: http://nepad-abne.net/. Accessed January 22,
2018.
89. African Union. Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Avail-
able at: https://au.int/en/organs/recs. Accessed January 22,
2018.
90. Convention on Biological Diversity. The Nagoya—Kuala Lumpur
Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Carta-
gena Protocol on Biosafety. Available at: https://bch.cbd.int/
protocol/supplementary/. Accessed January 18, 2018.
91. Wu B, Luo L, Gao XJ, 2016. Cas9-triggered chain ablation of
cas9 as a gene drive brake. Nat Biotechnol 34: 137–138.
92. Gantz VM, Bier E, 2016. The dawn of active genetics. Bioessays
38: 50–63.
93. Zentner GE, Wade MJ, 2017. The promise and peril of CRISPR
gene drives: genetic variation and inbreeding may impede the
propagation of gene drives based on the CRISPR genome
editing technology. Bioessays 39: 1700109.
94. Convention on Biological Diversity. The Nagoya Protocol on
Access and Beneﬁt-Sharing. Available at: https://www.cbd.int/
abs/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
95. Benedict M et al., 2008. Guidance for contained ﬁeld trials of
vector mosquitoes engineered to contain a gene drive system:
recommendations of a scientiﬁc working group. Vector Borne
Zoonotic Dis 8: 127–166.
96. FergusonHF,GandonS,MackinnonMJ,ReadAF, 2006.Malaria
parasite virulence in mosquitoes and its implications for the
introduction and efﬁcacy of GMMmalaria control programmes.
Boete C, ed. Genetically Modiﬁed Mosquitoes for Malaria
Control. Georgetown, TX: Landes Bioscience.
97. KeeseP, 2008.Risks fromGMOsdue tohorizontal gene transfer.
Environ Biosafety Res 7: 123–149.
98. Barratt BIP, Moeed A, Malone LA, 2006. Biosafety assessment
protocols for new organisms in New Zealand: can they apply
internationally to emerging technologies? EIA Review 26:
339–358.
99. Popovici J, Moreira LA, Poinsignon A, Iturbe-Ormaetxe I,
McNaughton D, O’Neill SL, 2010. Assessing key safety con-
cerns of aWolbachia-based strategy to control dengue trans-
mission by Aedes mosquitoes. Mem Inst Oswaldo Cruz 105:
957–964.
100. De Barro PJ, Murphy B, Jansen CC, Murray J, 2011. The pro-
posed release of the yellow fever mosquito, Aedes aegypti
containing a naturally occurring strain ofWolbachia pipientis, a
question of regulatory responsibility. J Verbraucherschutz
Lebensmsicherh 6: 33–40.
101. Hurst TP, Pittman G, O’Neill SL, Ryan PA, Nguyen HL, Kay BH,
2012. Impacts of Wolbachia infection on predator prey rela-
tionships: evaluating survival and horizontal transfer between
wMelPop infected Aedes aegypti and its predators. J Med
Entomol 49: 624–630.
102. Endersby NM, Hoffmann AA, 2013. Effect of Wolbachia on in-
secticide susceptibility in lines of Aedes aegypti. Bull Entomol
Res 103: 269–277.
103. TruongQH, TruongUN, Nguyen VH, Nguyen DC, 2011. Vietnam
EliminateDengueProject: Risk Assessment of the Pilot Release
of Aedes aegypti Mosquitoes Containing Wolbachia. Vietnam
EliminateDengueProject. Availableat: http://www.eliminatedengue.
com/library/publication/document/july_2011_ra_report_eng.
pdf. Accessed January 22, 2018.
104. Beaghton A, Hammond A, Nolan T, Crisanti A, Godfray HC, Burt
A, 2017. Requirements for driving antipathogen effector genes
into populations of disease vectors by homing. Genetics 205:
1587–1596.
105. James AA, 2005. Gene drive systems inmosquitoes: rules of the
road. Trends Parasitol 21: 64–67.
106. Hammond AM, Galizi R, 2017. Gene drives to ﬁght malaria:
current state and future directions. Pathog Glob Health 111:
412–423.
107. Noble C, Olejarz J, Esvelt KM, Church GM, Nowak MA, 2017.
Evolutionary dynamics of CRISPR gene drives. Sci Adv 3:
e1601964.
108. U.S. Department of Health andHumanServices. 2009.Biosafety
in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. Section VIII-C:
Parasitic Agents. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Health
and Human Services, 182–194.
109. American Committee of Medical Entomology ASoTMaH, 2003.
Arthropod containment guidelines. A project of the American
Committee of Medical Entomology and American Society of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis 3:
61–98.
110. Adelman ZN, Pledger D, Myles KM, 2017. Developing standard
operating procedures for gene drive research in disease vector
mosquitoes. Pathog Glob Health 111: 436–447.
111. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2017. EPA Revised
EcologicalRiskAssessment for theSection3Registrationof the
Microbial Pesticide End-Use Product ZAP Mosquito Larvae.
Available at: https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-
HQ-OPP-2016-0205-0019. Accessed March 30, 2018.
PATHWAY TO DEPLOYMENT OF GENE DRIVE MOSQUITOES 47
112. US Department of Health and Human Services, 2018. Facility
Inspection Report Response Organization: Florida Keys Mos-
quito Control District. Available at: https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/UCM514797.
pdf. Accessed March 30, 2018.
113. Convention on Biological Diversity. Country Proﬁles. Available
at: https://www.cbd.int/countries/nfp/default.shtml. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
114. Brown DM, Alphey LS, McKemey A, Beech C, James AA, 2014.
Criteria for identifying and evaluating candidate sites for open-
ﬁeld trials of genetically engineered mosquitoes. Vector Borne
Zoonotic Dis 14: 291–299.
115. Ferguson HM et al., 2008. Establishment of a large semi-ﬁeld
system for experimental studyof Africanmalaria vector ecology
and control in Tanzania.Malar J 7: 158.
116. Facchinelli L, Valerio L, Bond JG,Wise deValdezMR,Harrington
LC, Ramsey JM, Casas-Martinez M, Scott TW, 2011. Devel-
opment of a semi-ﬁeld system for contained ﬁeld trials with
Aedes aegypti in southern Mexico. Am J Trop Med Hyg 85:
248–256.
117. Vontas J, Moore S, Kleinschmidt I, Ranson H, Lindsay S,
Lengeler C, Hamon N, McLean T, Hemingway J, 2014.
Framework for rapid assessment and adoption of new vector
control tools. Trends Parasitol 30: 191–204.
118. Frentiu FD, Zakir T, Walker T, Popovici J, Pyke AT, van den Hurk
A, McGraw EA, O’Neill SL, 2014. Limited dengue virus repli-
cation in ﬁeld-collected Aedes aegypti mosquitoes infected
withWolbachia. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 8: e2688.
119. Hoffmann AA, Iturbe-Ormaetxe I, Callahan AG, Phillips BL,
Billington K, Axford JK, Montgomery B, Turley AP, O’Neill SL,
2014. Stability of the wMel Wolbachia infection following in-
vasion into Aedes aegypti populations. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 8:
e3115.
120. Smith PG, Ross DA, MorrowRH, ed., 2015. Field Trials of Health
Interventions: A Toolbox. Oxford University Press. Available at:
http://fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/academic/pdf/openaccess/
9780198732860.pdf. Accessed January 22, 2018.
121. Macias VM, James AA, 2015. Impact of genetic modiﬁcation of
vector populations on themalaria eradication agenda.Adelman
ZN, ed.Genetic Control of Malaria and Dengue. Oxford, United
Kingdom: Elsevier Academic Press.
122. Boete C, Koella JC, 2002. A theoretical approach to predicting
the success of genetic manipulation of malaria mosquitoes in
malaria control.Malar J 1: 3.
123. Habicht JP, Victora CG, Vaughan JP, 1999. Evaluation designs
for adequacy, plausibility and probability of public health pro-
gramme performance and impact. Int J Epidemiol 28: 10–18.
124. LehmannT,HawleyWA,GrebertH,DangaM,Atieli F,CollinsFH,
1999. The Rift Valley complex as a barrier to gene ﬂow for
Anopheles gambiae in Kenya. J Hered 90: 613–621.
125. Dao A, Yaro AS, Diallo M, Timbine S, Huestis DL, Kassogue Y,
TraoreAI, SanogoZL, SamakeD, LehmannT, 2014. Signatures
of aestivation and migration in Sahelian malaria mosquito
populations. Nature 516: 387–390.
126. Maliti D, Ranson H, Magesa S, Kisinza W, Mcha J, Haji K,
Killeen G, Weetman D, 2014. Islands and stepping-stones:
comparative population structure of Anopheles gambiae
sensu stricto and Anopheles arabiensis in Tanzania and im-
plications for the spread of insecticide resistance. PLoS One
9: e110910.
127. Kayondo JK, Mukwaya LG, Stump A, Michel AP, Coulibaly MB,
BesanskyNJ, Collins FH, 2005. Genetic structure ofAnopheles
gambiae populations on islands in northwestern Lake Victoria,
Uganda.Malar J 4: 59.
128. Miles A et al., 2016. Natural diversity of the malaria vector
Anopheles gambiae. bioRxiv, doi: 10.1101/096289.
129. World Health Organization. Overview of Malaria Elimination.
Available at: http://www.who.int/malaria/areas/elimination/
overview/en/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
130. World Health Organization, 2017. Design of Epidemiological
Trials for Vector Control Products: Report of a WHO Expert
AdvisoryGroup. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/255854/1/WHO-HTM-NTD-VEM-2017.04-eng.pdf. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
131. World Health Organization. International Clinical Trials Registry
Platform (ICTRP). Available at: http://www.who.int/ictrp/en/.
Accessed January 22, 2018.
132. U.S. National Library of Medicine. ClinicalTrials.gov. Available
at: https://clinicaltrials.gov/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
133. World Health Organization, 2005. Operational Guidelines for the Es-
tablishment and Functioning of Data andSafetyMonitoringBoards.
Available at: http://www.who.int/tdr/publications/documents/
operational-guidelines.pdf?ua=1. Accessed January 22, 2018.
134. Brown CA, Lilford RJ, 2006. The stepped wedge trial design: a
systematic review. BMC Med Res Methodol 6: 54.
135. World Health Organization, 2017.How to Design Vector Control
Efﬁcacy Trials: Guidance on Phase III Vector Control Field Trial
Design. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/
259688/1/WHO-HTM-NTD-VEM-2017.03-eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
136. Hayes RJ, Moulton LH, 2017. Cluster Randomised Trials. Boca
Raton, Florida: CRC Press.
137. Wilson AL, Boelaert M, Kleinschmidt I, Pinder M, Scott TW,
TustingLS, LindsaySW,2015. Evidence-based vector control?
Improving the quality of vector control trials. Trends Parasitol
31: 380–390.
138. Delrieu I, Leboulleux D, Ivinson K, Gessner BD; Malaria Trans-
missionBlocking Vaccine Technical ConsultationGroup, 2015.
Design of a phase III cluster randomized trial to assess the
efﬁcacy and safety of a malaria transmission blocking vaccine.
Vaccine 33: 1518–1526.
139. Drame PM et al., 2015. Speciﬁc antibodies to Anopheles gSG6-
P1 salivary peptide to assess early childhood exposure to
malaria vector bites.Malar J 14: 285.
140. U.S. National Institutes of Health, 2017. Certiﬁcates of Conﬁ-
dentiality: Background Information. Available at: https://
humansubjects.nih.gov/coc/background. Accessed January
22, 2018.
141. Convention on Biological Diversity. The Biosafety Clearing-
House. Available at: http://bch.cbd.int/about/. Accessed Jan-
uary 22, 2018.
142. Alphey N, Alphey L, Bonsall MB, 2011. A model framework to
estimate impact and cost of genetics-based sterile insect
methods for dengue vector control. PLoS One 6: e25384.
143. World Health Organization, 2015. Risks Associated with Scale-
Back of Vector Control after Malaria Transmission Has Been
Reduced. Available at: http://www.who.int/malaria/publications/
atoz/scale-back-vector-control.pdf?ua=1. Accessed January
22, 2018.
144. Gerardin J, Bever CA, Bridenbecker D, Hamainza B, Silumbe K,
Miller JM, Eisele TP, Eckhoff PA, Wenger EA, 2017. Effective-
ness of reactive case detection for malaria elimination in three
archetypical transmission settings: a modelling study. Malar J
16: 248.
145. U.S. Agency for International Development, 2016. Pathways to
Scale: A Guide on Business Models and Partnership Ap-
proaches to Scale-Up. Available at: https://www.usaid.gov/cii/
pathways-scale. Accessed January 22, 2018.
146. Hoeschle-Zeledon IPN, Kumar L, 2013. Regulatory Challenges
for Biological Control. SP-IPM Secretariat, International In-
stitute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). Available at: http://www.
spipm.cgiar.org/c/document_library/get_ﬁle?uuid=3509eb45-
64eb-47ac-a933-8ebcd5d5574a&groupId=17812. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
147. New Partnership for Africa’s Development. African Medicines
Regulatory Harmonisation (AMRH). Available at: http://www.
nepad.org/content/african-medicines-regulatory-harmonisation-
armh-programs. Accessed January 22, 2018.
148. World Health Organization, 2012. Handbook for Integrated
Vector Management. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/44768/1/9789241502801_eng.pdf. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
149. African Leaders Malaria Alliance, 2016. African Heads of State
Adopt Roadmap to Eliminate Malaria in Africa by 2030. Available
at: http://alma2030.org/content/african-heads-state-adopt-
roadmap-eliminate-malaria-africa-2030. Accessed January
22, 2018.
150. Kabayo JP, Boussaha A, 2002. Partnerships for Fighting Rural
Poverty: Africa Steps up Campaign Against the Tsetse Fly.
48 JAMES AND OTHERS
Vienna, Austria: IAEA Bulletin: International Atomic Energy
Agency, 11–16.
151. World Health Organization, 2017. The Evaluation Process for
Vector Control Products. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/
bitstream/10665/255644/1/WHO-HTM-GMP-2017.13-eng.pdf.
Accessed January 22, 2018.
152. Seck MT et al., 2015. Quality of sterile male Tsetse after long
distance transport as chilled, irradiated pupae.PLoSNegl Trop
Dis 9: e0004229.
153. Gamboa D et al., 2010. A large proportion of P. falciparum iso-
lates in the Amazon region of Peru lack pfhrp2 and pfhrp3:
implications for malaria rapid diagnostic tests. PLoS One 5:
e8091.
154. Maund SJ, Campbell PJ, Giddings JM, Hamer MJ, Henry K,
Pilling ED, Warinton JS, Wheeler JR, 2012. Ecotoxicology of
synthetic pyrethroids. Top Curr Chem 314: 137–165.
155. World Health Organization, 2017. A Framework for Malaria
Elimination. Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/
10665/254761/1/9789241511988-eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
156. De Barro PJ, Coombs MT, 2009. Post-release evaluation of
Eretmocerus hayati Zolnerowich and Rose in Australia. Bull
Entomol Res 99: 193–206.
157. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2017. FDA Issues Final Guid-
ance Clarifying FDA and EPA Jurisdiction over Mosquito-Related
Products. Available at: https://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/
NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm578420.htm. Accessed January
22, 2018.
158. Department of Environmental Affairs, Republic of South Africa;
and South African National Biodiversity Institute, 2011. Moni-
toring the Environmental Impacts of GM Maize in South Africa:
The Outcomes of the South Africa-Norway Biosafety Cooperation
Project (2008–2010). Available at: https://www.sanbi.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/documents/documents/sanbimaizereportlr.pdf.
Accessed January 22, 2018.
159. South African National Biodiversity Institute, Genetically
ModiﬁedOrganismsProgramme.Availableat: https://www.sanbi.
org/biodiversity/building-knowledge/biodiversity-monitoring-
assessment/genetically-modiﬁed-organisms-on-the-environment/.
Accessed May 23, 2018.
160. World Health Organization, 2016.A Toolkit for Integrated Vector
Management in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available at: http://apps.
who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/250267/1/9789241549653-eng.
pdf?ua=1. Accessed January 22, 2018.
161. DHIS 2. In Action. Available at: https://www.dhis2.org/inaction.
Accessed January 22, 2018.
162. ELIMINATION 8, 2016. Available at: https://malariaelimination8.
org/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
163. World Health Organization, 2012. Global Plan for Insecticide
ResistanceManagement inMalaria Vectors. Available at: http://
apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44846/1/9789241564472_
eng.pdf?ua=1. Accessed January 22, 2018.
164. TheWorldwide Insecticide Resistance Network (WIN). Available
at: https://win-network.ird.fr/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
165. Worldwide Antimalarial Resistance Network (WWARN). Avail-
able at: http://www.wwarn.org/. Accessed January 22, 2018.
166. IR Mapper. Available at: http://www.irmapper.com/. Accessed
January 22, 2018.
167. National Academies of Science - National Research Council,
1966. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Principles of
Research-Engineering Interaction. Available at: http://www.dtic.
mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/636529.pdf. Accessed March 30, 2018.
168. World Health Organization, 2017. WHO Malaria Terminology.
Available at: http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/208815/
1/WHO_HTM_GMP_2016.6_eng.pdf. Accessed January 22,
2018.
PATHWAY TO DEPLOYMENT OF GENE DRIVE MOSQUITOES 49
